LRMs we By inno training directly vatively LRMs on fine-tune the to origina accurately the l reasoning model verify solely task the correctness the o reasoning verthinking.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking-characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Training data is the backbone of large language models (LLMs), yet today's data markets often operate under exploitative pricing - sourcing data from marginalized groups with little pay or recognition. This paper introduces a theoretical framework for LLM data markets, modeling the strategic interactions between buyers (LLM builders) and sellers (human annotators). We begin with theoretical and empirical analysis showing how exploitative pricing drives high-quality sellers out of the market, degrading data quality and long-term model performance. Then we introduce fairshare, a pricing mechanism grounded in data valuation that quantifies each data's contribution.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) enables the development of intelligent agents capable of engaging in complex and multi-turn dialogues. However, multi-agent collaboration faces critical safety challenges, such as hallucination amplification and error injection and propagation. This paper presents GUARDIAN, a unified method for detecting and mitigating multiple safety concerns in GUARDing Intelligent Agent collaboratioNs. By modeling the multi-agent collaboration process as a discrete-time temporal attributed graph, GUARDIAN explicitly captures the propagation dynamics of hallucinations and errors. The unsupervised encoder-decoder architecture incorporating an incremental training paradigm learns to reconstruct node attributes and graph structures from latent embeddings, enabling the identification of anomalous nodes and edges with unparalleled precision. Moreover, we introduce a graph abstraction mechanism based on the Information Bottleneck Theory, which compresses temporal interaction graphs while preserving essential patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate GUARDIAN's effectiveness in safeguarding LLM multi-agent collaborations against diverse safety vulnerabilities, achieving state-of-the-art accuracy with efficient resource utilization.

Designing incentives for a multi-agent system to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium is both a crucial and challenging problem appearing in many decision-making domains, especially for a large number of agents $N$. Under the exchangeability assumption, we formalize this incentive design (ID) problem as a parameterized mean-field game (PMFG), aiming to reduce complexity via an infinite-population limit. We first show that when dynamics and rewards are Lipschitz, the finite-$N$ ID objective is approximated by the PMFG at rate $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$. Moreover, beyond the Lipschitz-continuous setting, we prove the same $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ decay for the important special case of sequential auctions, despite discontinuities in dynamics, through a tailored auction-specific analysis. Built on our novel approximation results, we further introduce our Adjoint Mean-Field Incentive Design (AMID) algorithm, which uses explicit differentiation of iterated equilibrium operators to compute gradients efficiently. By uniting approximation bounds with optimization guarantees, AMID delivers a powerful, scalable algorithmic tool for many-agent (large $N$) ID. Across diverse auction settings, the proposed AMID method substantially increases revenue over first-price formats and outperforms existing benchmark methods.

Score-based diffusion models have emerged as powerful tools in generative modeling, yet their theoretical foundations remain underexplored. In this work, we focus on the Wasserstein convergence analysis of score-based diffusion models. Specifically, we investigate the impact of various discretization schemes, including Euler discretization, exponential integrators, and midpoint randomization methods. Our analysis provides the first quantitative comparison of these discrete approximations, emphasizing their influence on convergence behavior. Furthermore, we explore scenarios where Hessian information is available and propose an accelerated sampler based on the local linearization method.

Binary classification in the classic PAC model exhibits a curious phenomenon: Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) learners are suboptimal in the realizable case yet optimal in the agnostic case. Roughly speaking, this owes itself to the fact that non-realizable distributions $\\mathcal{D}$ are more difficult to learn than realizable distributions -- even when one discounts a learner's error by $\\mathrm{err}(h^\\ast_\\mathcal{D})$, i.e., the error of the best hypothesis in $\\mathcal{H}$. Thus, optimal agnostic learners are permitted to incur excess error on (easier-to-learn) distributions $\\mathcal{D}$ for which $\\tau = \\mathrm{err}(h^\\ast_\\mathcal{D})$ is small.

We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true opinion about the eligibility of others to influence their own chances of selection. Impartial mechanisms circumvent this issue by guaranteeing that the selection of an agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. Previous research has established strong bounds on the performance of impartial mechanisms, measured by their ability to approximate the number of nominations for the most highly nominated agents. We study to what extent the performance of impartial mechanisms can be improved if they are given a prediction of a set of agents receiving a maximum number of nominations. Specifically, we provide bounds on the consistency and robustness of such mechanisms, where consistency measures the performance of the mechanisms when the prediction is correct and robustness its performance when the prediction is incorrect. For the general setting where up to $k$ agents are to be selected and agents nominate any number of other agents, we give a mechanism with consistency $1-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$ and robustness $1-\frac{1}{e}-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$. For the special case of selecting a single agent based on a single nomination per agent, we prove that $1$-consistency can be achieved while guaranteeing $\frac{1}{2}$-robustness. A close comparison with previous results shows that (asymptotically) optimal consistency can be achieved with little to no sacrifice in terms of robustness.

We consider gap-dependent regret bounds for episodic MDPs.

Finding an $\epsilon$-stationary point of a nonconvex function with a Lipschitz continuous Hessian is a central problem in optimization. Regularized Newton methods are a classical tool and have been studied extensively, yet they still face a trade off between global and local convergence. Whether a parameter-free algorithm of this type can simultaneously achieve optimal global complexity and quadratic local convergence remains an open question. To bridge this long-standing gap, we propose a new class of regularizers constructed from the current and previous gradients, and leverage the conjugate gradient approach with a negative curvature monitor to solve the regularized Newton equation. The proposed algorithm is adaptive, requiring no prior knowledge of the Hessian Lipschitz constant, and achieves a global complexity of $O(\epsilon^{-\frac{3}{2}})$ in terms of the second-order oracle calls, and $\tilde O(\epsilon^{-\frac{7}{4}})$ for Hessian-vector products, respectively. When the iterates converge to a point where the Hessian is positive definite, the method exhibits quadratic local convergence. Preliminary numerical results, including training the physics-informed neural networks, illustrate the competitiveness of our algorithm.