Hosted by Ben Byford, The Machine Ethics Podcast brings together interviews with academics, authors, business leaders, designers and engineers on the subject of autonomous algorithms, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and technology's impact on society. This month, Ben met in-person with Jen Semler. Jen Semler is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Cornell Tech's Digital Life Initiative. Her research focuses on the intersection of ethics, technology, and moral agency. She holds a DPhil (PhD) in philosophy from the University of Oxford.

The evolution of morality presents a puzzle: natural selection should favor self-interest, yet humans developed moral systems promoting altruism. We address this question by introducing a novel Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent simulation framework modeling prehistoric hunter-gatherer societies. This platform is designed to probe diverse questions in social evolution, from survival advantages to inter-group dynamics. To investigate moral evolution, we designed agents with varying moral dispositions based on the Expanding Circle Theory \citep{singer1981expanding}. We evaluated their evolutionary success across a series of simulations and analyzed their decision-making in specially designed moral dilemmas. These experiments reveal how an agent's moral framework, in combination with its cognitive constraints, directly shapes its behavior and determines its evolutionary outcome. Crucially, the emergent patterns echo seminal theories from related domains of social science, providing external validation for the simulations. This work establishes LLM-based simulation as a powerful new paradigm to complement traditional research in evolutionary biology and anthropology, opening new avenues for investigating the complexities of moral and social evolution.

The advancement of powerful yet opaque large language models (LLMs) necessitates a fundamental revision of the philosophical criteria used to evaluate artificial moral agents (AMAs). Pre-LLM frameworks often relied on the assumption of transparent architectures, which LLMs defy due to their stochastic outputs and opaque internal states. This paper argues that traditional ethical criteria are pragmatically obsolete for LLMs due to this mismatch. Engaging with core themes in the philosophy of technology, this paper proffers a revised set of ten functional criteria to evaluate LLM-based artificial moral agents: moral concordance, context sensitivity, normative integrity, metaethical awareness, system resilience, trustworthiness, corrigibility, partial transparency, functional autonomy, and moral imagination. These guideposts, applied to what we term "SMA-LLS" (Simulating Moral Agency through Large Language Systems), aim to steer AMAs toward greater alignment and beneficial societal integration in the coming years. We illustrate these criteria using hypothetical scenarios involving an autonomous public bus (APB) to demonstrate their practical applicability in morally salient contexts.

This paper investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models (LLMs), mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonal respect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphise chatbots. Indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings' behaviour toward chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we argue that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personal respect is premised on reciprocal recognition of second-personal authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personal respect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect: the respect we are dutybound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity.

We present an ethical decision-making framework that refines a pre-trained reinforcement learning (RL) model using a task-agnostic ethical layer. Following initial training, the RL model undergoes ethical fine-tuning, where human feedback is replaced by feedback generated from a large language model (LLM). The LLM embodies consequentialist, deontological, virtue, social justice, and care ethics as moral principles to assign belief values to recommended actions during ethical decision-making. An ethical layer aggregates belief scores from multiple LLM-derived moral perspectives using Belief Jensen-Shannon Divergence and Dempster-Shafer Theory into probability scores that also serve as the shaping reward, steering the agent toward choices that align with a balanced ethical framework. This integrated learning framework helps the RL agent navigate moral uncertainty in complex environments and enables it to make morally sound decisions across diverse tasks. Our approach, tested across different LLM variants and compared with other belief aggregation techniques, demonstrates improved consistency, adaptability, and reduced reliance on handcrafted ethical rewards. This method is especially effective in dynamic scenarios where ethical challenges arise unexpectedly, making it well-suited for real-world applications.

In this essay, I argue that explicit ethical machines, whose moral principles are inferred through a bottom-up approach, are unable to replicate human-like moral reasoning and cannot be considered moral agents. By utilizing Alan Turing's theory of computation, I demonstrate that moral reasoning is computationally intractable by these machines due to the halting problem. I address the frontiers of machine ethics by formalizing moral problems into 'algorithmic moral questions' and by exploring moral psychology's dual-process model. While the nature of Turing Machines theoretically allows artificial agents to engage in recursive moral reasoning, critical limitations are introduced by the halting problem, which states that it is impossible to predict with certainty whether a computational process will halt. A thought experiment involving a military drone illustrates this issue, showing that an artificial agent might fail to decide between actions due to the halting problem, which limits the agent's ability to make decisions in all instances, undermining its moral agency.

Developing value-aligned AI agents is a complex undertaking and an ongoing challenge in the field of AI. Specifically within the domain of Large Language Models (LLMs), the capability to consolidate multiple independently trained dialogue agents, each aligned with a distinct moral value, into a unified system that can adapt to and be aligned with multiple moral values is of paramount importance. In this paper, we propose a system that does contextual moral value alignment based on contextual aggregation. Here, aggregation is defined as the process of integrating a subset of LLM responses that are best suited to respond to a user input, taking into account features extracted from the user's input. The proposed system shows better results in term of alignment to human value compared to the state of the art.

Adam Smith developed a version of moral philosophy where better decisions are made by interrogating an impartial spectator within us. We discuss the possibility of using an external non-human-based substitute tool that would augment our internal mental processes and play the role of the impartial spectator. Such tool would have more knowledge about the world, be more impartial, and would provide a more encompassing perspective on moral assessment.

Chris Dixon, who invested early in companies ranging from Warby Parker to Kickstarter, once wrote that the next big thing always starts out looking like a toy. That's certainly true of artificial intelligence, which started out playing games like chess, go and playing humans on the game show Jeopardy! Yet today, AI has become so pervasive we often don't even recognize it anymore. Besides enabling us to speak to our phones and get answers back, intelligent algorithms are often working in the background, providing things like predictive maintenance for machinery and automating basic software tasks. As the technology becomes more powerful, it's also forcing us to ask some uncomfortable questions that were once more in the realm of science fiction or late-night dorm room discussions.

This paper addresses ontology and ethics of an AI agent called digital me. We define digital me as autonomous, decision-making, and learning agent, representing an individual and having practically immortal own life. It is assumed that digital me is equipped with the big-five personality model, ensuring that it provides a model of some aspects of a strong AI: consciousness, free will, and intentionality. As computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans, digital me can judge the personality of the individual represented by the digital me, other individuals' personalities, and other digital me-s. We describe seven ontological qualities of digital me: a) double-layer status of Digital Being versus digital me, b) digital me versus real me, c) mind-digital me and body-digital me, d) digital me versus doppelganger (shadow digital me), e) non-human time concept, f) social quality, g) practical immortality. We argue that with the advancement of AI's sciences and technologies, there exist two digital me thresholds. The first threshold defines digital me having some (rudimentarily) form of consciousness, free will, and intentionality. The second threshold assumes that digital me is equipped with moral learning capabilities, implying that, in principle, digital me could develop their own ethics which significantly differs from human's understanding of ethics. Finally we discuss the implications of digital me metaethics, normative and applied ethics, the implementation of the Golden Rule in digital me-s, and we suggest two sets of normative principles for digital me: consequentialist and duty based digital me principles.