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 natural policy gradient algorithm


Why Policy Gradient Algorithms Work for Undiscounted Total-Reward MDPs

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The classical policy gradient method is the theoretical and conceptual foundation of modern policy-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. Most rigorous analyses of such methods, particularly those establishing convergence guarantees, assume a discount factor $γ< 1$. In contrast, however, a recent line of work on policy-based RL for large language models uses the undiscounted total-reward setting with $γ= 1$, rendering much of the existing theory inapplicable. In this paper, we provide analyses of the policy gradient method for undiscounted expected total-reward infinite-horizon MDPs based on two key insights: (i) the classification of the MDP states into recurrent and transient states is invariant over the set of policies that assign strictly positive probability to every action (as is typical in deep RL models employing a softmax output layer) and (ii) the classical state visitation measure (which may be ill-defined when $γ= 1$) can be replaced with a new object that we call the transient visitation measure.


Policy Gradient Methods Find the Nash Equilibrium in N-player General-sum Linear-quadratic Games

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Policy optimization algorithms have achieved substantial empirical successes in addressing a variety of non-cooperative multi-agent problems, including self-driving vehicles [17], real-time bidding games [8], and optimal execution in financial markets [6]. However, there have been few results from a theoretical perspective showing why such a class of reinforcement learning algorithms performs well with the presence of competition among agents. As a starting point to tackle this challenging problem, we investigate linear-quadratic games (LQGs) which can be seen as a generalization of the linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) from a single agent to multiple agents. In an LQG, all agents jointly control a linear state process, which may be in high dimensions, where the control (or action) from each individual agent has a linear impact on the state process. Each agent optimizes a quadratic cost function which depends on the state process, the control from this agent and/or the controls from the opponents.