The visual object category reports of artificial neural networks (ANNs) are notoriously sensitive to tiny, adversarial image perturbations. Because human category reports (aka human percepts) are thought to be insensitive to those same small-norm perturbations -- and locally stable in general -- this argues that ANNs are incomplete scientific models of human visual perception. Consistent with this, we show that when small-norm image perturbations are generated by standard ANN models, human object category percepts are indeed highly stable. However, in this very same human-presumed-stable regime, we find that robustified ANNs reliably discover low-norm image perturbations that strongly disrupt human percepts. These previously undetectable human perceptual disruptions are massive in amplitude, approaching the same level of sensitivity seen in robustified ANNs. Further, we show that robustified ANNs support precise perceptual state interventions: they guide the construction of low-norm image perturbations that strongly alter human category percepts toward specific prescribed percepts. In sum, these contemporary models of biological visual processing are now accurate enough to guide strong and precise interventions on human perception.

Humans and other animals are frequently near-optimal in their ability to integrate noisy and ambiguous sensory data to form robust percepts---which are informed both by sensory evidence and by prior expectations about the structure of the environment. It is suggested that the brain does so using the statistical structure provided by an internal model of how latent, causal factors produce the observed patterns. In dynamic environments, such integration often takes the form of \emph{postdiction}, wherein later sensory evidence affects inferences about earlier percepts. As the brain must operate in current time, without the luxury of acausal propagation of information, how does such postdictive inference come about? Here, we propose a general framework for neural probabilistic inference in dynamic models based on the distributed distributional code (DDC) representation of uncertainty, naturally extending the underlying encoding to incorporate implicit probabilistic beliefs about both present and past. We show that, as in other uses of the DDC, an inferential model can be learnt efficiently using samples from an internal model of the world. Applied to stimuli used in the context of psychophysics experiments, the framework provides an online and plausible mechanism for inference, including postdictive effects.

Recently, there has been immense development in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) and computational neuroscienc e. Numerous architecture s and models have been implemented in artificial systems to challenge human intelligence, especially with the release of increasingly proficient large language model s (LLMs) . However, despite advancement s in LLMs, artificial systems still fall short in matching the human capacity for generalisation across diverse tasks and environments, thus being an overstatement to label the current generation s of LLMs as artificial general intelligence (AGI) . We propose that in order to create artificial systems with high generalisation capabilities, one must first examine and understand the fundamentals of human cognition through conceptual model s of the brain. This paper introduce s a theoretical model of cognition that integrates biological plausibility and functionality, encapsulating the fundamental elements of cognition and accounting for many psychological and behavioural regularities. The model consists of four main modules: the v isual processing module, the semantic module, the predictive module, and the executive module . The modules are discussed in chronological order, with each being affiliated with corresponding anatomical regions of the brain . Thereafter, the model is substantiated with real - world examples and that reflect its general problem - solving capabilities .

Precisely defining consciousness and identifying the mechanisms that effect it is a long-standing question, particularly relevant with advances in artificial intelligence. The scientific community is divided between physicalism and natural dualism. Physicalism posits consciousness is a physical process that can be modeled computationally; natural dualism rejects this hypothesis. Finding a computational model has proven elusive, particularly because of conflation of consciousness with other cognitive capabilities exhibited by humans, such as intelligence and physiological sensations. Here we show such a computational model that precisely models consciousness, natural or artificial, identifying the structural and functional mechanisms that effect it, confirming the physicalism hypothesis. We found such a model is obtainable when including the underlying (biological or digital) substrate and accounting for reactive behavior in substrate sub-systems (e.g., autonomous physiological responses). Results show that, unlike all other computational processes, consciousness is not independent of its substrate and possessing it is an evolutionary advantage for intelligent entities. Our result shows there is no impediment to the realization of fully artificial consciousness but, surprisingly, that it is also possible to realize artificial intelligence of arbitrary level without consciousness whatsoever, and that there is no advantage in imbuing artificial systems with consciousness.

However, patient outcomes with current technologies are limited.

This chapter gives an introduction to agent-oriented programming in JavaScript. It provides an example-based walk-through of how to implement abstractions for reasoning loop agents in vanilla JavaScript. The initial example is used as a stepping stone for explaining how to implement slightly more advanced agents and multi-agent systems using JS-son, a JavaScript library for agent-oriented programming. In this context, the chapter also explains how to integrate reasoning loop agents with generative AI technologies--specifically, large language models. Finally, application scenarios in several technology ecosystems and future research directions are sketched.

We examine the implications of quantum foundations for AGI, focusing on how seminal results such as Bell's theorems (non-locality), the Kochen-Specker theorem (contextuality) and no-cloning theorem problematise practical implementation of AGI in quantum settings. We introduce a novel information-theoretic taxonomy distinguishing between classical AGI and quantum AGI and show how quantum mechanics affects fundamental features of agency. We show how quantum ontology may change AGI capabilities, both via affording computational advantages and via imposing novel constraints.

The visual object category reports of artificial neural networks (ANNs) are notoriously sensitive to tiny, adversarial image perturbations. Because human category reports (aka human percepts) are thought to be insensitive to those same small-norm perturbations -- and locally stable in general -- this argues that ANNs are incomplete scientific models of human visual perception. Consistent with this, we show that when small-norm image perturbations are generated by standard ANN models, human object category percepts are indeed highly stable. However, in this very same "human-presumed-stable" regime, we find that robustified ANNs reliably discover low-norm image perturbations that strongly disrupt human percepts. These previously undetectable human perceptual disruptions are massive in amplitude, approaching the same level of sensitivity seen in robustified ANNs.

The original AIXI reinforcement learning agent, intended as a near ly parameter-free formal gold standard for artificial general intelligence (AGI), is a Cartesian dualist that believes it is interacting with an environment from the outside, in the sense that its policy is fixed and not overwritten by anything that happens in the environment, though its actions can certainly adapt based on the percepts it receives. This is frequently compared to a person playin g a video game, who certainly does not believe he is being simulated by the game b ut rather interacts with it only by observing the screen and pressing b uttons. In contrast, it would presumably be important for an AGI to be aware t hat it exists within its environment (the universe) and its computations ar e therefore subject to the laws of physics. With this in mind, we investigate versio ns of the AIXI agent [Hut00] that treat the action sequence a on a similar footing to the percept sequence e, meaning that the actions are considered as explainable by the same rules generating the percepts. The most obvious idea is to use the universal distribution to model the joint (action/percept) dis tribution (even though actions are selected by the agent). Although this is the mos t direct way to transform AIXI into an embedded agent, it does not appear to h ave been analyzed in detail; in particular, it is usually assumed (but not proven) to fail (often implicitly, without distinguishing the universal sequence and environment distributions, e.g.