Many real-world black-box optimization problems have multiple conflicting objectives. Rather than attempting to approximate the entire set of Pareto-optimal solutions, interactive preference learning, i.e., optimization with a decision maker in the loop, allows us to focus the search on the most relevant subset. However, few previous studies have exploited the fact that utility functions are typically monotonic. In this paper, we address the Bayesian Optimization with Preference Exploration (BOPE) problem and propose using a neural network ensemble as a utility surrogate model. This approach naturally integrates monotonicity and allows learning the decision maker's preferences from pairwise comparisons. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art approaches and is robust to noise in utility evaluations. An ablation study highlights the critical role of monotonicity in enhancing performance.

If you tell a learning model that you prefer an alternative a over another alternative b, then you probably expect the model to be monotone, that is, the valuation of a increases, and that of bdecreases. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, many widely deployed comparison-based preference learning models, including large language models, fail to have this guarantee. Until now, the only comparison-based preference learning algorithms that were proved to be monotone are the Generalized BradleyTerry models [10]. Yet, these models are unable to generalize to uncompared data. In this paper, we advance the understanding of the set of models with generalization ability that are monotone. Namely, we propose a new class of Linear Generalized Bradley-Terry models with Diffusion Priors, and identify sufficient conditions on alternatives' embeddings that guarantee monotonicity. Our experiments show that this monotonicity is far from being a general guarantee, and that our new class of generalizing models improves accuracy, especially when the dataset is limited.

Motivated by applications for set containment problems, we consider the following fundamental problem: can we design set-to-vector functions so that the natural partial order on sets is preserved, namely S T if and only if F(S) F(T). We call functions satisfying this property Monotone and Separating (MAS) set functions. We establish lower and upper bounds for the vector dimension necessary to obtain MAS functions, as a function of the cardinality of the multisets and the underlying ground set. In the important case of an infinite ground set, we show that MAS functions do not exist, but provide a model called MASNET which provably enjoys a relaxed MAS property we name "weakly MAS" and is stable in the sense of Holder continuity. We also show that MAS functions can be used to construct universal models that are monotone by construction and can approximate all monotone set functions. Experimentally, we consider a variety of set containment tasks. The experiments show the benefit of using our MASNET model, in comparison with standard set models which do not incorporate set containment as an inductive bias.

We study a two-institution stable matching model in which candidates from two distinct groups are evaluated using partially correlated signals that are groupbiased. This extends prior work (which assumes institutions evaluate candidates in an identical manner) to a more realistic setting in which institutions rely on overlapping, but independently processed, criteria. These evaluations could consist of a variety of informative tools such as standardized tests, shared recommendation systems, or AI-based assessments with local noise. Two key parameters govern evaluations: the bias parameter β (0,1], which models systematic disadvantage faced by one group, and the correlation parameter γ [0,1], which captures the alignment between institutional rankings. We study the representation ratio R(β,γ), i.e., the ratio of disadvantaged to advantaged candidates selected by the matching process in this setting.

Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are compact and convex, and their payoffs are concave in their own actions, strong guarantees follow: Nash equilibria always exist and decentralized algorithms converge to equilibria. If the game is furthermore monotone, an even stronger guarantee holds: Nash equilibria are unique under strictness assumptions. Unfortunately, we show that certifying concavity or monotonicity is NP-hard, already for games where utilities are multivariate polynomials and compact, convex basic semialgebraic strategy sets--an expressive class that captures extensive-form games with imperfect recall. On the positive side, we develop two hierarchies of sum-of-squares programs that certify concavity and monotonicity of a given game, and each level of the hierarchies can be solved in polynomial time. We show that almost all concave/monotone games are certified at some finite level of the hierarchies. Subsequently, we introduce the classes of SOS-concave/monotone games, which globally approximate concave/monotone games, and show that for any given game we can compute the closest SOS-concave/monotone game in polynomial time. Finally, we apply our techniques to canonical examples of extensiveform games with imperfect recall.

However, existing algorithms either require strict monotonicity or only guarantee the convergence of averaged iterates, as in Fictitious Play in continuous time. We address this gap with the following theoretical result. First, we prove that the last-iterated policy of a proximal-point (PP) update with KL regularization converges to an equilibrium of MFG under non-strict monotonicity. Second, we see that each PP update is equivalent to finding the equilibria of a KL-regularized MFG. We then prove that this equilibrium can be found using Mirror Descent (MD) with an exponential last-iterate convergence rate. Building on these insights, we propose the Approximate Proximal-Point (APP) algorithm, which approximately implements the PP update via a small number of MD steps. Numerical experiments on standard benchmarks confirm that the APP algorithm reliably converges to the unregularized mean-field equilibrium without time-averaging.

Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In games, where players' strategy sets are compact and convex, and their payoffs are concave in their own actions, strong guarantees follow: Nash equilibria always exist and decentralized algorithms converge to equilibria. If the game is furthermore, an even stronger guarantee holds: Nash equilibria are unique under strictness assumptions. Unfortunately, we show that concavity or monotonicity is NP-hard, already for games where utilities are multivariate polynomials and compact, convex basic semialgebraic strategy sets--an expressive class that captures extensive-form games with imperfect recall. On the positive side, we develop two hierarchies of sum-of-squares programs that certify concavity and monotonicity of a given game, and each level of the hierarchies can be solved in polynomial time. We show that almost all concave/monotone games are certified at some finite level of the hierarchies. Subsequently, we introduce the classes of SOS-concave/monotone games, which globally approximate concave/monotone games, and show that for any given game we can compute the closest SOS-concave/monotone game in polynomial time. Finally, we apply our techniques to canonical examples of extensive-form games with imperfect recall.

Conformal prediction provides a principled framework for uncertainty quantification with finite-sample coverage guarantees. While recent work has extended conformal prediction to online and sequential settings, existing methods typically focus on a single coverage level and do not ensure consistency across multiple confidence levels. In many real-world applications, such as weather forecasting, macroeconomic prediction, and risk management, different users operate under heterogeneous risk tolerances and require calibrated uncertainty estimates across a range of coverage levels. In such settings, it is desirable to produce prediction sets corresponding to different coverage levels that are nested and valid simultaneously. In this paper, we propose two novel online conformal prediction methods that output \emph{nested prediction sets} across a range of coverage levels, enabling simultaneous uncertainty quantification across the entire risk spectrum. Beyond interpretability, jointly estimating multiple coverage levels is known to improve statistical efficiency in classical quantile regression by enforcing non-crossing constraints and sharing information across quantiles. Our approaches leverage an online optimization perspective with small regret that translates to quantile estimation error control while enforcing nestedness of prediction sets. Empirical results on synthetic and real-world datasets, including applications in forecasting tasks with heterogeneous risk requirements, demonstrate that our method achieves stable coverage across all levels, strictly nested prediction sets, and improved efficiency compared to existing online conformal baselines.