A perfect clone in an ordinal election (i.e., an election where the voters rank the candidates in a strict linear order) is a set of candidates that each voter ranks consecutively. We consider different relaxations of this notion: independent or subelection clones are sets of candidates that only some of the voters recognize as a perfect clone, whereas approximate clones are sets of candidates such that every voter ranks their members close to each other, but not necessarily consecutively. We establish the complexity of identifying such imperfect clones, and of partitioning the candidates into families of imperfect clones. We also study the parameterized complexity of these problems with respect to a set of natural parameters such as the number of voters, the size or the number of imperfect clones we are searching for, or their level of imperfection.

We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and Kunreuther about a decade ago, generalized IDS games model agents' voluntary investment decisions when facing potential direct risk and transfer-risk exposure from other agents. A distinct feature of generalized IDS games, however, is that full investment can reduce transfer risk. As a result, depending on the transfer-risk reduction level, generalized IDS games may exhibit strategic complementarity (SC) or strategic substitutability (SS). We consider three variants of generalized IDS games in which players exhibit only SC, only SS, and both SC+SS.

This paper addresses the problem of finding EFX orientations of graphs of chores, in which each vertex corresponds to an agent, each edge corresponds to a chore, and a chore has zero marginal utility to an agent if its corresponding edge is not incident to the vertex corresponding to the agent. Recently, Zhou~et~al.~(IJCAI,~2024) analyzed the complexity of deciding whether graphs containing a mixture of goods and chores admit EFX orientations, and conjectured that deciding whether graphs containing only chores admit EFX orientations is NP-complete. In this paper, we resolve this conjecture by exhibiting a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an EFX orientation of a graph containing only chores if one exists, even if the graph contains self-loops. Remarkably, our first result demonstrates a surprising separation between the case of goods and the case of chores, because deciding whether graphs containing only goods admit EFX orientations of goods was shown to be NP-complete by Christodoulou et al.~(EC,~2023). In addition, we show the analogous decision problem for multigraphs to be NP-complete.

Approval-based committee (ABC) voting represents a well-studied multiwinner election setting, where a subset of candidates of a predetermined size, a so-called committee, needs to be chosen based on the approval preferences of a set of voters [23]. Traditionally, ABC voting is studied in the context where we know, for each voter and each candidate, whether the voter approves the candidate or not. In this paper, we investigate the situation where the approval information is incomplete. Specifically, we assume that each voter is associated with a set of approved candidates, a set of disapproved candidates, and a set of candidates where the voter's stand is unknown, hereafter referred to as the unknown candidates. Moreover, we may have (partial) ordinal information on voters' preferences among the unknown candidates, restricting the "valid" completions of voters' approval sets. When the number of candidates is large, unknown candidates are likely to exist because voters are not aware of or not familiar with, and therefore cannot evaluate, all candidates. In particular, this holds in scenarios where candidates join the election over time, and voter preferences over new candidates have not been elicited [16].

We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and Kunreuther about a decade ago, generalized IDS games model agents' voluntary investment decisions when facing potential direct risk and transfer-risk exposure from other agents. A distinct feature of generalized IDS games, however, is that full investment can reduce transfer risk. As a result, depending on the transfer-risk reduction level, generalized IDS games may exhibit strategic complementarity (SC) or strategic substitutability (SS). We consider three variants of generalized IDS games in which players exhibit only SC, only SS, and both SC+SS.

In this article, we show that the completion problem, i.e. the decision problem whether a partial structure can be completed to a full structure, is NP-complete for many combinatorial structures. While the gadgets for most reductions in literature are found by hand, we present an algorithm to construct gadgets in a fully automated way. Using our framework which is based on SAT, we present the first thorough study of the completion problem on sign mappings with forbidden substructures by classifying thousands of structures for which the completion problem is NP-complete. Our list in particular includes interior triple systems, which were introduced by Knuth towards an axiomatization of planar point configurations. Last but not least, we give an infinite family of structures generalizing interior triple system to higher dimensions for which the completion problem is NP-complete.

It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery. These problems model scenarios such as voters casting strategic votes and agents campaigning for voters to change their votes to make a desired candidate win. A common assumption is that the preferences of the voters follow the structure of a domain restriction such as single peakedness, and so manipulators only consider votes that also satisfy this restriction. We introduce the model where the preferences of the voters define their own restriction and strategic actions must ``conform'' by using only these votes. In this model, the election after manipulation will retain common domain restrictions. We explore the computational complexity of conformant manipulative actions and we discuss how conformant manipulative actions relate to other manipulative actions.

The Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) is an important model metric for evaluating binary classifiers, and many algorithms have been proposed to optimize AUC approximately. It raises the question of whether the generally insignificant gains observed by previous studies are due to inherent limitations of the metric or the inadequate quality of optimization. To better understand the value of optimizing for AUC, we present an efficient algorithm, namely AUC-opt, to find the provably optimal AUC linear classifier in $\mathbb{R}^2$, which runs in $\mathcal{O}(n_+ n_- \log (n_+ n_-))$ where $n_+$ and $n_-$ are the number of positive and negative samples respectively. Furthermore, it can be naturally extended to $\mathbb{R}^d$ in $\mathcal{O}((n_+n_-)^{d-1}\log (n_+n_-))$ by calling AUC-opt in lower-dimensional spaces recursively. We prove the problem is NP-complete when $d$ is not fixed, reducing from the \textit{open hemisphere problem}. Experiments show that compared with other methods, AUC-opt achieves statistically significant improvements on between 17 to 40 in $\mathbb{R}^2$ and between 4 to 42 in $\mathbb{R}^3$ of 50 t-SNE training datasets. However, generally the gain proves insignificant on most testing datasets compared to the best standard classifiers. Similar observations are found for nonlinear AUC methods under real-world datasets.

Determining the complexity of election attack problems is a major research direction in the computational study of voting problems. The paper "Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters" by Erd\'elyi et al. (JAAMAS 2021) provides a comprehensive study of the complexity of control problems. The sole open problem is constructive control by replacing voters for 2-Approval. We show that this case is in P, strengthening the recent RP (randomized polynomial-time) upper bound due to Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra (IJCAI 2022). We show this by transforming 2-Approval CCRV to weighted matching. We also use this approach to show that priced bribery for 2-Veto elections is in P. With this result, and the accompanying (unsurprising) result that priced bribery for 3-Veto elections is NP-complete, this settles the complexity for $k$-Approval and $k$-Veto standard control and bribery cases.

We consider a 2-layer, 3-node, n-input neural network whose nodes compute linear threshold functions of their inputs. We show that it is NP-complete to decide whether there exist weights and thresholds for the three nodes of this network so that it will produce output con(cid:173) sistent with a given set of training examples. We extend the result to other simple networks. This result suggests that those looking for perfect training algorithms cannot escape inherent computational difficulties just by considering only simple or very regular networks. It also suggests the importance, given a training problem, of finding an appropriate network and input encoding for that problem.