However, one might argue that this analysis might not allow for sufficient differentiation between tasks. To address this concern, we expanded our evaluation to the entire MMLU benchmark. This enabled a comparable assessment of task similarity, akin to our earlier experiments.

Definition 1.Let p (r) := P s,ap (r|s, a), p (rc|s, a) := P

Learning to accurately represent environmental uncertainty is crucial for adaptive and optimal behaviors in various cognitive tasks. However, it remains unclear how the human brain, constrained by finite cognitive resources, internalise the highly structured environmental uncertainty. In this study, we explore how these learned distributions deviate from the ground truth, resulting in observable inconsistency in a novel structured density estimation task. During each trial, human participants were asked to learn and report the latent probability distribution functions underlying sequentially presented independent observations. As the number of observations increased, the reported predictive density became closer to the ground truth. Nevertheless, we observed an intriguing inconsistency in human structure estimation, specifically a large error in the number of reported clusters.

However, DeepPurpose inherits several limitations from early MRL models.

Recent advances in center-based clustering continue to improve upon the drawbacksofLloyd'scelebrated k-meansalgorithmover 60yearsafteritsintroduction.

Analysis of learned representations has a blind spot: it focuses on $similarity$, measuring how closely embeddings align with external references, but similarity reveals only what is represented, not whether that structure is robust. We introduce $geometric$ $stability$, a distinct dimension that quantifies how reliably representational geometry holds under perturbation, and present $Shesha$, a framework for measuring it. Across 2,463 configurations in seven domains, we show that stability and similarity are empirically uncorrelated ($ρ\approx 0.01$) and mechanistically distinct: similarity metrics collapse after removing the top principal components, while stability retains sensitivity to fine-grained manifold structure. This distinction yields actionable insights: for safety monitoring, stability acts as a functional geometric canary, detecting structural drift nearly 2$\times$ more sensitively than CKA while filtering out the non-functional noise that triggers false alarms in rigid distance metrics; for controllability, supervised stability predicts linear steerability ($ρ= 0.89$-$0.96$); for model selection, stability dissociates from transferability, revealing a geometric tax that transfer optimization incurs. Beyond machine learning, stability predicts CRISPR perturbation coherence and neural-behavioral coupling. By quantifying $how$ $reliably$ systems maintain structure, geometric stability provides a necessary complement to similarity for auditing representations across biological and computational systems.

Narratives about artificial intelligence (AI) entangle autonomy, the capacity to self-govern, with sentience, the capacity to sense and feel. AI agents that perform tasks autonomously and companions that recognize and express emotions may activate mental models of autonomy and sentience, respectively, provoking distinct reactions. To examine this possibility, we conducted three pilot studies (N = 374) and four preregistered vignette experiments describing an AI as autonomous, sentient, both, or neither (N = 2,702). Activating a mental model of sentience increased general mind perception (cognition and emotion) and moral consideration more than autonomy, but autonomy increased perceived threat more than sentience. Sentience also increased perceived autonomy more than vice versa. Based on a within-paper meta-analysis, sentience changed reactions more than autonomy on average. By disentangling different mental models of AI, we can study human-AI interaction with more precision to better navigate the detailed design of anthropomorphized AI and prompting interfaces.

Explanatory Interactive Learning (XIL) is a powerful interactive learning framework designed to enable users to customize and correct AI models by interacting with their explanations. In a nutshell, XIL algorithms select a number of items on which an AI model made a decision (e.g. images and their tags) and present them to users, together with corresponding explanations (e.g. image regions that drive the model's decision). Then, users supply corrective feedback for the explanations, which the algorithm uses to improve the model. Despite showing promise in debugging tasks, recent studies have raised concerns that explanatory interaction may trigger order effects, a well-known cognitive bias in which the sequence of presented items influences users' trust and, critically, the quality of their feedback. We argue that these studies are not entirely conclusive, as the experimental designs and tasks employed differ substantially from common XIL use cases, complicating interpretation. To clarify the interplay between order effects and explanatory interaction, we ran two larger-scale user studies (n = 713 total) designed to mimic common XIL tasks. Specifically, we assessed order effects both within and between debugging sessions by manipulating the order in which correct and wrong explanations are presented to participants. Order effects had a limited, through significant impact on users' agreement with the model (i.e., a behavioral measure of their trust), and only when examined withing debugging sessions, not between them. The quality of users' feedback was generally satisfactory, with order effects exerting only a small and inconsistent influence in both experiments. Overall, our findings suggest that order effects do not pose a significant issue for the successful employment of XIL approaches. More broadly, our work contributes to the ongoing efforts for understanding human factors in AI.