When should we defer to AI outputs over human expert judgment? Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, I motivate the idea that some AI systems qualify as Artificial Epistemic Authorities (AEAs) due to their demonstrated reliability and epistemic su periority. I then introduce AI Preemptionism, the view that AEA outputs should replace rather than supplement a user's independent epistemic reasons. I show that classic objections to preemptionism - such as uncritical deference, epistemic entren chment, and unhinging epistemic bases - apply in amplified form to AEAs, given their opacity, self-reinforcing authority, and lack of epistemic failure markers. Against this, I develop a more promising alternative: a total evidence view of AI deference. According to this view, AEA outputs should function as contributory reasons rather than outright replacements for a user's independent epistemic considerations. This approach has three key advantages: (i) it mitigates expertise atrophy by keeping human users engaged, (ii) it provides an epistemic case for meaningful human oversight and control, and (iii) it explains the justified mistrust of AI when reliability conditions are unmet. While demanding in practice, this account offers a principled way to determine when AI deference is justified, particularly in high-stakes contexts requiring rigorous reliability.

Constructing assurance cases is a widely used, and sometimes required, process toward demonstrating that safety-critical systems will operate safely in their planned environment. To mitigate the risk of errors and missing edge cases, the concept of defeaters - arguments or evidence that challenge claims in an assurance case - has been introduced. Defeaters can provide timely detection of weaknesses in the arguments, prompting further investigation and timely mitigations. However, capturing defeaters relies on expert judgment, experience, and creativity and must be done iteratively due to evolving requirements and regulations. This paper proposes CoDefeater, an automated process to leverage large language models (LLMs) for finding defeaters. Initial results on two systems show that LLMs can efficiently find known and unforeseen feasible defeaters to support safety analysts in enhancing the completeness and confidence of assurance cases.

A traditional assurance case employs a positive argument in which reasoning steps, grounded on evidence and assumptions, sustain a top claim that has external significance. Human judgement is required to check the evidence, the assumptions, and the narrative justifications for the reasoning steps; if all are assessed good, then the top claim can be accepted. A valid concern about this process is that human judgement is fallible and prone to confirmation bias. The best defense against this concern is vigorous and skeptical debate and discussion in the manner of a dialectic or Socratic dialog. There is merit in recording aspects of this discussion for the benefit of subsequent developers and assessors. Defeaters are a means doing this: they express doubts about aspects of the argument and can be developed into subcases that confirm or refute the doubts, and can record them as documentation to assist future consideration. This report describes how defeaters, and multiple levels of defeaters, should be represented and assessed in Assurance 2.0 and its Clarissa/ASCE tool support. These mechanisms also support eliminative argumentation, which is a contrary approach to assurance, favored by some, that uses a negative argument to refute all reasons why the top claim could be false.

Defeasibility in causal reasoning implies that the causal relationship between cause and effect can be strengthened or weakened. Namely, the causal strength between cause and effect should increase or decrease with the incorporation of strengthening arguments (supporters) or weakening arguments (defeaters), respectively. However, existing works ignore defeasibility in causal reasoning and fail to evaluate existing causal strength metrics in defeasible settings. In this work, we present {\delta}-CAUSAL, the first benchmark dataset for studying defeasibility in causal reasoning. {\delta}-CAUSAL includes around 11K events spanning ten domains, featuring defeasible causality pairs, i.e., cause-effect pairs accompanied by supporters and defeaters. We further show current causal strength metrics fail to reflect the change of causal strength with the incorporation of supporters or defeaters in {\delta}-CAUSAL. To this end, we propose CESAR (Causal Embedding aSsociation with Attention Rating), a metric that measures causal strength based on token-level causal relationships. CESAR achieves a significant 69.7% relative improvement over existing metrics, increasing from 47.2% to 80.1% in capturing the causal strength change brought by supporters and defeaters. We further demonstrate even Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-3.5 still lag 4.5 and 10.7 points behind humans in generating supporters and defeaters, emphasizing the challenge posed by {\delta}-CAUSAL.

