This paper explores prompts and prompting in large language models (LLMs) as dynamic semiotic phenomena, drawing on Peirce's triadic model of signs, his nine sign types, and the Dynacom model of communication. The aim is to reconceptualize prompting not as a technical input mechanism but as a communicative and epistemic act involving an iterative process of sign formation, interpretation, and refinement. The theoretical foundation rests on Peirce's semiotics, particularly the interplay between representamen, object, and interpretant, and the typological richness of signs: qualisign, sinsign, legisign; icon, index, symbol; rheme, dicent, argument - alongside the interpretant triad captured in the Dynacom model. Analytically, the paper positions the LLM as a semiotic resource that generates interpretants in response to user prompts, thereby participating in meaning-making within shared universes of discourse. The findings suggest that prompting is a semiotic and communicative process that redefines how knowledge is organized, searched, interpreted, and co-constructed in digital environments. This perspective invites a reimagining of the theoretical and methodological foundations of knowledge organization and information seeking in the age of computational semiosis

We integrate foundational theories of meaning with a mathematical formalism of artificial general intelligence (AGI) to offer a comprehensive mechanistic explanation of meaning, communication, and symbol emergence. This synthesis holds significance for both AGI and broader debates concerning the nature of language, as it unifies pragmatics, logical truth conditional semantics, Peircean semiotics, and a computable model of enactive cognition, addressing phenomena that have traditionally evaded mechanistic explanation. By examining the conditions under which a machine can generate meaningful utterances or comprehend human meaning, we establish that the current generation of language models do not possess the same understanding of meaning as humans nor intend any meaning that we might attribute to their responses. To address this, we propose simulating human feelings and optimising models to construct weak representations. Our findings shed light on the relationship between meaning and intelligence, and how we can build machines that comprehend and intend meaning.

The following defines intent, an arbitrary task and its solutions, and then argues that an agent which always constructs what is called an Intensional Solution would qualify as artificial general intelligence. We then explain how natural language may emerge and be acquired by such an agent, conferring the ability to model the intent of other individuals labouring under similar compulsions, because an abstract symbol system and the solution to a task are one and the same.

In order to construct an ethical artificial intelligence (AI) two complex problems must be overcome. Firstly, humans do not consistently agree on what is or is not ethical. Second, contemporary AI and machine learning methods tend to be blunt instruments which either search for solutions within the bounds of predefined rules, or mimic behaviour. An ethical AI must be capable of inferring unspoken rules, interpreting nuance and context, possess and be able to infer intent, and explain not just its actions but its intent. Using enactivism, semiotics, perceptual symbol systems and symbol emergence, we specify an agent that learns not just arbitrary relations between signs but their meaning in terms of the perceptual states of its sensorimotor system. Subsequently it can learn what is meant by a sentence and infer the intent of others in terms of its own experiences. It has malleable intent because the meaning of symbols changes as it learns, and its intent is represented symbolically as a goal. As such it may learn a concept of what is most likely to be considered ethical by the majority within a population of humans, which may then be used as a goal. The meaning of abstract symbols is expressed using perceptual symbols of raw sensorimotor stimuli as the weakest (consistent with Ockham's Razor) necessary and sufficient concept, an intensional definition learned from an ostensive definition, from which the extensional definition or category of all ethical decisions may be obtained. Because these abstract symbols are the same for both situation and response, the same symbol is used when either performing or observing an action. This is akin to mirror neurons in the human brain. Mirror symbols may allow the agent to empathise, because its own experiences are associated with the symbol, which is also associated with the observation of another agent experiencing something that symbol represents.

As we saw yesterday, artificial intelligence (AI) has enjoyed a a string of unbroken successes against humans. But these are successes in games where the map is the territory. That fact hints at the problem tech philosopher and futurist George Gilder raises in Gaming AI (free download here). Whether all human activities can be treated that way successfully is an entirely different question. As Gilder puts it, "AI is a system built on the foundations of computer logic, and when Silicon Valley's AI theorists push the logic of their case to a "singularity," they defy the most crucial findings of twentieth-century mathematics and computer science." Here is one of the crucial findings they defy (or ignore): Philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) pointed out that, generally, mental activity comes in threes, not twos (so he called it triadic).

This spanning of scope reflects the genius of Peirce's insight wherein semiosis can begin literally at the cusp of Nothingness [20] and then proceed to capture the process of signmaking, language, logic, the scientific method and thought abstraction to embrace the broadest and most complex of topics. This process is itself mediated by truth-testing and community use and consensus, with constant refinement as new insights and knowledge arise.