The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has sparked an overwhelming number of AI ethics guidelines, boards and codes of conduct. These outputs primarily analyse competing theories, principles and values for AI development and deployment. However, as a series of recent problematic incidents about AI ethics/ethicists demonstrate, this orientation is insufficient. Before proceeding to evaluate other professions, AI ethicists should critically evaluate their own; yet, such an evaluation should be more explicitly and systematically undertaken in the literature. I argue that these insufficiencies could be mitigated by developing a research agenda for a feminist metaethics of AI. Contrary to traditional metaethics, which reflects on the nature of morality and moral judgements in a non-normative way, feminist metaethics expands its scope to ask not only what ethics is but also what our engagement with it should be like. Applying this perspective to the context of AI, I suggest that a feminist metaethics of AI would examine: (i) the continuity between theory and action in AI ethics; (ii) the real-life effects of AI ethics; (iii) the role and profile of those involved in AI ethics; and (iv) the effects of AI on power relations through methods that pay attention to context, emotions and narrative.

His most recent book on AI is "Reimagining Businesses with AI." The rise of AI and digital technologies is enabling many capabilities, disrupting several business models and changing the way we live and work. At the same time, this technological shift is also giving rise to many concerns around ethics, privacy, security and the future of humanity. The notion of ethics has evolved. Decisions around right and wrong always depended on human cognition and were guided by popular sentiments and socially acceptable norms.

It is not clear to what the projects of creating an artificial intelligence(AI) that does ethics, is moral, or makes moral judgments amounts. In this paper we discuss some of the extant metaethical theories and debates in moral philosophy by which such projects should be informed, specifically focusing on the project of creating an AI that makes moral judgments. We argue that the scope and aims of that project depend a great deal on antecedent metaethical commitments. Metaethics, therefore, plays the role of an Archimedean fulcrum in this context, very much like the Archimedean role that it is often taken to take in context of normative ethics.