Carmosino et al. (2016) demonstrated that natural proofs of circuit lower bounds for $\Lambda$ imply efficient algorithms for learning $\Lambda$-circuits, but only over \textit{the uniform distribution}, with \textit{membership queries}, and provided $\AC^0[p] \subseteq \Lambda$. We consider whether this implication can be generalized to $\Lambda \not\supseteq \AC^0[p]$, and to learning algorithms which use only random examples and learn over arbitrary example distributions (Valiant's PAC-learning model). We first observe that, if, for any circuit class $\Lambda$, there is an implication from natural proofs for $\Lambda$ to PAC-learning for $\Lambda$, then standard assumptions from lattice-based cryptography do not hold. In particular, we observe that depth-2 majority circuits are a (conditional) counter example to the implication, since Nisan (1993) gave a natural proof, but Klivans and Sherstov (2009) showed hardness of PAC-learning under lattice-based assumptions. We thus ask: what learning algorithms can we reasonably expect to follow from Nisan's natural proofs? Our main result is that all natural proofs arising from a type of communication complexity argument, including Nisan's, imply PAC-learning algorithms in a new \textit{distributional} variant (i.e., an ``average-case'' relaxation) of Valiant's PAC model. Our distributional PAC model is stronger than the average-case prediction model of Blum et al. (1993) and the heuristic PAC model of Nanashima (2021), and has several important properties which make it of independent interest, such as being \textit{boosting-friendly}. The main applications of our result are new distributional PAC-learning algorithms for depth-2 majority circuits, polytopes and DNFs over natural target distributions, as well as the nonexistence of encoded-input weak PRFs that can be evaluated by depth-2 majority circuits.

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions involving only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets of items, i.e., for more than one unit per distinct good. Our objective is to determine allocations of multisets that maximize the Social Welfare. Our main results are for multi-minded and submodular bidders. In the first setting each bidder has a positive value for being allocated one multiset from a prespecified demand set of alternatives. In the second setting each bidder is associated to a submodular valuation function that defines his value for the multiset he is allocated. For multi-minded bidders, we design a truthful FPTAS that fully optimizes the Social Welfare, while violating the supply constraints on goods within factor (1+e), for any fixed e>0 (i.e., the approximation applies to the constraints and not to the Social Welfare). This result is best possible, in that full optimization is impossible without violating the supply constraints. For submodular bidders, we obtain a PTAS that approximates the optimum Social Welfare within factor (1+e), for any fixed e>0, without violating the supply constraints. This result is best possible as well. Our allocation algorithms are Maximal-in-Range and yield truthful mechanisms, when paired with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments.

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions involving a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets of items, i.e., for more than one unit per distinct good, that are expressed through their private valuation functions. Our objective is to determine allocations of multisets that maximize the Social Welfare approximately. Despite the recent theoretical advances on the design of truthful combinatorial auctions (for multiple distinct goods in unit supply) and multi-unit auctions (for multiple units of a single good), results for the combined setting are much scarcer. We elaborate on the main developments of [Krysta et al., AAMAS 2013], concerning bidders with multi-minded and submodular valuation functions, with an emphasis on the presentation of the relevant algorithmic techniques.

We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then uses VCG payments over this sub-range. We show that obtaining a fully polynomial-time incentive-compatible approximation scheme, at least using VCG payments, is NP-hard. For the case of valuations given by black boxes, we give a polynomial-time incentive-compatible 2-approximation mechanism and show that no better is possible, at least using VCG payments.