Despite being confined within the interior darkness of the skull, the human brain possesses a remarkable ability to interpret, understand and analyse the world out there, plan for unseen futures, and make decisions that can alter the course of events. This extraordinary capability is conjectured to come from the brain's function as a predictive machine, constantly inferring the hidden causes of its sensory inputs to maintain a coherent model of its environment. This view, which dates back to Helmholtz's idea of "perception as unconscious inference" (von Helmholtz, 1866)--evolving into the "Bayesian brain" hypothesis (Doya et al., 2007)--suggests that the brain operates as a constructive statistical organ. It updates its beliefs about the external world based on incoming sensory data under a generative model (GM). The GM furnishes the brain with a structured representation that supports probabilistic beliefs over both the latent dynamical states of the external world, corresponding to the generative process (GP), as well as the observation mappings through which these states give rise to sensory signals. Essentially, the brain continually refines its probabilistic beliefs about both the latent states and the causal mechanisms of the world through a process of online triple estimation, jointly optimising beliefs over: hidden states, model parameters, and their associated uncertainties in accordance with the principles of Bayesian inference (Eells, 2004; Parr et al., 2022). More technically, given a sensory observation yt at time t, perception can be formulated as an online triple estimation scheme, whose three components are: 1) online hidden state inference, 2) online parameter learning, and 3) online uncertainty estimation, all three of which are the core components of our proposed online generalised PC scheme and are elaborated in Section.

Physical AI agents, such as robots and other embodied systems operating under tight and fluctuating resource constraints, remain far less capable than biological agents in open-ended real-world environments. This paper argues that Active Inference (AIF), grounded in the Free Energy Principle, offers a principled foundation for closing that gap. We develop this argument from first principles, following a chain from probability theory through Bayesian machine learning and variational inference to active inference and reactive message passing. From the FEP perspective, systems that maintain their structural and functional integrity over time can, under suitable assumptions, be described as minimizing variational free energy (VFE), and AIF operationalizes this by unifying perception, learning, planning, and control within a single computational objective. We show that VFE minimization is naturally realized by reactive message passing on factor graphs, where inference emerges from local, parallel computations. This realization is well matched to the constraints of physical operation, including hard deadlines, asynchronous data, fluctuating power budgets, and changing environments. Because reactive message passing is event-driven, interruptible, and locally adaptable, performance degrades gracefully under reduced resources while model structure can adjust online. We further show that, under suitable coupling and coarse-graining conditions, coupled AIF agents can be described as higher-level AIF agents, yielding a homogeneous architecture based on the same message-passing primitive across scales. Our contribution is not empirical benchmarking, but a clear theoretical and architectural case for the engineering community.

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Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy.

However,extrinsic rewards may be insufficiently informative to encourage an agent to explore and understand its environment, particularly in partially observed settings where the agent has a limited view of its environment.

While some biological neural networks are well known, we expect that the vast majority remain undiscovered due to the enormous variety of tasks the brain performs. Many methods have been developed to help discover latent networks of neural populations (i.e.

This technical note considers the sampling of outcomes that provide the greatest amount of information about the structure of underlying world models. This generalisation furnishes a principled approach to structure learning under a plausible set of generative models or hypotheses. In active inference, policies - i.e., combinations of actions - are selected based on their expected free energy, which comprises expected information gain and value. Information gain corresponds to the KL divergence between predictive posteriors with, and without, the consequences of action. Posteriors over models can be evaluated quickly and efficiently using Bayesian Model Reduction, based upon accumulated posterior beliefs about model parameters. The ensuing information gain can then be used to select actions that disambiguate among alternative models, in the spirit of optimal experimental design. We illustrate this kind of active selection or reasoning using partially observed discrete models; namely, a 'three-ball' paradigm used previously to describe artificial insight and 'aha moments' via (synthetic) introspection or sleep. We focus on the sample efficiency afforded by seeking outcomes that resolve the greatest uncertainty about the world model, under which outcomes are generated.

Building on the Extended Mind (EM) theory and radical enactivism, this article suggests an alternative to representation-based models of the mind. We lay out a novel ABC framework of the translating mind, in which translation is not the manipulation of static interlingual correspondences but an enacted activity, dynamically integrating affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) processes. Drawing on Predictive Processing and (En)Active Inference, we argue that the translator's mind emerges, rather than being merely extended, through loops of brain-body-environment interactions. This non-representational account reframes translation as skillful participation in sociocultural practice, where meaning is co-created in real time through embodied interaction with texts, tools, and contexts.

We report a structural convergence among four influential theories of mind: Kahneman's dual-system theory, Friston's predictive processing, Minsky's society of mind, and Clark's extended mind, emerging unintentionally within a practical AI architecture known as Agentic Flow. Designed to address the limitations of large language models (LLMs), Agentic Flow comprises five interlocking modules: Retrieval, Cognition, Control, Memory, and Action, organized into a repeatable cognitive loop. Although originally inspired only by Minsky and Clark, subsequent analysis revealed that its structure echoes computational motifs from all four theories, suggesting that theoretical convergence can emerge naturally from implementation demands rather than deliberate synthesis. Controlled evaluations confirmed this: the structured agent achieved 95.8% task success versus 62.3% for baseline LLMs, demonstrating robust constraint adherence and reproducible reasoning. We describe this convergence under a broader descriptive meta-architecture called PEACE, highlighting recurring design patterns such as predictive modeling, associative recall, and error-sensitive control. Later formalized as the Structured Cognitive Loop (SCL), this framework generalizes the same principles as a foundation for behavioral intelligence in LLM-based agents. Rather than claiming theoretical unification, this paper proposes that intelligent architectures may evolve toward shared structural patterns shaped by practical constraints. As a position paper, it aims to frame this convergence as an interpretive reflection rather than a finalized theory, inviting further theoretical and experimental dialogue. Agentic Flow, or equivalently the Structured Cognitive Loop, thus offers a glimpse of how a unified cognitive form can arise not from abstraction, but from the necessities of real-world reasoning.