Belief merging aims at extracting a coherent and informative view from a set of belief bases. A first requirement for belief merging operators is to obey basic rationality conditions. Another expected property is to preserve as much information as possible from the input bases. In this paper, we show how new merging operators, called compositional operators, can be defined from existing ones. Such operators aim at offering a higher discriminative power than the merging operators on which they are based, without leading to a complexity shift or losing rationality postulates. We identify some sufficient conditions for ensuring that rationality is fully preserved by composition.

Belief merging aims at defining the beliefs of a group of agents from the beliefs of each member of the group. It is related to more general notions of aggregation from economics (social choice theory). Two main subclasses of belief merging operators exist: majority operators which are related to utilitarianism, and arbitration operators which are related to egalitarianism. Though utilitarian (majority) operators have been extensively studied so far, there is much less work on egalitarian operators. In order to fill the gap, we investigate possible translations in a belief merging framework of some egalitarian properties and concepts coming from social choice theory, such as Sen-Hammond equity, Pigou- Dalton property, median, and Lorenz curves. We study how these properties interact with the standard rationality conditions considered in belief merging. Among other results, we show that the distance-based merging operators satisfying Sen-Hammond equity are mainly those for which leximax is used as the aggregation function.

We define a consensus postulate in the propositional belief merging setting. In a nutshell, this postulate imposes the merged base to be consistent with the pieces of information provided by each agent involved in the merging process. The interplay of this new postulate with the IC postulates for belief merging is studied, and an incompatibility result is proved. The maximal sets of IC postulates which are consistent with the consensus postulate are exhibited. When satisfying some of the remaining IC postulates, consensus operators are shown to suffer from a weak inferential power. We then introduce two families of consensus operators having a better inferential power by setting aside some of these postulates.

Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e., the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to a better merged base according to her point of view. Obviously, strategy-proof operators are highly desirable in order to guarantee equity among agents even when some of them are not sincere. In this paper, we draw the strategy-proof landscape for many merging operators from the literature, including model-based ones and formula-based ones. Both the general case and several restrictions on the merging process are considered.