There is no agreed definition of intelligence, so it is problematic to simply ask whether brains, swarms, computers, or other systems are intelligent or not. To compare the potential intelligence exhibited by different cognitive systems, I use the common approach used by artificial intelligence and artificial life: Instead of studying the substrate of systems, let us focus on their organization. This organization can be measured with information. Thus, I apply an informationist epistemology to describe cognitive systems, including brains and computers. This allows me to frame the usefulness and limitations of the brain-computer analogy in different contexts. I also use this perspective to discuss the evolution and ecology of intelligence.

Self-organization can be broadly defined as the ability of a system to display ordered spatio-temporal patterns solely as the result of the interactions among the system components. Processes of this kind characterize both living and artificial systems, making self-organization a concept that is at the basis of several disciplines, from physics to biology to engineering. Placed at the frontiers between disciplines, Artificial Life (ALife) has heavily borrowed concepts and tools from the study of self-organization, providing mechanistic interpretations of life-like phenomena as well as useful constructivist approaches to artificial system design. Despite its broad usage within ALife, the concept of self-organization has been often excessively stretched or misinterpreted, calling for a clarification that could help with tracing the borders between what can and cannot be considered self-organization. In this review, we discuss the fundamental aspects of self-organization and list the main usages within three primary ALife domains, namely "soft" (mathematical/computational modeling), "hard" (physical robots), and "wet" (chemical/biological systems) ALife. Finally, we discuss the usefulness of self-organization within ALife studies, point to perspectives for future research, and list open questions.

This essay explores the limits of Turing machines concerning the modeling of minds and suggests alternatives to go beyond those limits. Keywords: computability, mind, Turing, interactions One of the main open questions in science and philosophy since ancient times has been how bodies relate to minds. René Descartes proposed his famous dualism to ontologically separate the physical (res extensa) from the mental (res cogitans). However, with Cartesian dualism one cannot relate bodies and minds. This has led many people to propose ways of reducing minds to the physical realm (e.g.

This paper discusses the benefits of describing the world as information, especially in the study of the evolution of life and cognition. Traditional studies encounter problems because it is difficult to describe life and cognition in terms of matter and energy, since their laws are valid only at the physical scale. However, if matter and energy, as well as life and cognition, are described in terms of information, evolution can be described consistently as information becoming more complex. The paper presents eight tentative laws of information, valid at multiple scales, which are generalizations of Darwinian, cybernetic, thermodynamic, psychological, philosophical, and complexity principles. These are further used to discuss the notions of life, cognition and their evolution.

This paper presents the Computing Networks (CNs) framework. CNs are used to generalize neural and swarm architectures. Artificial neural networks, ant colony optimization, particle swarm optimization, and realistic biological models are used as examples of instantiations of CNs. The description of these architectures as CNs allows their comparison. Their differences and similarities allow the identification of properties that enable neural and swarm architectures to perform complex computations and exhibit complex cognitive abilities. In this context, the most relevant characteristics of CNs are the existence multiple dynamical and functional scales. The relationship between multiple dynamical and functional scales with adaptation, cognition (of brains and swarms) and computation is discussed.