Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of individual actions are hard to predict. We show that in a large class of games good strategies can be constructed by conditioning one's behavior solely on outcomes (i.e.

We consider the problem of zero-shot coordination - constructing AI agents that can coordinate with novel partners they have not seen before (e.g. humans). Standard Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) methods typically focus on the self-play (SP) setting where agents construct strategies by playing the game with themselves repeatedly. Unfortunately, applying SP naively to the zero-shot coordination problem can produce agents that establish highly specialized conventions that do not carry over to novel partners they have not been trained with. We introduce a novel learning algorithm called other-play (OP), that enhances self-play by looking for more robust strategies, exploiting the presence of known symmetries in the underlying problem. We characterize OP theoretically as well as experimentally. We study the cooperative card game Hanabi and show that OP agents achieve higher scores when paired with independently trained agents. In preliminary results we also show that our OP agents obtains higher average scores when paired with human players, compared to state-of-the-art SP agents.

A long-standing problem in model free reinforcement learning (RL) is that it requires a large number of trials to learn a good policy, especially in environments with sparse rewards. We explore a method to increase the sample efficiency of RL when we have access to demonstrations. Our approach, which we call Backplay, uses a single demonstration to construct a curriculum for a given task. Rather than starting each training episode in the environment's fixed initial state, we start the agent near the end of the demonstration and move the starting point backwards during the course of training until we reach the initial state. We perform experiments in a competitive four player game (Pommerman) and a path-finding maze game. We find that this weak form of guidance provides significant gains in sample complexity with a stark advantage in sparse reward environments. In some cases, standard RL did not yield any improvement while Backplay reached success rates greater than 50% and generalized to unseen initial conditions in the same amount of training time. Additionally, we see that agents trained via Backplay can learn policies superior to those of the original demonstration.

Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of individual actions are hard to predict. We show that in a large class of games good strategies can be constructed by conditioning one's behavior solely on outcomes (ie. one's past rewards). We call this consequentialist conditional cooperation. We show how to construct such strategies using deep reinforcement learning techniques and demonstrate, both analytically and experimentally, that they are effective in social dilemmas beyond simple matrix games. We also show the limitations of relying purely on consequences and discuss the need for understanding both the consequences of and the intentions behind an action.