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FedFed: Feature Distillation against Data Heterogeneity in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) typically faces data heterogeneity, i.e., distribution shifting among clients. Sharing clients' information has shown great potentiality in mitigating data heterogeneity, yet incurs a dilemma in preserving privacy and promoting model performance. To alleviate the dilemma, we raise a fundamental question: Is it possible to share partial features in the data to tackle data heterogeneity?In this work, we give an affirmative answer to this question by proposing a novel approach called Fed
The Best of Both Worlds: On the Dilemma of Out-of-distribution Detection
Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection is essential for model trustworthiness which aims to sensitively identity semantic OOD samples and robustly generalize for covariate-shifted OOD samples. However, we discover that the superior OOD detection performance of state-of-the-art methods is achieved by secretly sacrificing the OOD generalization ability. The classification accuracy frequently collapses catastrophically when even slight noise is encountered. Such a phenomenon violates the motivation of trustworthiness and significantly limits the model's deployment in the real world. What is the hidden reason behind such a limitation?
Similarity-based cooperative equilibrium
As machine learning agents act more autonomously in the world, they will increasingly interact with each other. Unfortunately, in many social dilemmas like the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, standard game theory predicts that ML agents will fail to cooperate with each other. Prior work has shown that one way to enable cooperative outcomes in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is to make the agents mutually transparent to each other, i.e., to allow them to access one another's source code (Rubinstein, 1998; Tennenholtz, 2004) - or weights in the case of ML agents. However, full transparency is often unrealistic, whereas partial transparency is commonplace. Moreover, it is challenging for agents to learn their way to cooperation in the full transparency setting. In this paper, we introduce a more realistic setting in which agents only observe a single number indicating how similar they are to each other. We prove that this allows for the same set of cooperative outcomes as the full transparency setting. We also demonstrate experimentally that cooperation can be learned using simple ML methods.
Inducing Equilibria via Incentives: Simultaneous Design-and-Play Ensures Global Convergence
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the payoffs of the agents with incentives while anticipating the response of the agents, who play a non-cooperative game that converges to an equilibrium. The existing bilevel optimization algorithms raise a dilemma when applied to this problem: anticipating how incentives affect the agents at equilibrium requires solving the equilibrium problem repeatedly, which is computationally inefficient; bypassing the time-consuming step of equilibrium-finding can reduce the computational cost, but may lead the designer to a sub-optimal solution. To address such a dilemma, we propose a method that tackles the designer's and agents' problems simultaneously in a single loop. Specifically, at each iteration, both the designer and the agents only move one step. Nevertheless, we allow the designer to gradually learn the overall influence of the incentives on the agents, which guarantees optimality after convergence. The convergence rate of the proposed scheme is also established for a broad class of games.
MG-Net: Learn to Customize QAOA with Circuit Depth Awareness
However, their practical realization confronts a dilemma: the requisite circuit depth for satisfactory performance is problem-specific and often exceeds the maximum capability of current quantum devices. To address this dilemma, here we first analyze the convergence behavior of QAOA, uncovering the origins of this dilemma and elucidating the intricate relationship between the employed mixer Hamiltonian, the specific problem at hand, and the permissible maximum circuit depth. Harnessing this understanding, we introduce the Mixer Generator Network (MG-Net), a unified deep learning framework adept at dynamically formulating optimal mixer Hamiltonians tailored to distinct tasks and circuit depths. Systematic simulations, encompassing Ising models and weighted Max-Cut instances with up to 64 qubits, substantiate our theoretical findings, highlighting MG-Net's superior performance in terms of both approximation ratio and efficiency.