This has resulted in t.he building of systems with semanti(cid:173) cally nameable nodes which perform inferencing by examining t.he pat,t.erns of activation spread.

We begin this chapter with the bold claim that it provides a neuroscientific explanation of the magic of creativity. Creativity presents a formidable challenge for neuroscience. Neuroscience generally involves studying what happens in the brain when someone engages in a task that involves responding to a stimulus, or retrieving information from memory and using it the right way, or at the right time. If the relevant information is not already encoded in memory, the task generally requires that the individual make systematic use of information that is encoded in memory. But creativity is different. It paradoxically involves studying how someone pulls out of their brain something that was never put into it! Moreover, it must be something both new and useful, or appropriate to the task at hand. The ability to pull out of memory something new and appropriate that was never stored there in the first place is what we refer to as the magic of creativity. Even if we are so fortunate as to determine which areas of the brain are active and how these areas interact during creative thought, we will not have an answer to the question of how the brain comes up with solutions and artworks that are new and appropriate. On the other hand, since the representational capacity of neurons emerges at a level that is higher than that of the individual neurons themselves, the inner workings of neurons is too low a level to explain the magic of creativity. Thus we look to a level that is midway between gross brain regions and neurons. Since creativity generally involves combining concepts from different domains, or seeing old ideas from new perspectives, we focus our efforts on the neural mechanisms underlying the representation of concepts and ideas. Thus we ask questions about the brain at the level that accounts for its representational capacity, i.e. at the level of distributed aggregates of neurons.

Analogical although analogy can help, as note that although still in its infancy reasoning is thus achieved in such well as hamper, learning. The role of and somewhat simplistic in character, systems by mainly keeping the analogy in learning is discussed by connectionist research might prove abstract relational microfeatures. Ann Brown and by Rand Spiro et al., to have an edge in tackling these Rumelhart proposes another way and the role of analogy in knowledge problems. The research described in for achieving analogical reasoning, acquisition is discussed by Brian Ross this book presents a grand challenge that is, "soft clamp," in which input and by John Bransford et al.; Stella and a future prospect for AI clamps can be overridden, and the Vosniadou studies the developmental researchers (traditional or connectionistic) rule of thumb is that the more concrete change in the use of analogy. Because in their endeavor to find a a feature is, the easier it can be part 3 of the book is of marginal better and more cognitively plausible overridden. The system finds the interest to AI, I do not discuss it any representation scheme.

Thishas resulted in t.he building of systems with semantically nameable nodes which perform inferencing by examining t.he pat,t.erns of activation spread.

One att·empt at explaining human inferencing is that of spreading activat,ion, particularly in the st.ructured connectionist paradigm. This has resulted in t.he building of systems with semantically nameable nodes which perform inferencing by examining t.he pat,t.erns of activation spread.

One att·empt at explaining human inferencing is that of spreading activat,ion, particularly in the st.ructured connectionist paradigm. This has resulted in t.he building of systems with semantically nameable nodes which perform inferencing by examining t.he pat,t.erns of activation spread.