Large Language Models' (LLMs) programming capabilities enable their participation in open-source games: a game-theoretic setting in which players submit computer programs in lieu of actions. These programs offer numerous advantages, including interpretability, inter-agent transparency, and formal verifiability; additionally, they enable program equilibria, solutions that leverage the transparency of code and are inaccessible within normal-form settings. We evaluate the capabilities of leading open-and closed-weight LLMs to predict and classify program strategies and evaluate features of the approximate program equilibria reached by LLM agents in dyadic and evolutionary settings. We identify the emergence of payoffmaximizing, cooperative, and deceptive strategies, characterize the adaptation of mechanisms within these programs over repeated open-source games, and analyze their comparative evolutionary fitness. We find that open-source games serve as a viable environment to study and steer the emergence of cooperative strategy in multi-agent dilemmas.

Competitive coevolutionary algorithms (CoEAs) have a natural application to problems that are adversarial or feature strategic interaction. However, there is currently limited theoretical insight into how to avoid pathological behaviour associated with CoEAs. In this paper we use impartial combinatorial games as a challenging domain for CoEAs and provide a corresponding runtime analysis. By analysing how individuals capitalise on the mistakes of their opponents, we prove that the Univariate Marginal Distribution Algorithm finds (with high probability) an optimal strategy for a game called Reciprocal LeadingOnes within O(n2 log3 n)game evaluations, a significant improvement over the best known bound of O(n5 log2 n). Critical to the analysis is the introduction of a novel stabilising operator, the impact of which we study both theoretically and empirically.

Robot sports, characterized by well-defined objectives, explicit rules, and dynamic interactions, present ideal scenarios for demonstrating embodied intelligence. In this paper, we present VolleyBots, a novel robot sports testbed where multiple drones cooperate and compete in the sport of volleyball under physical dynamics.

Planning under opponent uncertainty is a fundamental challenge in multi-agent environments, where an agent must act while inferring the hidden policies of its opponents. Existing type-based methods rely on manually defined behavior classes and struggle to scale, while model-free approaches are sample-inefficient and lack a principled way to incorporate uncertainty into planning. We propose Quantized Opponent Models (QOM), which learn a compact catalog of opponent types via a quantized autoencoder and maintain a Bayesian belief over these types online. This posterior supports both a belief-weighted meta-policy and a Monte-Carlo planning algorithm that directly integrates uncertainty, enabling real-time belief updates and focused exploration. Experiments show that QOM achieves superior performance with lower search cost, offering a tractable and effective solution for belief-aware planning.

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.

We study Online Lazy Gradient Descent for optimisation on a strongly convex domain. The algorithm is known to achieve O( N) regret against adversarial opponents; here we show it is universal in the sense that it also achieves O(log N) expected regret against i.i.d opponents. This improves upon the more complex metaalgorithm of Huang et al [20] that only gets O( Nlog N) and O(log N) bounds. In addition we show that, unlike for the simplex, order bounds for pseudo-regret and expected regret are equivalent for strongly convex domains.

Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD).