Recommending event schedules is a key issue in Event-based Social Networks (EBSNs) in order to maintain user activity. An effective recommendation is required to maximize the user's preference, subjecting to both time and geographical constraints. Existing methods face an inherent trade-off among efficiency, effectiveness, and generalization, due to the NP-hard nature of the problem. This paper proposes the Chain-of-Scheduling (CoS) framework, which activates the event scheduling capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) through a guided, efficient scheduling process. CoS enhances LLM by formulating the schedule task into three atomic stages, i.e., exploration, verification and integration. Then we enable the LLMs to generate CoS autonomously via Knowledge Distillation (KD). Experimental results show that CoS achieves near-theoretical optimal effectiveness with high efficiency on three real-world datasets in a interpretable manner. Moreover, it demonstrates strong zero-shot learning ability on out-of-domain data.

Stance detection is an active task in natural language processing (NLP) that aims to identify the author's stance towards a particular target within a text. Given the remarkable language understanding capabilities and encyclopedic prior knowledge of large language models (LLMs), how to explore the potential of LLMs in stance detection has received significant attention. Unlike existing LLM-based approaches that focus solely on fine-tuning with large-scale datasets, we propose a new prompting method, called \textit{Chain of Stance} (CoS). In particular, it positions LLMs as expert stance detectors by decomposing the stance detection process into a series of intermediate, stance-related assertions that culminate in the final judgment. This approach leads to significant improvements in classification performance. We conducted extensive experiments using four SOTA LLMs on the SemEval 2016 dataset, covering the zero-shot and few-shot learning setups. The results indicate that the proposed method achieves state-of-the-art results with an F1 score of 79.84 in the few-shot setting.

Backdoor attacks present significant threats to Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly with the rise of third-party services that offer API integration and prompt engineering. Untrustworthy third parties can plant backdoors into LLMs and pose risks to users by embedding malicious instructions into user queries. The backdoor-compromised LLM will generate malicious output when and input is embedded with a specific trigger predetermined by an attacker. Traditional defense strategies, which primarily involve model parameter fine-tuning and gradient calculation, are inadequate for LLMs due to their extensive computational and clean data requirements. In this paper, we propose a novel solution, Chain-of-Scrutiny (CoS), to address these challenges. Backdoor attacks fundamentally create a shortcut from the trigger to the target output, thus lack reasoning support. Accordingly, CoS guides the LLMs to generate detailed reasoning steps for the input, then scrutinizes the reasoning process to ensure consistency with the final answer. Any inconsistency may indicate an attack. CoS only requires black-box access to LLM, offering a practical defense, particularly for API-accessible LLMs. It is user-friendly, enabling users to conduct the defense themselves. Driven by natural language, the entire defense process is transparent to users. We validate the effectiveness of CoS through extensive experiments across various tasks and LLMs. Additionally, experiments results shows CoS proves more beneficial for more powerful LLMs.

When querying a large language model (LLM), the context, i.e. personal, demographic, and cultural information specific to an end-user, can significantly shape the response of the LLM. For example, asking the model to explain Newton's second law with the context "I am a toddler" yields a different answer compared to the context "I am a physics professor." Proper usage of the context enables the LLM to generate personalized responses, whereas inappropriate contextual influence can lead to stereotypical and potentially harmful generations (e.g. associating "female" with "housekeeper"). In practice, striking the right balance when leveraging context is a nuanced and challenging problem that is often situation-dependent. One common approach to address this challenge is to fine-tune LLMs on contextually appropriate responses. However, this approach is expensive, time-consuming, and not controllable for end-users in different situations. In this work, we propose Context Steering (CoS) - a simple training-free method that can be easily applied to autoregressive LLMs at inference time. By measuring the contextual influence in terms of token prediction likelihood and modulating it, our method enables practitioners to determine the appropriate level of contextual influence based on their specific use case and end-user base. We showcase a variety of applications of CoS including amplifying the contextual influence to achieve better personalization and mitigating unwanted influence for reducing model bias. In addition, we show that we can combine CoS with Bayesian Inference to quantify the extent of hate speech on the internet. We demonstrate the effectiveness of CoS on state-of-the-art LLMs and benchmarks.

Multi-agent systems require effective coordination between groups and individuals to achieve common goals. However, current multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods primarily focus on improving individual policies and do not adequately address group-level policies, which leads to weak cooperation. To address this issue, we propose a novel Consensus-oriented Strategy (CoS) that emphasizes group and individual policies simultaneously. Specifically, CoS comprises two main components: (a) the vector quantized group consensus module, which extracts discrete latent embeddings that represent the stable and discriminative group consensus, and (b) the group consensus-oriented strategy, which integrates the group policy using a hypernet and the individual policies using the group consensus, thereby promoting coordination at both the group and individual levels. Through empirical experiments on cooperative navigation tasks with both discrete and continuous spaces, as well as Google research football, we demonstrate that CoS outperforms state-of-the-art MARL algorithms and achieves better collaboration, thus providing a promising solution for achieving effective coordination in multi-agent systems.

Deep neural networks are known to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. In this work, we focus on improving adversarial robustness in the challenging zero-shot image classification setting. To address this issue, we propose LAAT, a novel Language-driven, Anchor-based Adversarial Training strategy. LAAT utilizes a text encoder to generate fixed anchors (normalized feature embeddings) for each category and then uses these anchors for adversarial training. By leveraging the semantic consistency of the text encoders, LAAT can enhance the adversarial robustness of the image model on novel categories without additional examples. We identify the large cosine similarity problem of recent text encoders and design several effective techniques to address it. The experimental results demonstrate that LAAT significantly improves zero-shot adversarial performance, outperforming previous state-of-the-art adversarially robust one-shot methods. Moreover, our method produces substantial zero-shot adversarial robustness when models are trained on large datasets such as ImageNet-1K and applied to several downstream datasets.

A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.

Distributed, online data mining systems have emerged as a result of applications requiring analysis of large amounts of correlated and high-dimensional data produced by multiple distributed data sources. We propose a distributed online data classification framework where data is gathered by distributed data sources and processed by a heterogeneous set of distributed learners which learn online, at run-time, how to classify the different data streams either by using their locally available classification functions or by helping each other by classifying each other's data. Importantly, since the data is gathered at different locations, sending the data to another learner to process incurs additional costs such as delays, and hence this will be only beneficial if the benefits obtained from a better classification will exceed the costs. We model the problem of joint classification by the distributed and heterogeneous learners from multiple data sources as a distributed contextual bandit problem where each data is characterized by a specific context. We develop a distributed online learning algorithm for which we can prove sublinear regret. Compared to prior work in distributed online data mining, our work is the first to provide analytic regret results characterizing the performance of the proposed algorithm.

Cooperation among automated agents is becoming increasingly important in various artificial intelligence applications. Coalitional (i.e., cooperative) game theory supplies conceptual and mathematical tools useful in the analysis of such interactions, and in particular in the achievement of stable outcomes among self-interested agents. Here, we study the minimal external subsidy required to stabilize the core of a coalitional game. Following the Cost of Stability (CoS) model introduced by Bachrach et al. [2009a], we give tight bounds on the required subsidy under various restrictions on the social structure of the game. We then compare the extended core induced by subsidies with the least core of the game, proving tight bounds on the ratio between the minimal subsidy and the minimal demand relaxation that each lead to stability.

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability. We define the \emph{cost of stability (CoS)} as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with coalition structures.