Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution concept for multi-player general-sum IIEFGs. However, existing algorithms for finding an EFCE require full feedback from the game, and it remains open how to efficiently learn the EFCE in the more challenging bandit feedback setting where the game can only be learned by observations from repeated playing. This paper presents the first sample-efficient algorithm for learning the EFCE from bandit feedback. We begin by proposing K-EFCE--a generalized definition that allows players to observe and deviate from the recommended actions for K times. The K-EFCE includes the EFCE as a special case at K = 1, and is an increasingly stricter notion of equilibrium as K increases.

In this paper we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in a general-sum multiplayer game, the swap regret of each player after T repetitions of the game is bounded by O(logT), improving over the prior best bounds of O(log4(T)). At the same time, we guarantee optimal O( T) swap regret in the adversarial regime as well. To obtain these results, our primary contribution is to show that when all players follow our dynamics with a time-invariant learning rate, the second-order path lengths of the dynamics up to time T are bounded by O(logT), a fundamental property which could have further implications beyond near-optimally bounding the (swap) regret. Our proposed learning dynamics combine in a novel way optimistic regularized learning with the use of self-concordant barriers. Further, our analysis is remarkably simple, bypassing the cumbersome framework of higher-order smoothness recently developed by Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (NeurIPS'21).

In this paper, we develop efficient parameterized algorithms for regimes between these two extremes.

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