Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have transformed natural language understanding and generation, leading to extensive benchmarking across diverse tasks. However, cryptanalysis - a critical area for data security and its connection to LLMs' generalization abilities - remains underexplored in LLM evaluations. To address this gap, we evaluate the cryptanalytic potential of state-of-the-art LLMs on ciphertexts produced by a range of cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a benchmark dataset of diverse plaintexts, spanning multiple domains, lengths, writing styles, and topics, paired with their encrypted versions. Using zero-shot and few-shot settings along with chain-of-thought prompting, we assess LLMs' decryption success rate and discuss their comprehension abilities. Our findings reveal key insights into LLMs' strengths and limitations in side-channel scenarios and raise concerns about their susceptibility to under-generalization-related attacks. This research highlights the dual-use nature of LLMs in security contexts and contributes to the ongoing discussion on AI safety and security.

This paper presents a systematic evaluation of Large Language Models' (LLMs) behavior on long-tail distributed (encrypted) texts and their safety implications. We introduce a two-dimensional framework for assessing LLM safety: (1) instruction refusal-the ability to reject harmful obfuscated instructions, and (2) generation safety-the suppression of generating harmful responses. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that models that possess capabilities to decrypt ciphers may be susceptible to mismatched-generalization attacks: their safety mechanisms fail on at least one safety dimension, leading to unsafe responses or over-refusal. Based on these findings, we evaluate a number of pre-LLM and post-LLM safeguards and discuss their strengths and limitations. This work contributes to understanding the safety of LLM in long-tail text scenarios and provides directions for developing robust safety mechanisms.

Encrypted traffic classification is the task of identifying the application or service associated with encrypted network traffic. One effective approach for this task is to use deep learning methods to encode the raw traffic bytes directly and automatically extract features for classification (byte-based models). However, current byte-based models input raw traffic bytes, whether plaintext or encrypted text, for automated feature extraction, neglecting the distinct impacts of plaintext and encrypted text on downstream tasks. Additionally, these models primarily focus on improving classification accuracy, with little emphasis on the efficiency of models. In this paper, for the first time, we analyze the impact of plaintext and encrypted text on the model's effectiveness and efficiency. Based on our observations and findings, we propose a two-phase approach to balance the trade-off between plaintext and encrypted text in traffic classification. Specifically, Stage one is to Determine whether the Plain text is enough to be accurately Classified (DPC) using the proposed DPC Selector. This stage quickly identifies samples that can be classified using plaintext, leveraging explicit byte features in plaintext to enhance model's efficiency. Stage two aims to adaptively make a classification with the result from stage one. This stage incorporates encrypted text information for samples that cannot be classified using plaintext alone, ensuring the model's effectiveness on traffic classification tasks. Experiments on two datasets demonstrate that our proposed model achieves state-of-the-art results in both effectiveness and efficiency.