Mean field games (MFGs) have emerged as a powerful framework for modeling interactions in large-scale multi-agent systems. Despite recent advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) for MFGs, existing methods are typically limited to finite spaces or stationary models, hindering their applicability to real-world problems. This paper introduces a novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm specifically designed for non-stationary continuous MFGs. The proposed approach builds upon a Fictitious Play (FP) methodology, leveraging DRL for bestresponse computation and supervised learning for average policy representation. Furthermore, it learns a representation of the time-dependent population distribution using a Conditional Normalizing Flow. To validate the effectiveness of our method, we evaluate it on three different examples of increasing complexity. By addressing critical limitations in scalability and density approximation, this work represents a significant advancement in applying DRL techniques to complex MFG problems, bringing the field closer to real-world multi-agent systems.

Robot sports, characterized by well-defined objectives, explicit rules, and dynamic interactions, present ideal scenarios for demonstrating embodied intelligence. In this paper, we present VolleyBots, a novel robot sports testbed where multiple drones cooperate and compete in the sport of volleyball under physical dynamics.

When solving two-player zero-sum games, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often create populations of agents where, at each iteration, a new agent is discovered as the best response to a mixture over the opponent population. Within such a process, the update rules of "who to compete with" (i.e., the opponent mixture) and "how to beat them" (i.e., finding best responses) are underpinned by manually developed game theoretical principles such as fictitious play and Double Oracle. In this paper1, we introduce a novel framework--Neural Auto-Curricula (NAC)--that leverages meta-gradient descent to automate the discovery of the learning update rule without explicit human design. Specifically, we parameterise the opponent selection module by neural networks and the bestresponse module by optimisation subroutines, and update their parameters solely via interaction with the game engine, where both players aim to minimise their exploitability. Surprisingly, even without human design, the discovered MARL algorithms achieve competitive or even better performance with the state-of-the-art population-based game solvers (e.g., PSRO) on Games of Skill, differentiable Lotto, non-transitive Mixture Games, Iterated Matching Pennies, and Kuhn Poker. Additionally, we show that NAC is able to generalise from small games to large games, for example training on Kuhn Poker and outperforming PSRO on Leduc Poker. Our work inspires a promising future direction to discover general MARL algorithms solely from data.

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 To prove Theorem 1, we need the help of the following Lemma See Proposition 7.1 in [3]. Now we can prove our Theorem 1. Proof. For games with only one step (normal-form games, functional-form games), there is only one fixed state. Therefore, the distribution of state-action is equivalent to the distribution of the action. A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 Let us restate our Theorem 2 Theorem 2. For a given empirical payoff matrix A RM N and the reward vector aM+1 for policy M + ||(I A>(A>))aM+1||2, (18) where (A>) is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of A>, and σmin(A) is the minimum singular value of A. Proof. The last equation comes from the analytic calculation of min1>β=1 ||β (A>) aM+1||2 using Lagrangian.

Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD).