In the highly complex and stochastic global, supply chain environments, local enterprise agents seek distributed and dynamic strategies for agile responses to disruptions. Existing literature explores both centralized and distributed approaches, while most work neglects temporal dynamics and the heterogeneity of the risk management of individual agents. To address this gap, this letter presents a heterogeneous risk management mechanism to incorporate uncertainties and risk attitudes into agent communication and decision-making strategy. Hence, this approach empowers enterprises to handle disruptions in stochastic environments in a distributed way, and in particular in the context of multi-agent control and management. Through a simulated case study, we showcase the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach under stochastic settings and how the decision of disruption responses changes when agents hold various risk attitudes.

Public models offer predictions to a variety of downstream tasks and have played a crucial role in various AI applications, showcasing their proficiency in accurate predictions. However, the exclusive emphasis on prediction accuracy may not align with the diverse end objectives of downstream agents. Recognizing the public model's predictions as a service, we advocate for integrating the objectives of downstream agents into the optimization process. Concretely, to address performance disparities and foster fairness among heterogeneous agents in training, we propose a novel Equitable Objective. This objective, coupled with a policy gradient algorithm, is crafted to train the public model to produce a more equitable/uniform performance distribution across downstream agents, each with their unique concerns. Both theoretical analysis and empirical case studies have proven the effectiveness of our method in advancing performance equity across diverse downstream agents utilizing the public model for their decision-making. Codes and datasets are released at https://github.com/Ren-Research/Socially-Equitable-Public-Models.

We study the problem of making predictions so that downstream agents who best respond to them will be guaranteed diminishing swap regret, no matter what their utility functions are. It has been known since Foster and Vohra (1997) that agents who best-respond to calibrated forecasts have no swap regret. Unfortunately, the best known algorithms for guaranteeing calibrated forecasts in sequential adversarial environments do so at rates that degrade exponentially with the dimension of the prediction space. In this work, we show that by making predictions that are not calibrated, but are unbiased subject to a carefully selected collection of events, we can guarantee arbitrary downstream agents diminishing swap regret at rates that substantially improve over the rates that result from calibrated forecasts -- while maintaining the appealing property that our forecasts give guarantees for any downstream agent, without our forecasting algorithm needing to know their utility function. We give separate results in the ``low'' (1 or 2) dimensional setting and the ``high'' ($> 2$) dimensional setting. In the low dimensional setting, we show how to make predictions such that all agents who best respond to our predictions have diminishing swap regret -- in 1 dimension, at the optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$ rate. In the high dimensional setting we show how to make forecasts that guarantee regret scaling at a rate of $O(T^{2/3})$ (crucially, a dimension independent exponent), under the assumption that downstream agents smoothly best respond. Our results stand in contrast to rates that derive from agents who best respond to calibrated forecasts, which have an exponential dependence on the dimension of the prediction space.

HAPTIC is individuals - agents or humans - within them to establish grounded in game theory and probabilistic modeling. It has successful relationships with their partners. In Supply been proved that HAPTIC agents learn other agents' behaviors Chain Management (SCM), establishing trust improves the reliably using direct observations. One shortcoming of chances of a successful supply chain relationship, and increases HAPTIC is that it does not support reported observations.

HAPTIC is grounded in game theory and probabilistic modeling. It has been proved that My thesis contributes to the field of multi-agent HAPTIC agents learn other agents' behaviors reliably using systems by proposing a novel trust-based decision direct observations. One shortcoming of HAPTIC is that it model for supply chain management.

Many real-world applications, such as Supply Chain Management (SCM), can be modeled using multi-agent systems. One shortcoming of current SCM models is that their trust models are ad hoc and do not have a strong theoretical basis. We propose a trust model for SCM that is grounded in probabilistic game theory. In this model, trust can be gained through direct interactions, and/or by asking for information from other trustworthy agents. We will use this model to simulate and study supply chain market behavior.

One of the critical factors for a successful cooperative relationship in a supply chain partnership is trust. Many real-world applications, such as Supply Chain Management (SCM), can be modeled using multi-agent systems. One shortcoming of current SCM models is that their trust models are ad hoc and do not have a strong theoretical basis. As a result, they are unable to model subtleties in agent behavior that can be used to build a more accurate trust model. We propose a trust model for SCM that is grounded in probabilistic game theory. In this model, trust can be gained through direct interactions and/or by asking for information from other trustworthy agents. We will use this model to simulate and study supply chain market behavior.