Reinforcement learning (RL) traditionally trains agents using interaction data, which limits their capabilities to the scope of the training data.

Humans excel at analogical reasoning - applying knowledge from one task to a related one with minimal relearning. In contrast, reinforcement learning (RL) agents typically require extensive retraining even when new tasks share structural similarities with previously learned ones. In this work, we propose MAGIK, a novel framework that enables RL agents to transfer knowledge to analogous tasks without interacting with the target environment. Our approach leverages an imagination mechanism to map entities in the target task to their analogues in the source domain, allowing the agent to reuse its original policy. Experiments on custom Mini-Grid and MuJoCo tasks show that MAGIK achieves effective zero-shot transfer using only a small number of human-labelled examples. We compare our approach to related baselines and highlight how it offers a novel and effective mechanism for knowledge transfer via imagination-based analogy mapping.

Reinforcement learning (RL) trains agents to accomplish complex tasks through environmental interaction data, but its capacity is also limited by the scope of the available data. To obtain a knowledgeable agent, a promising approach is to leverage the knowledge from large language models (LLMs). Despite previous studies combining LLMs with RL, seamless integration of the two components remains challenging due to their semantic gap. This paper introduces a novel method, Knowledgeable Agents from Language Model Rollouts (KALM), which extracts knowledge from LLMs in the form of imaginary rollouts that can be easily learned by the agent through offline reinforcement learning methods. The primary challenge of KALM lies in LLM grounding, as LLMs are inherently limited to textual data, whereas environmental data often comprise numerical vectors unseen to LLMs. To address this, KALM fine-tunes the LLM to perform various tasks based on environmental data, including bidirectional translation between natural language descriptions of skills and their corresponding rollout data. This grounding process enhances the LLM's comprehension of environmental dynamics, enabling it to generate diverse and meaningful imaginary rollouts that reflect novel skills. Initial empirical evaluations on the CLEVR-Robot environment demonstrate that KALM enables agents to complete complex rephrasings of task goals and extend their capabilities to novel tasks requiring unprecedented optimal behaviors. KALM achieves a success rate of 46% in executing tasks with unseen goals, substantially surpassing the 26% success rate achieved by baseline methods. Furthermore, KALM effectively enables the LLM to comprehend environmental dynamics, resulting in the generation of meaningful imaginary rollouts that reflect novel skills and demonstrate the seamless integration of large language models and reinforcement learning.

Natural Language-conditioned reinforcement learning (RL) enables the agents to follow human instructions. Previous approaches generally implemented language-conditioned RL by providing human instructions in natural language (NL) and training a following policy. In this outside-in approach, the policy needs to comprehend the NL and manage the task simultaneously. However, the unbounded NL examples often bring much extra complexity for solving concrete RL tasks, which can distract policy learning from completing the task. To ease the learning burden of the policy, we investigate an inside-out scheme for natural language-conditioned RL by developing a task language (TL) that is task-related and unique. The TL is used in RL to achieve highly efficient and effective policy training. Besides, a translator is trained to translate NL into TL. We implement this scheme as TALAR (TAsk Language with predicAte Representation) that learns multiple predicates to model object relationships as the TL. Experiments indicate that TALAR not only better comprehends NL instructions but also leads to a better instruction-following policy that improves 13.4% success rate and adapts to unseen expressions of NL instruction. The TL can also be an effective task abstraction, naturally compatible with hierarchical RL.

This is a follow up to a previous article, where we looked at a simple Reinforcement Learning (RL) game in which a green ball learnt to reach a small circle at the centre of a canvas within 200 steps. We wrote a Q-learning algorithm and visualised it using a Tkinter based GUI. We will now give the green ball a slightly more complicated challenge. This time the aim is to learn to reach the centre within 200 steps as well but now there is another ball, a red ball, which the green ball must avoid. The red ball starts near the circle and moves randomly.

The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new evidence lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van Fraassen's Reflection Principle ([1984]), would be that in the absence of new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such examples, if not settled, would demonstrate the inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the Bayesian approach and without eliminating this inconsistency, the approach cannot be regarded as scientific. The Sleeping Beauty Problem is just such an example. The existing attempts to solve the problem fall into three categories. The first two share the view that new evidence is absent, but differ about the conclusion of whether Sleeping Beauty should change her belief or not, and why. The third category is characterized by the view that, after all, new evidence (although hidden from the initial view) is involved. My solution is radically different and does not fall in either of these categories. I deflate the paradox by arguing that the two different degrees of belief presented in the Sleeping Beauty Problem are in fact beliefs in two different propositions, i.e. there is no need to explain the (un)change of belief.