Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain level of knowledge about worker models (expertise levels, costs for exerting efforts, etc.). In this paper, we propose a novel inference aided reinforcement mechanism that acquires data sequentially and requires no such prior assumptions. Specifically, we first design a Gibbs sampling augmented Bayesian inference algorithm to estimate workers' labeling strategies from the collected labels at each step. Then we propose a reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) method, building on top of the above estimates, to uncover how workers respond to different payments. RIL dynamically determines the payment without accessing any ground-truth labels. We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels both at each step and in the long run. Empirical results show that our mechanism performs consistently well under both rational and non-fully rational (adaptive learning) worker models. Besides, the payments offered by RIL are more robust and have lower variances compared to existing one-shot mechanisms.

We study the design of optimal Bayesian data acquisition mechanisms for a platform interested in estimating the mean of a distribution by collecting data from privacy-conscious users. In our setting, users have heterogeneous sensitivities for two types of privacy losses corresponding to local and central differential privacy measures. The local privacy loss is due to the leakage of a user's information when she shares her data with the platform, and the central privacy loss is due to the released estimate by the platform to the public. The users share their data in exchange for a payment (e.g., through monetary transfers or services) that compensates for their privacy losses. The platform does not know the privacy sensitivity of users and must design a mechanism to solicit their preferences and then deliver both local and central privacy guarantees while minimizing the estimation error plus the expected payment to users. We first establish minimax lower bounds for the estimation error, given a vector of privacy guarantees, and show that a linear estimator is (near) optimal. We then turn to our main goal: designing an optimal data acquisition mechanism. We establish that the design of such mechanisms in a Bayesian setting (where the platform knows the distribution of users' sensitivities and not their realizations) can be cast as a nonconvex optimization problem. Additionally, for the class of linear estimators, we prove that finding the optimal mechanism admits a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme.

It used to be just a sci-fi nightmare scenario, but today, AI phishing is real, and it's costing companies millions. We've already touched upon this one, but the Hong Kong phishing scam that targeted an employee at Arup deserves a deeper dive. The employee was tricked by deepfake versions of her CFO and colleagues into transferring HK 200 million across 15 transactions. The case has been widely reported and confirmed by the Hong Kong police. Every face and voice was AI-generated.

Capable of creating "nearly perfect" face swaps during live video chats, Hoatian has made millions, mainly via Telegram. But its main channel vanished after WIRED's inquiry into scammers using the app. The Chinese-language artificial intelligence app Haotian is so effective that it's made millions of dollars selling its face-swapping technology on Telegram . The service integrates easily with messaging platforms like WhatsApp and WeChat and claims that users can tweak up to 50 settings--including the ability to adjust things like cheekbone size and eye position--to help mimic the face they are impersonating. But while Haotian is a robust and versatile platform, researchers and WIRED's own analysis have found that the service has been marketing to so-called "pig butchering" scammers and those running online fraud operations in Southeast Asia.

Online platforms connect users with relevant products and services using ads. A key challenge is that a user's search query often leaves their true intent ambiguous. Typically, platforms passively predict relevance based on available signals and in some cases offer query refinements. The shift from traditional search to conversational AI provides a new approach. When a user's query is ambiguous, a Large Language Model (LLM) can proactively offer several clarifying follow-up prompts. In this paper we consider the following: what if some of these follow-up prompts can be ``sponsored,'' i.e., selected for their advertising potential. How should these ``suggestion slots'' be allocated? And, how does this new mechanism interact with the traditional ad auction that might follow? This paper introduces a formal model for designing and analyzing these interactive platforms. We use this model to investigate a critical engineering choice: whether it is better to build an end-to-end pipeline that jointly optimizes the user interaction and the final ad auction, or to decouple them into separate mechanisms for the suggestion slots and another for the subsequent ad slot. We show that the VCG mechanism can be adopted to jointly optimize the sponsored suggestion and the ads that follow; while this mechanism is more complex, it achieves outcomes that are efficient and truthful. On the other hand, we prove that the simple-to-implement modular approach suffers from strategic inefficiency: its Price of Anarchy is unbounded.

Many online platforms act as intermediaries between a seller and a set of buyers.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly capable of initiating financial transactions on behalf of users or other agents. This evolution introduces a fundamental challenge: verifying both the authenticity of an autonomous agent and the true intent behind its transactions in a decentralized, trustless environment. Traditional payment systems assume human authorization, but autonomous, agent-led payments remove that safeguard. This paper presents a blockchain-based framework that cryptographically authenticates and verifies the intent of every AI-initiated transaction. The proposed system leverages decentralized identity (DID) standards and verifiable credentials to establish agent identities, on-chain intent proofs to record user authorization, and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to preserve privacy while ensuring policy compliance. Additionally, secure execution environments (TEE-based attestations) guarantee the integrity of agent reasoning and execution. The hybrid on-chain/off-chain architecture provides an immutable audit trail linking user intent to payment outcome. Through qualitative analysis, the framework demonstrates strong resistance to impersonation, unauthorized transactions, and misalignment of intent. This work lays the foundation for secure, auditable, and intent-aware autonomous economic agents, enabling a future of verifiable trust and accountability in AI-driven financial ecosystems.

Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain level of knowledge about worker models (expertise levels, costs for exerting efforts, etc.). In this paper, we propose a novel inference aided reinforcement mechanism that acquires data sequentially and requires no such prior assumptions. Specifically, we first design a Gibbs sampling augmented Bayesian inference algorithm to estimate workers' labeling strategies from the collected labels at each step. Then we propose a reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) method, building on top of the above estimates, to uncover how workers respond to different payments. RIL dynamically determines the payment without accessing any ground-truth labels. We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels both at each step and in the long run. Empirical results show that our mechanism performs consistently well under both rational and non-fully rational (adaptive learning) worker models. Besides, the payments offered by RIL are more robust and have lower variances compared to existing one-shot mechanisms.

We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize rational workers to provide high-quality labels.