Learning to make decisions from observed data in dynamic environments remains a problem of fundamental importance in a numbers of fields, from artificial intelligence and robotics, to medicine and finance. This paper concerns the problem of learning control policies for unknown linear dynamical systems so as to maximize a quadratic reward function. We present a method to optimize the expected value of the reward over the posterior distribution of the unknown system parameters, given data. The algorithm involves sequential convex programing, and enjoys reliable local convergence and robust stability guarantees. Numerical simulations and stabilization of a real-world inverted pendulum are used to demonstrate the approach, with strong performance and robustness properties observed in both.

Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) gives an optimal convergence rate when minimizing convex stochastic objectives $f(x)$. However, in terms of making the gradients small, the original SGD does not give an optimal rate, even when $f(x)$ is convex. If $f(x)$ is convex, to find a point with gradient norm $\varepsilon$, we design an algorithm SGD3 with a near-optimal rate $\tilde{O}(\varepsilon^{-2})$, improving the best known rate $O(\varepsilon^{-8/3})$. If $f(x)$ is nonconvex, to find its $\varepsilon$-approximate local minimum, we design an algorithm SGD5 with rate $\tilde{O}(\varepsilon^{-3.5})$,

In this paper, we study the problem of escaping from saddle points in smooth nonconvex optimization problems subject to a convex set $\mathcal{C}$. We propose a generic framework that yields convergence to a second-order stationary point of the problem, if the convex set $\mathcal{C}$ is simple for a quadratic objective function.

In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics. We focus on the challenging setting where players select actions from compact convex sets and receive only bandit feedback. Our main contribution is the design of an uncoupled learning algorithm that guarantees last-iterate convergence to the Nash equilibrium with high probability. We establish a convergence rate of $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/4})$ up to polynomial factors in problem parameters. Crucially, our proposed algorithm is computationally efficient, requiring only an efficient linear optimization oracle over the players' compact action sets. The algorithm is obtained by combining techniques from experimental design and the classic Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) framework, with a carefully chosen regularizer function tailored to the geometry of the action set of each learner.

Our approach generalizes and improves all prior work on TDS learning: (1) we obtain universal learners that succeed simultaneously for large classes of test distributions, (2) achieve near-optimal error rates, and (3) give exponential improvements for constant depth circuits.