Logics for reasoning about knowledge and actions have seen many applications in various domains of multi-agent systems, including epistemic planning. Change of knowledge based on observations about the surroundings forms a key aspect in such planning scenarios. Public Observation Logic (POL) is a variant of public announcement logic for reasoning about knowledge that gets updated based on public observations. Each state in an epistemic (Kripke) model is equipped with a set of expected observations. These states evolve as the expectations get matched with the actual observations. In this work, we prove that the satisfiability problem of $\POL$ is 2EXPTIME-complete.

In this paper, we propose a modal logic in which counting modalities appear in linear inequalities. We show that each formula can be transformed into an equivalent graph neural network (GNN). We also show that each GNN can be transformed into a formula. We show that the satisfiability problem is decidable. We also discuss some variants that are in PSPACE.

Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.

Steen's (2018) Hintikka set properties for Church's type theory based on primitive equality are reduced to the Hintikka set properties of Benzm\"uller, Brown and Kohlhase (2004) which are based on the logical connectives negation, disjunction and universal quantification.

When we say "I know why he was late", we know not only the fact that he was late, but also an explanation of this fact. We propose a logical framework of "knowing why" inspired by the existing formal studies on why-questions, scientific explanation, and justification logic. We introduce the Ky_i operator into the language of epistemic logic to express "agent i knows why phi" and propose a Kripke-style semantics of such expressions in terms of knowing an explanation of phi. We obtain two sound and complete axiomatizations w.r.t. two different model classes depending on different assumptions about introspection.

In this paper, we propose a single-agent modal logic framework for reasoning about goal-direct "knowing how" based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic and automated planning. We first define a modal language to express "I know how to guarantee phi given psi" with a semantics not based on standard epistemic models but labelled transition systems that represent the agent's knowledge of his own abilities. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture the valid reasoning patterns about "knowing how" where the most important axiom suggests its compositional nature.

The first section discusses the importance of having systems that own M.S. thesis (Moore, 19)5), suggests that predicate calculus can understand the concept of knowledge, and how knowledge is be treated in a more natural manner than resolution and related to action. Section 2 points out some of the special problems combined with domain-dependent control information for greater that are involved in reasoning about knowledge, and section $ efficiency. Furthermore, the problems of reasoning about knowledge seem to require the full ability to handle quantifiers presents a logic of knowledge based on the idea of possible worlds. Section 4 integrates this with a logic of actions and gives an and logical connectives which only predicate calculus posseses.

In this paper we will be concerned with such reasoning in its most general form, that is, in inferences that are defeasible: given more information, we may retract them. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a form of non-monotonic inference based on the notion of a partial model of the world. We take partial models to reflect our partial knowledge of the true state of affairs. We then define non-monotonic inference as the process of filling in unknown parts of the model with conjectures: statements that could turn out to be false, given more complete knowledge. To take a standard example from default reasoning: since most birds can fly, if Tweety is a bird it is reasonable to assume that she can fly, at least in the absence of any information to the contrary. We thus have some justification for filling in our partial picture of the world with this conjecture. If our knowledge includes the fact that Tweety is an ostrich, then no such justification exists, and the conjecture must be retracted.

Uncertainty is unavoidable when modeling most application domains. In medicine, for example, symptoms (such as pain, dizziness, or nausea) are always subjective, and hence imprecise and incomparable. Additionally, concepts and their relationships may be inexpressible in a crisp, clear-cut manner. We extend the description logic ALC with multi-valued semantics based on lattices that can handle uncertainty on concepts as well as on the axioms of the ontology. We introduce reasoning methods for this logic w.r.t. general concept inclusions and show that the complexity of reasoning is not increased by this new semantics.

We investigate cut-elimination and cut-simulation in impredicative (higher-order) logics. We illustrate that adding simple axioms such as Leibniz equations to a calculus for an impredicative logic -- in our case a sequent calculus for classical type theory -- is like adding cut. The phenomenon equally applies to prominent axioms like Boolean- and functional extensionality, induction, choice, and description. This calls for the development of calculi where these principles are built-in instead of being treated axiomatically.