Large language models have recently shown a remarkable ability for few-shot learning, including patterns of algorithmic nature. However, it is still an open question to determine what kind of patterns these models can capture and how many examples they need in their prompts. We frame this question as a teaching problem with strong priors, and study whether language models can identify simple algorithmic concepts from small witness sets. In particular, we explore how several GPT architectures, program induction systems and humans perform in terms of the complexity of the concept and the number of additional examples, and how much their behaviour differs. This first joint analysis of language models and machine teaching can address key questions for artificial intelligence and machine learning, such as whether some strong priors, and Occam's razor in particular, can be distilled from data, making learning from a few examples possible.

The marginal likelihood, also known as the evidence, is regarded as a mathematical embodiment of Occam's razor, enabling model selection that avoids overfitting. The evidence lower bound (ELBO) objective from variational inference has also been used for similar purposes. Prior work has shown that restricting the approximate posterior family via a mean-field approximation can lead the ELBO to underfit. In this paper, we show how ELBO-based hyperparameter learning in a simple over-parameterized regression model can also produce overfitting, depending on the assumed rank of the covariance matrix in a Gaussian approximate posterior. Surprisingly, among only the underfit and overfit options, Bayesian model selection via the evidence itself sometimes prefers the overfit version, while the ELBO does not. Bayesian practitioners hoping to scale to large models should be cautious about how reduced-rank assumptions needed for tractability may impact the potential for model selection.

Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward function of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot be resolved by observing the agent's policy in enough environments. This paper shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decompose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even with a reasonable simplicity prior/Occam's razor on the set of decompositions, we cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high regret. To address this, we need simple `normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively from observations.

Toaddressthis, we need simple'normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively fromobservations.

Neural network sparsification is a promising avenue to save computational time and memory costs, especially in an age where many successful AI models are becoming too large to naively deploy on consumer hardware. While much work has focused on different weight pruning criteria, the overall sparsifiability of the network, i.e., its capacity to be pruned without quality loss, has often been overlooked. We present Sparsifiability via the Marginal likelihood (SpaM), a sparsification framework that highlights the effectiveness of using the Bayesian marginal likelihood in conjunction with sparsity-inducing priors for making neural networks more sparsifiable. Our approach implements an automatic Occam's razor that selects the most sparsifiable model that still explains the data well, both for structured and unstructured sparsification. In addition, we demonstrate that the pre-computed posterior precision from the Laplace approximation can be re-used to define a cheap pruning criterion, which outperforms many existing (more expensive) approaches. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, especially at high sparsity levels, across a range of different neural network architectures and datasets.

State-of-the-art deep neural networks are still struggling to address the catastrophic forgetting problem in continual learning. In this paper, we propose one simple paradigm (named as S-Prompting) and two concrete approaches to highly reduce the forgetting degree in one of the most typical continual learning scenarios, i.e., domain increment learning (DIL). The key idea of the paradigm is to learn prompts independently across domains with pre-trained transformers, avoiding the use of exemplars that commonly appear in conventional methods. This results in a win-win game where the prompting can achieve the best for each domain.

Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward function of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot be resolved by observing the agent's policy in enough environments. This paper shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decompose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even with a reasonable simplicity prior/Occam's razor on the set of decompositions, we cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high regret. To address this, we need simple `normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively from observations.

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