As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is

Otherwise, we only need to seek the strongest one.

Training agents in multi-agent games presents significant challenges due to their intricate nature. These challenges are exacerbated by dynamics influenced not only by the environment but also by strategies of opponents. Existing methods often struggle with slow convergence and instability.To address these challenges, we harness the potential of imitation learning (IL) to comprehend and anticipate actions of the opponents, aiming to mitigate uncertainties with respect to the game dynamics.Our key contributions include:(i) a new multi-agent IL model for predicting next moves of the opponents - our model works with hidden actions of opponents and local observations;(ii) a new multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that combines our IL model and policy training into one single training process;and (iii) extensive experiments in three challenging game environments, including an advanced version of the Star-Craft multi-agent challenge (i.e., SMACv2).Experimental results show that our approach achieves superior performance compared to state-of-the-art MARL algorithms.

We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of generalized equilibrium which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and pair of regret constraints, where we show that any such equilibrium is reachable by a pair of algorithms which maintain their regret guarantees against arbitrary opponents. As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is unconstrained. We show that this captures an extension of Stackelberg equilibria with a matching optimal value, and that there exists a wide class of games where a player can significantly increase their utility by deviating from a no-swap-regret algorithm against a no-swap learner (in fact, almost any game without pure Nash equilibria is of this form). Additionally, we make use of generalized equilibria to consider tradeoffs in terms of the opponent's algorithm choice. We give a tight characterization for the maximal reward obtainable against some no-regret learner, yet we also show a class of games in which this is bounded away from the value obtainable against the class of common mean-based no-regret algorithms. Finally, we consider the question of learning reward-optimal strategies via repeated play with a no-regret agent when the game is initially unknown. Again we show tradeoffs depending on the opponent's learning algorithm: the Stackelberg strategy is learnable in exponential time with any no-regret agent (and in polynomial time with any no-adaptive-regret agent) for any game where it is learnable via queries, and there are games where it is learnable in polynomial time against any no-swap-regret agent but requires exponential time against a mean-based no-regret agent.

When an agent is in a multi-agent environment, it may face previously unseen opponents, and it is a challenge to cooperate with other agents to accomplish the task together or to maximize its own rewards. Most opponent modeling methods deal with the non-stationarity caused by unknown opponent policies via predicting the opponent's actions. However, focusing on the opponent's action is shortsighted, which also constrains the adaptability to unknown opponents in complex tasks. In this paper, we propose opponent modeling based on subgoal inference, which infers the opponent's subgoals through historical trajectories. As subgoals are likely to be shared by different opponent policies, predicting subgoals can yield better generalization to unknown opponents.