Most machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which poses security concerns on these models. Adversarial examples are crafted by applying subtle but intentionally worst-case modifications to examples from the dataset, leading the model to output a different answer from the original example. In this paper, adversarial examples are formed in an exactly opposite manner, which are significantly different from the original examples but result in the same answer. We propose a novel set of algorithms to produce such adversarial examples, including the negative iterative fast gradient sign method (NI-FGSM) and the negative iterative fast gradient method (NI-FGM), along with their momentum variants: the negative momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (NMI-FGSM) and the negative momentum iterative fast gradient method (NMI-FGM). Adversarial examples constructed by these methods could be used to perform an attack on machine learning systems in certain occasions. Moreover, our results show that the adversarial examples are not merely distributed in the neighbourhood of the examples from the dataset; instead, they are distributed extensively in the sample space.

In addition to above methods, the second group comparison contains additive-perturbation-based attacks, i.e., Interpretation-based noise (Interp

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are highly susceptible to adversarial examples--subtle perturbations applied to inputs that are often imperceptible to humans yet lead to incorrect model predictions. In black-box scenarios, however, existing adversarial examples exhibit limited transferability and struggle to effectively compromise multiple unseen DNN models. Previous strategies enhance the cross-model generalization of adversarial examples by introducing versatility into adversarial perturbations, thereby improving transferability. However, further refining perturbation versatility often demands intricate algorithm development and substantial computation consumption. In this work, we propose an input transpose method that requires almost no additional labor and computation costs but can significantly improve the transferability of existing adversarial strategies. Even without adding adversarial perturbations, our method demonstrates considerable effectiveness in cross-model attacks. Our exploration finds that on specific datasets, a mere $1^\circ$ left or right rotation might be sufficient for most adversarial examples to deceive unseen models. Our further analysis suggests that this transferability improvement triggered by rotating only $1^\circ$ may stem from visible pattern shifts in the DNN's low-level feature maps. Moreover, this transferability exhibits optimal angles that, when identified under unrestricted query conditions, could potentially yield even greater performance.

Deep neural networks have demonstrated remarkable performance across various domains. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can lead to erroneous predictions. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) can leverage the generators and discriminators model to quickly produce high-quality adversarial examples. Since both modules train in a competitive and simultaneous manner, GAN-based algorithms like AdvGAN can generate adversarial examples with better transferability compared to traditional methods. However, the generation of perturbations is usually limited to a single iteration, preventing these examples from fully exploiting the potential of the methods. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel approach named Progressive Auto-Regression AdvGAN (PAR-AdvGAN). It incorporates an auto-regressive iteration mechanism within a progressive generation network to craft adversarial examples with enhanced attack capability. We thoroughly evaluate our PAR-AdvGAN method with a large-scale experiment, demonstrating its superior performance over various state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks, as well as the original AdvGAN.Moreover, PAR-AdvGAN significantly accelerates the adversarial example generation, i.e., achieving the speeds of up to 335.5 frames per second on Inception-v3 model, outperforming the gradient-based transferable attack algorithms. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/PAR-01BF/

Strong adversarial examples are the keys to evaluating and enhancing the robustness of deep neural networks. The popular adversarial attack algorithms maximize the non-concave loss function using the gradient ascent. However, the performance of each attack is usually sensitive to, for instance, minor image transformations due to insufficient information (only one input example, few white-box source models and unknown defense strategies). Hence, the crafted adversarial examples are prone to overfit the source model, which limits their transferability to unidentified architectures. In this paper, we propose Multiple Asymptotically Normal Distribution Attacks (MultiANDA), a novel method that explicitly characterizes adversarial perturbations from a learned distribution. Specifically, we approximate the posterior distribution over the perturbations by taking advantage of the asymptotic normality property of stochastic gradient ascent (SGA), then apply the ensemble strategy on this procedure to estimate a Gaussian mixture model for a better exploration of the potential optimization space. Drawing perturbations from the learned distribution allow us to generate any number of adversarial examples for each input. The approximated posterior essentially describes the stationary distribution of SGA iterations, which captures the geometric information around the local optimum. Thus, the samples drawn from the distribution reliably maintain the transferability. Our proposed method outperforms nine state-of-the-art black-box attacks on deep learning models with or without defenses through extensive experiments on seven normally trained and seven defence models.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which poses security concerns on these algorithms due to the potentially severe consequences. Adversarial attacks serve as an important surrogate to evaluate the robustness of deep learning models before they are deployed. However, most of existing adversarial attacks can only fool a black-box model with a low success rate. To address this issue, we propose a broad class of momentum-based iterative algorithms to boost adversarial attacks. By integrating the momentum term into the iterative process for attacks, our methods can stabilize update directions and escape from poor local maxima during the iterations, resulting in more transferable adversarial examples. To further improve the success rates for black-box attacks, we apply momentum iterative algorithms to an ensemble of models, and show that the adversarially trained models with a strong defense ability are also vulnerable to our black-box attacks. We hope that the proposed methods will serve as a benchmark for evaluating the robustness of various deep models and defense methods. With this method, we won the first places in NIPS 2017 Non-targeted Adversarial Attack and Targeted Adversarial Attack competitions.

Though convolutional neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on various vision tasks, they are extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are obtained by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to the original images. Adversarial examples can thus be used as an useful tool to evaluate and select the most robust models in safety-critical applications. However, most of the existing adversarial attacks only achieve relatively low success rates under the challenging black-box setting, where the attackers have no knowledge of the model structure and parameters. To this end, we propose to improve the transferability of adversarial examples by creating diverse input patterns. Instead of only using the original images to generate adversarial examples, our method applies random transformations to the input images at each iteration. Extensive experiments on ImageNet show that the proposed attack method can generate adversarial examples that transfer much better to different networks than existing baselines. To further improve the transferability, we (1) integrate the recently proposed momentum method into the attack process; and (2) attack an ensemble of networks simultaneously. By evaluating our method against top defense submissions and official baselines from NIPS 2017 adversarial competition, this enhanced attack reaches an average success rate of 73.0%, which outperforms the top 1 attack submission in the NIPS competition by a large margin of 6.6%. We hope that our proposed attack strategy can serve as a benchmark for evaluating the robustness of networks to adversaries and the effectiveness of different defense methods in future. The code is public available at https://github.com/cihangxie/DI-2-FGSM.