The long-run behavior of multi-agent online learning -- and, in particular, no-regret learning -- is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have common interests. By contrast, in general harmonic games -- the strategic complement of potential games, where players have competing interests -- very little is known outside the narrow subclass of $2$-player zero-sum games with a fully-mixed equilibrium. Our paper seeks to partially fill this gap by focusing on the full class of (generalized) harmonic games and examining the convergence properties of follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL), the most widely studied class of no-regret learning schemes. As a first result, we show that the continuous-time dynamics of FTRL are Poincaré recurrent, i.e., they return arbitrarily close to their starting point infinitely often, and hence fail to converge. In discrete time, the standard, vanilla implementation of FTRL may lead to even worse outcomes, eventually trapping the players in a perpetual cycle of best-responses. However, if FTRL is augmented with a suitable extrapolation step -- which includes as special cases the optimistic and mirror-prox variants of FTRL -- we show that learning converges to a Nash equilibrium from any initial condition, and all players are guaranteed at most $\mathcal{O}(1)$ regret. These results provide an in-depth understanding of no-regret learning in harmonic games, nesting prior work on $2$-player zero-sum games, and showing at a high level that potential and harmonic games are complementary not only from the strategic but also from the dynamic viewpoint.

Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) is a powerful framework for various online learning problems. By designing its regularizer and learning rate to be adaptive to past observations, FTRL is known to work adaptively to various properties of an underlying environment. However, most existing adaptive learning rates are for online learning problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(\sqrt{T})$ for the number of rounds $T$, and there are only a few studies on adaptive learning rates for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$, which include several important problems dealing with indirect feedback. To address this limitation, we establish a new adaptive learning rate framework for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. Our learning rate is designed by matching the stability, penalty, and bias terms that naturally appear in regret upper bounds for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. As applications of this framework, we consider three major problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$: partial monitoring, graph bandits, and multi-armed bandits with paid observations. We show that FTRL with our learning rate and the Tsallis entropy regularizer improves existing Best-of-Both-Worlds (BOBW) regret upper bounds, which achieve simultaneous optimality in the stochastic and adversarial regimes. The resulting learning rate is surprisingly simple compared to the existing learning rates for BOBW algorithms for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$.

This phenomenon, that we coin "fast and furious" learning in games, sets a new benchmark about what is possible both in max-min optimization as well as in multi-agent systems.

Quantile (and, more generally, KL) regret bounds, such as those achieved by NormalHedge (Chaudhuri, Freund, and Hsu 2009) and its variants, relax the goal of competing against the best individual expert to only competing against a majority of experts on adversarial data.

Much of the work in online learning focuses on the study of sublinear upper bounds on the regret.