Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) policies have achieved Best-of-BothWorlds (BOBW) results in various settings through hybrid regularizers, whereas analogous results for Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader (FTPL) remain limited due to inherent analytical challenges. To advance the analytical foundations of FTPL, we revisit classical FTRL-FTPL duality for unbounded perturbations and establish BOBW results for FTPL under a broad family of asymmetric unbounded Fréchettype perturbations, including hybrid perturbations combining Gumbel-type and Fréchet-type tails. These results not only extend the BOBW results of FTPL but also offer new insights into designing alternative FTPL policies competitive with hybrid regularization approaches. Motivated by earlier observations in two-armed bandits, we further investigate the connection between the 1/2-Tsallis entropy and a Fréchet-type perturbation. Our numerical observations suggest that it corresponds to a symmetric Fréchet-type perturbation, and based on this, we establish the first BOBW guarantee for symmetric unbounded perturbations in the two-armed setting. In contrast, in general multi-armed bandits, we find an instance in which symmetric Fréchet-type perturbations violate the key condition for standard BOBW analysis, which is a problem not observed with asymmetric or nonnegative Fréchet-type perturbations. Although this example does not rule out alternative analyses achieving BOBW results, it suggests the limitations of directly applying the relationship observed in two-armed cases to the general case and thus emphasizes the need for further investigation to fully understand the behavior of FTPL in broader settings.

We study online convex optimisation on ℓp-balls in Rd for p > 2. While always sub-linear, the optimal regret exhibits a shift between the high-dimensional setting (d > T), when the dimension d is greater than the time horizon T and the low-dimensional setting (d T). We show that Follow-the-Regularised-Leader (FTRL) with time-varying regularisation which is adaptive to the dimension regime is anytime optimal for all dimension regimes. Motivated by this, we ask whether it is possible to obtain anytime optimality of FTRL with fixed non-adaptive regularisation. Our main result establishes that for separable regularisers, adaptivity in the regulariser is necessary, and that any fixed regulariser will be sub-optimal in one of the two dimension regimes. Finally, we provide lower bounds which rule out sublinear regret bounds for the linear bandit problem in sufficiently high-dimension for all ℓp-balls with p 1.

In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain invariant to small--but otherwise arbitrary--perturbations to the game's payoff structure, and we provide a crisp geometric characterization thereof. Subsequently, we turn to the question of dynamic robustness, and we examine which equilibria may arise as stable limit points of the dynamics of "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) in the presence of randomness and uncertainty. Despite their very distinct origins, we establish a structural correspondence between these two notions of robustness: strategic robustness implies dynamic robustness, and, conversely, the requirement of strategic robustness cannot be relaxed if dynamic robustness is to be maintained. Finally, we examine the rate of convergence to robust equilibria as a function of the underlying regularizer, and we show that entropically regularized learning converges at a geometric rate in games with affinely constrained action spaces.

The long-run behavior of multi-agent online learning -- and, in particular, no-regret learning -- is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have common interests. By contrast, in general harmonic games -- the strategic complement of potential games, where players have competing interests -- very little is known outside the narrow subclass of $2$-player zero-sum games with a fully-mixed equilibrium. Our paper seeks to partially fill this gap by focusing on the full class of (generalized) harmonic games and examining the convergence properties of follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL), the most widely studied class of no-regret learning schemes. As a first result, we show that the continuous-time dynamics of FTRL are Poincaré recurrent, i.e., they return arbitrarily close to their starting point infinitely often, and hence fail to converge. In discrete time, the standard, vanilla implementation of FTRL may lead to even worse outcomes, eventually trapping the players in a perpetual cycle of best-responses. However, if FTRL is augmented with a suitable extrapolation step -- which includes as special cases the optimistic and mirror-prox variants of FTRL -- we show that learning converges to a Nash equilibrium from any initial condition, and all players are guaranteed at most $\mathcal{O}(1)$ regret. These results provide an in-depth understanding of no-regret learning in harmonic games, nesting prior work on $2$-player zero-sum games, and showing at a high level that potential and harmonic games are complementary not only from the strategic but also from the dynamic viewpoint.

Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) is a powerful framework for various online learning problems. By designing its regularizer and learning rate to be adaptive to past observations, FTRL is known to work adaptively to various properties of an underlying environment. However, most existing adaptive learning rates are for online learning problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(\sqrt{T})$ for the number of rounds $T$, and there are only a few studies on adaptive learning rates for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$, which include several important problems dealing with indirect feedback. To address this limitation, we establish a new adaptive learning rate framework for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. Our learning rate is designed by matching the stability, penalty, and bias terms that naturally appear in regret upper bounds for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$. As applications of this framework, we consider three major problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$: partial monitoring, graph bandits, and multi-armed bandits with paid observations. We show that FTRL with our learning rate and the Tsallis entropy regularizer improves existing Best-of-Both-Worlds (BOBW) regret upper bounds, which achieve simultaneous optimality in the stochastic and adversarial regimes. The resulting learning rate is surprisingly simple compared to the existing learning rates for BOBW algorithms for problems with a minimax regret of $\Theta(T^{2/3})$.

This phenomenon, that we coin "fast and furious" learning in games, sets a new benchmark about what is possible both in max-min optimization as well as in multi-agent systems.

Quantile (and, more generally, KL) regret bounds, such as those achieved by NormalHedge (Chaudhuri, Freund, and Hsu 2009) and its variants, relax the goal of competing against the best individual expert to only competing against a majority of experts on adversarial data.