WASHINGTON – U.S. astronauts Christina Koch and Jessica Meir on Friday became the first female pairing to carry out a spacewalk -- a historic milestone as NASA prepares to send the first woman to the moon. "It symbolizes exploration by all that dare to dream and work hard to achieve that dream," Meir said after the seven-hour and 17-minute spacewalk to replace a power controller on the International Space Station. The mission was originally planned for earlier this year but had to be aborted due to a lack of properly fitting spacesuits, leading to allegations of sexism. Koch and Meir began the walk with standard safety checks on their suits and tethers, before making their way to the repair site on the station's port side as the sunlit Earth came into view. In a call to reporters just a few minutes before, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine emphasized the symbolic significance of the day.

A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.

Nefarious actors on social media and other platforms often spread rumors and falsehoods through images whose metadata (e.g., captions) have been modified to provide visual substantiation of the rumor/falsehood. This type of modification is referred to as image repurposing, in which often an unmanipulated image is published along with incorrect or manipulated metadata to serve the actor's ulterior motives. We present the Multimodal Entity Image Repurposing (MEIR) dataset, a substantially challenging dataset over that which has been previously available to support research into image repurposing detection. The new dataset includes location, person, and organization manipulations on real-world data sourced from Flickr. We also present a novel, end-to-end, deep multimodal learning model for assessing the integrity of an image by combining information extracted from the image with related information from a knowledge base. The proposed method is compared against state-of-the-art techniques on existing datasets as well as MEIR, where it outperforms existing methods across the board, with AUC improvement up to 0.23.

Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence and convergence results in the Plurality voting system. This paper extends the model in multiple directions, considering voters with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more permissive notion of best-response. It is proved that a voting equilibrium exists even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative setting is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. An alternative behavior is analyzed, where voters try to minimize their worst-case regret. As it turns out, the two behaviors coincide in the simple setting of Meir et al.[EC'14], but not in the general case.