We strengthen recent connections between prediction markets and learning by showing that a natural class of market makers can be understood as performing stochastic mirror descent when trader demands are sequentially drawn from a fixed distribution. This provides new insights into how market prices (and price paths) may be interpreted as a summary of the market's belief distribution by relating them to the optimization problem being solved. In particular, we show that under certain conditions the stationary point of the stochastic process of prices generated by the market is equal to the market's Walrasian equilibrium of classic market analysis. Together, these results suggest how traditional market making mechanisms might be replaced with general purpose learning algorithms while still retaining guarantees about their behaviour.

We start with the distinction of outcome- and belief-based Bayesian models of the sequential update of agents' beliefs and subjective reliability of sources (trust). We then focus on discussing the influential Bayesian model of belief-based trust update by Eric Olsson, which models dichotomic events and explicitly represents anti-reliability. After sketching some disastrous recent results for this perhaps most promising model of belief update, we show new simulation results for the temporal dynamics of learning belief with and without trust update and with and without communication. The results seem to shed at least a somewhat more positive light on the communicating-and-trust-updating agents. This may be a light at the end of the tunnel of belief-based models of trust updating, but the interpretation of the clear findings is much less clear.

We strengthen recent connections between prediction markets and learning byshowing that a natural class of market makers can be understood as performing stochastic mirror descent when trader demands are sequentially drawnfrom a fixed distribution. This provides new insights into how market prices (and price paths) may be interpreted as a summary of the market's belief distribution by relating them to the optimization problem being solved. In particular, we show that under certain conditions the stationary pointof the stochastic process of prices generated by the market is equal to the market's Walrasian equilibrium of classic market analysis. Together, these results suggest how traditional market making mechanisms might be replaced with general purpose learning algorithms while still retaining guaranteesabout their behaviour.