We consider a learner's problem of acquiring data dynamically for training a regression model, where the training data are collected from strategic data sources. A fundamental challenge is to incentivize data holders to exert effort to improve the quality of their reported data, despite that the quality is not directly verifiable by the learner. In this work, we study a dynamic data acquisition process where data holders can contribute multiple times.

Increasing the thinking budget of AI models can significantly improve accuracy, but not all questions warrant the same amount of reasoning. Users may prefer to allocate different amounts of reasoning effort depending on how they value output quality versus latency and cost. To leverage this tradeoff effectively, users need fine-grained control over the amount of thinking used for a particular query, but few approaches enable such control. Existing methods require users to specify the absolute number of desired tokens, but this requires knowing the difficulty of the problem beforehand to appropriately set the token budget for a query. To address these issues, we propose Adaptive Effort Control, a self-adaptive reinforcement learning method that trains models to use a user-specified fraction of tokens relative to the current average chain-of-thought length for each query. This approach eliminates dataset- and phase-specific tuning while producing better cost-accuracy tradeoff curves compared to standard methods. Users can dynamically adjust the cost-accuracy trade-off through a continuous effort parameter specified at inference time. We observe that the model automatically learns to allocate resources proportionally to the task difficulty and, across model scales ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, our approach enables a 2-3x reduction in chain-of-thought length while maintaining or improving performance relative to the base model used for RL training.

This paper investigates the critical role of trust and fatigue in human-cobot collaborative order picking, framing the challenge within the scope of Logistics 5.0: the implementation of human-robot symbiosis in smart logistics. We propose a dynamic, leader-follower Stackelberg game to model this interaction, where utility functions explicitly account for human fatigue and trust. Through agent-based simulations, we demonstrate that while a naive model leads to a "trust death spiral," a refined trust model creates a "trust synergy cycle," increasing productivity by nearly 100 percent. Finally, we show that a cobot operating in a Trust-Recovery Mode can overcome system brittleness after a disruption, reducing trust recovery time by over 75 percent compared to a non-adaptive model. Our findings provide a framework for designing intelligent cobot behaviors that fulfill the Industry 5.0 pillars of human-centricity, sustainability, and resilience.

Quantified formulas pose a significant challenge for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers due to their inherent undecidability. Existing instantiation techniques, such as e-matching, syntax-guided, model-based, conflict-based, and enumerative methods, often complement each other. This paper introduces a novel instantiation approach that dynamically learns from these techniques during solving. By treating observed instantiations as samples from a latent language, we use probabilistic context-free grammars to generate new, similar terms. Our method not only mimics successful past instantiations but also explores diversity by optionally inverting learned term probabilities, aiming to balance exploitation and exploration in quantifier reasoning.

Federated learning (FL) provides a promising paradigm for facilitating collaboration between multiple clients that jointly learn a global model without directly sharing their local data. However, existing research suffers from two caveats: 1) From the perspective of agents, voluntary and unselfish participation is often assumed. But self-interested agents may opt out of the system or provide low-quality contributions without proper incentives; 2) From the mechanism designer's perspective, the aggregated models can be unsatisfactory as the existing game-theoretical federated learning approach for data collection ignores the potential heterogeneous effort caused by contributed data. To alleviate above challenges, we propose an incentive-aware framework for agent participation that considers data heterogeneity to accelerate the convergence process. Specifically, we first introduce the notion of Wasserstein distance to explicitly illustrate the heterogeneous effort and reformulate the existing upper bound of convergence. To induce truthful reporting from agents, we analyze and measure the generalization error gap of any two agents by leveraging the peer prediction mechanism to develop score functions. We further present a two-stage Stackelberg game model that formalizes the process and examines the existence of equilibrium. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.

Summary: In this paper, the authors explore the problem of data collecting using crowdsourcing. In the setting of the paper, each task is a labeling task with binary labels, and workers are strategic in choosing effort levels and reporting strategies that maximize their utility. The true label for each task and workers' parameters are all unknown to the requester. The requester's goal is to learn how to decide the payment and how to aggregate the collected labels by learning from workers' past answers. The authors' proposed approach is a combination of incentive design, Bayesian inference, and reinforcement learning.

We consider a learner's problem of acquiring data dynamically for training a regression model, where the training data are collected from strategic data sources. A fundamental challenge is to incentivize data holders to exert effort to improve the quality of their reported data, despite that the quality is not directly verifiable by the learner. In this work, we study a dynamic data acquisition process where data holders can contribute multiple times.

We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst $k$ Agents at each of $T$ rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a $T$-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory -- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy \emph{non-responsive} equilibrium amongst the Agents -- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a \emph{monotone} bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight -- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed $T$-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight -- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.

Because high-quality data is like oxygen for AI systems, effectively eliciting information from crowdsourcing workers has become a first-order problem for developing high-performance machine learning algorithms. Two prevalent paradigms, spot-checking and peer prediction, enable the design of mechanisms to evaluate and incentivize high-quality data from human labelers. So far, at least three metrics have been proposed to compare the performances of these techniques [33, 8, 3]. However, different metrics lead to divergent and even contradictory results in various contexts. In this paper, we harmonize these divergent stories, showing that two of these metrics are actually the same within certain contexts and explain the divergence of the third. Moreover, we unify these different contexts by introducing \textit{Spot Check Equivalence}, which offers an interpretable metric for the effectiveness of a peer prediction mechanism. Finally, we present two approaches to compute spot check equivalence in various contexts, where simulation results verify the effectiveness of our proposed metric.

Counterfactual (CF) explanations, also known as contrastive explanations and algorithmic recourses, are popular for explaining machine learning models in high-stakes domains. For a subject that receives a negative model prediction (e.g., mortgage application denial), the CF explanations are similar instances but with positive predictions, which informs the subject of ways to improve. While their various properties have been studied, such as validity and stability, we contribute a novel one: their behaviors under iterative partial fulfillment (IPF). Specifically, upon receiving a CF explanation, the subject may only partially fulfill it before requesting a new prediction with a new explanation, and repeat until the prediction is positive. Such partial fulfillment could be due to the subject's limited capability (e.g., can only pay down two out of four credit card accounts at this moment) or an attempt to take the chance (e.g., betting that a monthly salary increase of \$800 is enough even though \$1,000 is recommended). Does such iterative partial fulfillment increase or decrease the total cost of improvement incurred by the subject? We mathematically formalize IPF and demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that different CF algorithms exhibit vastly different behaviors under IPF. We discuss implications of our observations, advocate for this factor to be carefully considered in the development and study of CF algorithms, and give several directions for future work.