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Learning Distributed and Fair Policies for Network Load Balancing as Markov Potential Game

Neural Information Processing Systems

This paper investigates the network load balancing problem in data centers (DCs) where multiple load balancers (LBs) are deployed, using the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. The challenges of this problem consist of the heterogeneous processing architecture and dynamic environments, as well as limited and partial observability of each LB agent in distributed networking systems, which can largely degrade the performance of in-production load balancing algorithms in real-world setups. Centralised training and distributed execution (CTDE) RL scheme has been proposed to improve MARL performance, yet it incurs -- especially in distributed networking systems, which prefer distributed and plug-and-play design schemes -- additional communication and management overhead among agents. We formulate the multi-agent load balancing problem as a Markov potential game, with a carefully and properly designed workload distribution fairness as the potential function. A fully distributed MARL algorithm is proposed to approximate the Nash equilibrium of the game. Experimental evaluations involve both an event-driven simulator and a real-world system, where the proposed MARL load balancing algorithm shows close-to-optimal performance in simulations and superior results over in-production LBs in the real-world system.



Multi-agent Multi-armed Bandits with Minimum Reward Guarantee Fairness

Manupriya, Piyushi, Himanshu, null, Jagarlapudi, SakethaNath, Ghalme, Ganesh

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We investigate the problem of maximizing social welfare while ensuring fairness in a multi-agent multi-armed bandit (MA-MAB) setting. In this problem, a centralized decision-maker takes actions over time, generating random rewards for various agents. Our goal is to maximize the sum of expected cumulative rewards, a.k.a. social welfare, while ensuring that each agent receives an expected reward that is at least a constant fraction of the maximum possible expected reward. Our proposed algorithm, RewardFairUCB, leverages the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) technique to achieve sublinear regret bounds for both fairness and social welfare. The fairness regret measures the positive difference between the minimum reward guarantee and the expected reward of a given policy, whereas the social welfare regret measures the difference between the social welfare of the optimal fair policy and that of the given policy. We show that RewardFairUCB algorithm achieves instance-independent social welfare regret guarantees of $\tilde{O}(T^{1/2})$ and a fairness regret upper bound of $\tilde{O}(T^{3/4})$. We also give the lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{T})$ for both social welfare and fairness regret. We evaluate RewardFairUCB's performance against various baseline and heuristic algorithms using simulated data and real world data, highlighting trade-offs between fairness and social welfare regrets.


Learning Distributed and Fair Policies for Network Load Balancing as Markov Potential Game

Neural Information Processing Systems

This paper investigates the network load balancing problem in data centers (DCs) where multiple load balancers (LBs) are deployed, using the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. The challenges of this problem consist of the heterogeneous processing architecture and dynamic environments, as well as limited and partial observability of each LB agent in distributed networking systems, which can largely degrade the performance of in-production load balancing algorithms in real-world setups. Centralised training and distributed execution (CTDE) RL scheme has been proposed to improve MARL performance, yet it incurs -- especially in distributed networking systems, which prefer distributed and plug-and-play design schemes -- additional communication and management overhead among agents. We formulate the multi-agent load balancing problem as a Markov potential game, with a carefully and properly designed workload distribution fairness as the potential function. A fully distributed MARL algorithm is proposed to approximate the Nash equilibrium of the game.


SCALES: From Fairness Principles to Constrained Decision-Making

Balakrishnan, Sreejith, Bi, Jianxin, Soh, Harold

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

This paper proposes SCALES, a general framework that translates well-established fairness principles into a common representation based on the Constraint Markov Decision Process (CMDP). With the help of causal language, our framework can place constraints on both the procedure of decision making (procedural fairness) as well as the outcomes resulting from decisions (outcome fairness). Specifically, we show that well-known fairness principles can be encoded either as a utility component, a non-causal component, or a causal component in a SCALES-CMDP. We illustrate SCALES using a set of case studies involving a simulated healthcare scenario and the real-world COMPAS dataset. Experiments demonstrate that our framework produces fair policies that embody alternative fairness principles in single-step and sequential decision-making scenarios.


Dynamic Modeling and Equilibria in Fair Decision Making

Williams, Joshua, Kolter, J. Zico

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Recent studies on fairness in automated decision making systems have both investigated the potential future impact of these decisions on the population at large, and emphasized that imposing ''typical'' fairness constraints such as demographic parity or equality of opportunity does not guarantee a benefit to disadvantaged groups. However, these previous studies have focused on either simple one-step cost/benefit criteria, or on discrete underlying state spaces. In this work, we first propose a natural continuous representation of population state, governed by the Beta distribution, using a loan granting setting as a running example. Next, we apply a model of population dynamics under lending decisions, and show that when conditional payback probabilities are estimated correctly 1) ``optimal'' behavior by lenders can lead to ''Matthew Effect'' bifurcations (i.e., ''the rich get richer and the poor get poorer''), but that 2) many common fairness constraints on the allowable policies cause groups to converge to the same equilibrium point. Last, we contrast our results in the case of misspecified conditional probability estimates with prior work, and show that for this model, different levels of group misestimation guarantees that even fair policies lead to bifurcations. We illustrate some of the modeling conclusions on real data from credit scoring.