Lemma A.2. Algorithm ϕ gives a lower bound on the query γ . That is, ϕ (x, R) γ (x, R).

We first define the restricted Cheeger constant in the link prediction task. Then, according to Proposition 2.1, we have: Then, we can draw the same conclusion with Eq.12, and the Thus, Eq.16 can be simplified to: "sites" Based on the Eq.15 and Eq.17, we can rewrite L The inequality holds due to the assumption. Knowledge discovery: In the 5 random experiments, we add 500 pseudo links in each iteration. The metadata information of the nodes are all strongly relevant to "Linux" Both papers focus on the "malware"/"phishing" under the topic "Computer security". The detailed result of the case study is shown in Table 6.

Proposition 2.5 is a direct consequence of the following lemma (remember that Lemma A.1 (Smooth functions conserved through a given flow.) . Assume that @h () ()=0 for all 2 . Let us first show the direct inclusion. Now let us show the converse inclusion. We recall (cf Example 2.10 and Example 2.11) that linear and Assumption 2.9, which we recall reads as: Theorem 2.14, let us show that (9) holds for standard ML losses.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study adversarial alignment, and ask to what extent these models remain aligned when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force.

The objective is to predict potential energy and forces.