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Reviews: Near Minimax Optimal Players for the Finite-Time 3-Expert Prediction Problem

Neural Information Processing Systems

The paper studies the classic prediction with experts advice problem. There are a finite number k of experts and a finite number T of rounds. There is a player that makes sequential decisions for T rounds based on the advice of the k experts, and his goal is to minimize the maximum regret he can experience (minimax regret). Naturally, the optimal adversarial strategy is a key quantity to study here. This paper takes up the conjectured minimax optimal adversarial strategy called "Comb strategy" in the Gravin et al. paper and shows that it is indeed minimax optimal in the case of 3 experts.


Numerical solution of a PDE arising from prediction with expert advice

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

This work investigates the online machine learning problem of prediction with expert advice in an adversarial setting through numerical analysis of, and experiments with, a related partial differential equation. The problem is a repeated two-person game involving decision-making at each step informed by $n$ experts in an adversarial environment. The continuum limit of this game over a large number of steps is a degenerate elliptic equation whose solution encodes the optimal strategies for both players. We develop numerical methods for approximating the solution of this equation in relatively high dimensions ($n\leq 10$) by exploiting symmetries in the equation and the solution to drastically reduce the size of the computational domain. Based on our numerical results we make a number of conjectures about the optimality of various adversarial strategies, in particular about the non-optimality of the COMB strategy.


Finite-Time 4-Expert Prediction Problem

arXiv.org Machine Learning

We explicitly solve the nonlinear PDE that is the continuous limit of dynamic programming of \emph{expert prediction problem} in finite horizon setting with $N=4$ experts. The \emph{expert prediction problem} is formulated as a zero sum game between a player and an adversary. By showing that the solution is $\mathcal{C}^2$, we are able to show that the strategies conjectured in arXiv:1409.3040G form an asymptotic Nash equilibrium. We also prove the "Finite vs Geometric regret" conjecture proposed in arXiv:1409.3040G for $N=4$, and we give a stronger conjecture which characterizes the relation between the finite and geometric stopping.