'We May Have a Crisis on Our Hands': The Unregulated Rise of Emotionally Intelligent AI Pillay is an editorial fellow at TIME. Pillay is an editorial fellow at TIME. At least once a month, two-thirds of people who regularly use AI turn to their bots for advice on sensitive personal issues and emotional support. Many people now report trusting their chatbots more than their elected representatives, civil servants, faith leaders--and the companies building AI. That's according to data from 70 countries, gathered by the Collective Intelligence Project (CIP).

Large conferences such as NeurIPS and AAAI serve as crossroads of various AI fields, since they attract submissions from a vast number of communities. However, in some cases, this has resulted in a poor reviewing experience for some communities, whose submissions get assigned to less qualified reviewers outside of their communities. An often-advocated solution is to break up any such large conference into smaller conferences, but this can lead to isolation of communities and harm interdisciplinary research.

Modern AI systems increasingly operate inside markets and institutions where data, behavior, and incentives are endogenous. This paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning by studying a principal-agent interaction in a Markov decision process with strategic externalities, where both the principal and the agent learn over time. We propose a two-phase incentive mechanism that first estimates implementable transfers and then uses them to steer long-run dynamics; under mild regret-based rationality and exploration conditions, the mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and thus asymptotically optimal welfare. Simulations illustrate how even coarse incentives can correct inefficient learning under stateful externalities, highlighting the necessity of incentive-aware design for safe and welfare-aligned AI in markets and insurance.

However, the data at each location may be insufficient to train a robust model.

An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning

Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes domains often involves assigning decisions to agents with incentives to strategically modify their input to the algorithm.