An assurance case is intended to provide justifiable confidence in the truth of its top claim, which typically concerns safety or security. A natural question is then "how much" confidence does the case provide? We argue that confidence cannot be reduced to a single attribute or measurement. Instead, we suggest it should be based on attributes that draw on three different perspectives: positive, negative, and residual doubts. Positive Perspectives consider the extent to which the evidence and overall argument of the case combine to make a positive statement justifying belief in its claims. We set a high bar for justification, requiring it to be indefeasible. The primary positive measure for this is soundness, which interprets the argument as a logical proof. Confidence in evidence can be expressed probabilistically and we use confirmation measures to ensure that the "weight" of evidence crosses some threshold. In addition, probabilities can be aggregated from evidence through the steps of the argument using probability logics to yield what we call probabilistic valuations for the claims. Negative Perspectives record doubts and challenges to the case, typically expressed as defeaters, and their exploration and resolution. Assurance developers must guard against confirmation bias and should vigorously explore potential defeaters as they develop the case, and should record them and their resolution to avoid rework and to aid reviewers. Residual Doubts: the world is uncertain so not all potential defeaters can be resolved. We explore risks and may deem them acceptable or unavoidable. It is crucial however that these judgments are conscious ones and that they are recorded in the assurance case. This report examines the perspectives in detail and indicates how Clarissa, our prototype toolset for Assurance 2.0, assists in their evaluation.

The study of defeasible reasoning unites epistemologists with those working in AI, in part, because both are interested in epistemic rationality. While it is traditionally thought to govern the formation and (with)holding of beliefs, epistemic rationality may also apply to the interrogative attitudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry, such as wondering, investigating, and curiosity. Since generally intelligent systems should be capable of rational inquiry, AI researchers have a natural interest in the norms that govern interrogative attitudes. Following its recent coinage, we use the term "zetetic" to refer to the properties and norms associated with the capacity to inquire. In this paper, we argue that zetetic norms can be modeled via defeasible inferences to and from questions---a.k.a erotetic inferences---in a manner similar to the way norms of epistemic rationality are represented by defeasible inference rules. We offer a sequent calculus that accommodates the unique features of "erotetic defeat" and that exhibits the computational properties needed to inform the design of zetetic agents. The calculus presented here is an improved version of the one presented in Millson (2019), extended to cover a new class of defeasible erotetic inferences.

This paper formally compares some central notions from two well-known formalisms for rule-based argumentation, DeLP and ASPIC+. The comparisons especially focus on intuitive adequacy and inter-translatability, consistency, and closure properties. As for differences in the definitions of arguments and attack, it turns out that DeLP's definitions are intuitively appealing but that they may not fully comply with Caminada and Amgoud's rationality postulates of strict closure and indirect consistency. For some special cases, the DeLP definitions are shown to fare better than ASPIC+. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to consider a variant of DeLP with grounded semantics, since in some examples its current notion of warrant arguably has counterintuitive consequences and may lead to sets of warranted arguments that are not admissible. Finally, under some minimality and consistency assumptions on ASPIC+ arguments, a one-to-many correspondence between ASPIC+ arguments and DeLP arguments is identified in such a way that if the DeLP warranting procedure is changed to grounded semantics, then DeLP notion of warrant and ASPIC+'s notion of justification are equivalent. This result is proven for three alternative definitions of attack.

Linear Logic and Defeasible Logic have been adopted to formalise different features relevant to agents: consumption of resources, and reasoning with exceptions. We propose a framework to combine sub-structural features, corresponding to the consumption of resources, with defeasibility aspects, and we discuss the design choices for the framework.

Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the problem by adapting various classical social-choice-theoretic properties for the argumentation domain. We show that while argument-wise plurality voting satisfies many properties, it fails to guarantee the collective rationality of the outcome, and struggles with ties. We then present more general results, proving multiple impossibility results on the existence of any good aggregation operator. After characterising the sufficient and necessary conditions for satisfying collective rationality, we study whether restricting the domain of argument-wise plurality voting to classical semantics allows us to escape the impossibility result. We close by listing graph-theoretic restrictions under which argument-wise plurality rule does produce collectively rational outcomes. In addition to identifying fundamental barriers to collective argument evaluation, our results open up the door for a new research agenda for the argumentation and computational social choice communities.

Argumentation is a promising model for reasoning with uncertain knowledge. The key concept of acceptability enables to differentiate arguments and counterarguments: The certainty of a proposition can then be evaluated through the most acceptable arguments for that proposition. In this paper, we investigate different complementary points of view: - an acceptability based on the existence of direct counterarguments, - an acceptability based on the existence of defenders. Pursuing previous work on preference-based argumentation principles, we enforce both points of view by taking into account preference orderings for comparing arguments. Our approach is illustrated in the context of reasoning with stratified knowldge bases.