In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap.

In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap.

We will add this in the revision.

We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC.

Mean-Field Game (MFG) serves as a crucial mathematical framework in modeling the collective behavior of individual agents interacting stochastically with a large population. In this work, we aim at solving a challenging class of MFGs in which the differentiability of these interacting preferences may not be available to the solver, and the population is urged to converge exactly to some desired distribution. These setups are, despite being well-motivated for practical purposes, complicated enough to paralyze most (deep) numerical solvers. Nevertheless, we show that Schrödinger Bridge -- as an entropy-regularized optimal transport model -- can be generalized to accepting mean-field structures, hence solving these MFGs. This is achieved via the application of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations theory, which, intriguingly, leads to a computational framework with a similar structure to Temporal Difference learning. As such, it opens up novel algorithmic connections to Deep Reinforcement Learning that we leverage to facilitate practical training. We show that our proposed objective function provides necessary and sufficient conditions to the mean-field problem. Our method, named Deep Generalized Schrödinger Bridge (DeepGSB), not only outperforms prior methods in solving classical population navigation MFGs, but is also capable of solving 1000-dimensional opinion depolarization, setting a new state-of-the-art numerical solver for high-dimensional MFGs. Our code will be made available at https://github.com/ghliu/DeepGSB.

Mean-field games (MFGs) study the Nash equilibrium of systems with a continuum of interacting agents, which can be formulated as the fixed-point of optimal control problems. They provide a unified framework for a variety of applications, including optimal transport (OT) and generative models. Despite their broad applicability, solving high-dimensional MFGs remains a significant challenge due to fundamental computational and analytical obstacles. In this work, we propose a particle-based deep Flow Matching (FM) method to tackle high-dimensional MFG computation. In each iteration of our proximal fixed-point scheme, particles are updated using first-order information, and a flow neural network is trained to match the velocity of the sample trajectories in a simulation-free manner. Theoretically, in the optimal control setting, we prove that our scheme converges to a stationary point sublinearly, and upgrade to linear (exponential) convergence under additional convexity assumptions. Our proof uses FM to induce an Eulerian coordinate (density-based) from a Lagrangian one (particle-based), and this also leads to certain equivalence results between the two formulations for MFGs when the Eulerian solution is sufficiently regular. Our method demonstrates promising performance on non-potential MFGs and high-dimensional OT problems cast as MFGs through a relaxed terminal-cost formulation.

We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be formulated as a structured bi-level optimization problem, in which the leader needs to learn a policy maximizing its reward, anticipating the response of the followers. Existing methods for solving these (and related) problems often rely on restrictive independence assumptions between the leader's and followers' objectives, use samples inefficiently due to nested-loop algorithm structure, and lack finite-time convergence guarantees. To address these limitations, we propose AC-SMFG, a single-loop actor-critic algorithm that operates on continuously generated Markovian samples. The algorithm alternates between (semi-)gradient updates for the leader, a representative follower, and the mean field, and is simple to implement in practice. We establish the finite-time and finite-sample convergence of the algorithm to a stationary point of the Stackelberg objective. To our knowledge, this is the first Stackelberg MFG algorithm with non-asymptotic convergence guarantees. Our key assumption is a "gradient alignment" condition, which requires that the full policy gradient of the leader can be approximated by a partial component of it, relaxing the existing leader-follower independence assumption. Simulation results in a range of well-established economics environments demonstrate that AC-SMFG outperforms existing multi-agent and MFG learning baselines in policy quality and convergence speed.