We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own preferences. We show that existing RLHF algorithms, including recent pluralistic methods, are not strategyproof, and that even a single strategic labeler can cause arbitrarily large misalignment with social welfare. Moreover, we prove that, in the worst case, any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform k-times worse than the optimal policy, where k is the number of labelers. This suggests a fundamental trade-off between incentive alignment (ensuring labelers report truthfully) and policy alignment (maximizing social welfare). To address this, we propose the Pessimistic Median of MLEs algorithm, which, under appropriate policy coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of labelers and samples increases. Our results apply to both contextual bandits and Markov decision processes.

Synthetically-generated data plays an increasingly larger role in training large language models. However, while synthetic data has been found to be useful, studies have also shown that without proper curation it can cause LLM performance to plateau, or even "collapse", after many training iterations. In this paper, we formalize this question and develop a theoretical framework to investigate how much curation is needed in order to ensure that LLM performance continually improves. Our analysis is inspired by boosting, a classic machine learning technique that leverages a very weak learning algorithm to produce an arbitrarily good classifier. The approach we analyze subsumes many recently proposed methods for training LLMs on synthetic data, and thus our analysis sheds light on why they are successful, and also suggests opportunities for future improvement. We present experiments that validate our theory, and show that dynamically focusing labeling resources on the most challenging examples -- in much the same way that boosting focuses the efforts of the weak learner -- leads to improved performance.

We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own preferences. We show that existing RLHF algorithms, including recent pluralistic methods, are not strategyproof, and that even a single strategic labeler can cause arbitrarily large misalignment with social welfare. Moreover, we prove that, in the worst case, any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform $k$-times worse than the optimal policy, where $k$ is the number of labelers. This suggests a fundamental trade-off between incentive alignment (ensuring labelers report truthfully) and policy alignment (maximizing social welfare). To address this, we propose the Pessimistic Median of MLEs algorithm, which, under appropriate policy coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of labelers and samples increases. Our results apply to both contextual bandits and Markov decision processes.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to human preferences typically relies on aggregating pooled feedback into a single reward model. However, this standard approach assumes that all labelers share the same underlying preferences, ignoring the fact that real-world labelers are highly heterogeneous and usually anonymous. Consequently, relying solely on binary choice data fundamentally distorts the learned policy, making the true population-average preference unidentifiable. To overcome this critical limitation, we demonstrate that augmenting preference datasets with a simple, secondary signal -- the user's response time -- can restore the identifiability of the population's average preference. By modeling each decision as a Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM), we introduce a novel, consistent estimator of heterogeneous preferences that successfully corrects the distortions of standard choice-only labels. We prove that our estimator asymptotically converges to the true average preference even in extreme cases where each anonymous labeler contributes only a single choice. Empirically, across both synthetic and real-world datasets, our method consistently outperforms standard baselines that otherwise fail and plateau at a bias floor. Because response times are essentially free to record and require zero user tracking or identification, our results bring promises and open up new opportunities for future data-collection pipelines to improve the social benefit without requiring user-level identifiers or repeated elicitations.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We study active learning where the labeler can not only return incorrect labels but also abstain from labeling. We consider different noise and abstention conditions of the labeler. We propose an algorithm which utilizes abstention responses, and analyze its statistical consistency and query complexity under fairly natural assumptions on the noise and abstention rate of the labeler. This algorithm is adaptive in a sense that it can automatically request less queries with a more informed or less noisy labeler. We couple our algorithm with lower bounds to show that under some technical conditions, it achieves nearly optimal query complexity.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

The assistant is helpful, creative,clever,andveryfriendly.