perturbation
Lower bounds on the robustness to adversarial perturbations
The input-output mappings learned by state-of-the-art neural networks are significantly discontinuous. It is possible to cause a neural network used for image recognition to misclassify its input by applying very specific, hardly perceptible perturbations to the input, called adversarial perturbations. Many hypotheses have been proposed to explain the existence of these peculiar samples as well as several methods to mitigate them. A proven explanation remains elusive, however. In this work, we take steps towards a formal characterization of adversarial perturbations by deriving lower bounds on the magnitudes of perturbations necessary to change the classification of neural networks. The bounds are experimentally verified on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets.
Adversarially Robust Generalization Requires More Data
Machine learning models are often susceptible to adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Even small perturbations can cause state-of-the-art classifiers with high standard accuracy to produce an incorrect prediction with high confidence. To better understand this phenomenon, we study adversarially robust learning from the viewpoint of generalization. We show that already in a simple natural data model, the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly larger than that of standard learning. This gap is information theoretic and holds irrespective of the training algorithm or the model family. We complement our theoretical results with experiments on popular image classification datasets and show that a similar gap exists here as well. We postulate that the difficulty of training robust classifiers stems, at least partially, from this inherently larger sample complexity.
Lipschitz-Margin Training: Scalable Certification of Perturbation Invariance for Deep Neural Networks
To take a steady step towards robust classifiers, we aim to create neural network models provably defended from perturbations. Prior certification work requires strong assumptions on network structures and massive computational costs, and thus the range of their applications was limited. From the relationship between the Lipschitz constants and prediction margins, we present a computationally efficient calculation technique to lower-bound the size of adversarial perturbations that can deceive networks, and that is widely applicable to various complicated networks. Moreover, we propose an efficient training procedure that robustifies networks and significantly improves the provably guarded areas around data points. In experimental evaluations, our method showed its ability to provide a non-trivial guarantee and enhance robustness for even large networks.
Scaling provable adversarial defenses
Recent work has developed methods for learning deep network classifiers that are \emph{provably} robust to norm-bounded adversarial perturbation; however, these methods are currently only possible for relatively small feedforward networks. In this paper, in an effort to scale these approaches to substantially larger models, we extend previous work in three main directly. First, we present a technique for extending these training procedures to much more general networks, with skip connections (such as ResNets) and general nonlinearities; the approach is fully modular, and can be implemented automatically analogously to automatic differentiation. Second, in the specific case of $\ell_\infty$ adversarial perturbations and networks with ReLU nonlinearities, we adopt a nonlinear random projection for training, which scales \emph{linearly} in the number of hidden units (previous approached scaled quadratically). Third, we show how to further improve robust error through cascade models. On both MNIST and CIFAR data sets, we train classifiers that improve substantially on the state of the art in provable robust adversarial error bounds: from 5.8% to 3.1% on MNIST (with $\ell_\infty$ perturbations of $\epsilon=0.1$),
Adversarial Risk and Robustness: General Definitions and Implications for the Uniform Distribution
We study adversarial perturbations when the instances are uniformly distributed over {0,1}^n. We study both inherent bounds that apply to any problem and any classifier for such a problem as well as bounds that apply to specific problems and specific hypothesis classes. As the current literature contains multiple definitions of adversarial risk and robustness, we start by giving a taxonomy for these definitions based on their direct goals; we identify one of them as the one guaranteeing misclassification by pushing the instances to the error region. We then study some classic algorithms for learning monotone conjunctions and compare their adversarial risk and robustness under different definitions by attacking the hypotheses using instances drawn from the uniform distribution. We observe that sometimes these definitions lead to significantly different bounds. Thus, this study advocates for the use of the error-region definition, even though other definitions, in other contexts with context-dependent assumptions, may coincide with the error-region definition. Using the error-region definition of adversarial perturbations, we then study inherent bounds on risk and robustness of any classifier for any classification problem whose instances are uniformly distributed over {0,1}^n. Using the isoperimetric inequality for the Boolean hypercube, we show that for initial error 0.01, there always exists an adversarial perturbation that changes O( n) bits of the instances to increase the risk to 0.5, making classifier's decisions meaningless. Furthermore, by also using the central limit theorem we show that when n, at most c n bits of perturbations, for a universal constant c<1.17, suffice for increasing the risk to 0.5, and the same c n bits of perturbations on average suffice to increase the risk to 1, hence bounding the robustness by c n.
Efficient Formal Safety Analysis of Neural Networks
Neural networks are increasingly deployed in real-world safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving, aircraft collision avoidance, and malware detection. However, these networks have been shown to often mispredict on inputs with minor adversarial or even accidental perturbations. Consequences of such errors can be disastrous and even potentially fatal as shown by the recent Tesla autopilot crash. Thus, there is an urgent need for formal analysis systems that can rigorously check neural networks for violations of different safety properties such as robustness against adversarial perturbations within a certain L-norm of a given image. An effective safety analysis system for a neural network must be able to either ensure that a safety property is satisfied by the network or find a counterexample, i.e., an input for which the network will violate the property. Unfortunately, most existing techniques for performing such analysis struggle to scale beyond very small networks and the ones that can scale to larger networks suffer from high false positives and cannot produce concrete counterexamples in case of a property violation. In this paper, we present a new efficient approach for rigorously checking different safety properties of neural networks that significantly outperforms existing approaches by multiple orders of magnitude. Our approach can check different safety properties and find concrete counterexamples for networks that are 10x larger than the ones supported by existing analysis techniques. We believe that our approach to estimating tight output bounds of a network for a given input range can also help improve the explainability of neural networks and guide the training process of more robust neural networks.
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Self-Routing Capsule Networks
Taeyoung Hahn, Myeongjang Pyeon, Gunhee Kim
In this work, we propose a novel and surprisingly simple routing strategy called self-routing, where each capsule is routed independently by its subordinate routing network. Therefore, the agreement between capsules is not required anymore, but both poses and activations of upper-level capsules are obtained in a way similar to Mixture-of-Experts. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, and SmallNORB showthat the self-routing performs more robustly against white-box adversarial attacks and affine transformations, requiring less computation.
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Anti-causal domain generalization: Leveraging unlabeled data
Saengkyongam, Sorawit, Gamella, Juan L., Miller, Andrew C., Peters, Jonas, Meinshausen, Nicolai, Heinze-Deml, Christina
The problem of domain generalization concerns learning predictive models that are robust to distribution shifts when deployed in new, previously unseen environments. Existing methods typically require labeled data from multiple training environments, limiting their applicability when labeled data are scarce. In this work, we study domain generalization in an anti-causal setting, where the outcome causes the observed covariates. Under this structure, environment perturbations that affect the covariates do not propagate to the outcome, which motivates regularizing the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. Crucially, estimating these perturbation directions does not require labels, enabling us to leverage unlabeled data from multiple environments. We propose two methods that penalize the model's sensitivity to variations in the mean and covariance of the covariates across environments, respectively, and prove that these methods have worst-case optimality guarantees under certain classes of environments. Finally, we demonstrate the empirical performance of our approach on a controlled physical system and a physiological signal dataset.
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