Collaborative learning enables multiple participants to learn a single global model by exchanging focused updates instead of sharing data. One of the core challenges in collaborative learning is ensuring that participants are rewarded fairly for their contributions, which entails two key sub-problems: contribution assessment and reward allocation. This work focuses on fair reward allocation, where the participants are incentivized through model rewards - differentiated final models whose performance is commensurate with the contribution. In this work, we leverage the concept of slimmable neural networks to collaboratively learn a shared global model whose performance degrades gracefully with a reduction in model width. We also propose a post-training fair allocation algorithm that determines the model width for each participant based on their contributions. We theoretically study the convergence of our proposed approach and empirically validate it using extensive experiments on different datasets and architectures. We also extend our approach to enable training-time model reward allocation.

Collaborative learning (CL) enables multiple participants to jointly train machine learning (ML) models on decentralized data sources without raw data sharing. While the primary goal of CL is to maximize the expected accuracy gain for each participant, it is also important to ensure that the gains are fairly distributed. Specifically, no client should be negatively impacted by the collaboration, and the individual gains must ideally be commensurate with the contributions. Most existing CL algorithms require central coordination and focus on the gain maximization objective while ignoring collaborative fairness. In this work, we first show that the existing measure of collaborative fairness based on the correlation between accuracy values without and with collaboration has drawbacks because it does not account for negative collaboration gain. We argue that maximizing mean collaboration gain (MCG) while simultaneously minimizing the collaboration gain spread (CGS) is a fairer alternative. Next, we propose the CYCle protocol that enables individual participants in a private decentralized learning (PDL) framework to achieve this objective through a novel reputation scoring method based on gradient alignment between the local cross-entropy and distillation losses. Experiments on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Fed-ISIC2019 datasets empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the CYCle protocol to ensure positive and fair collaboration gain for all participants, even in cases where the data distributions of participants are highly skewed. For the simple mean estimation problem with two participants, we also theoretically show that CYCle performs better than standard FedAvg, especially when there is large statistical heterogeneity.

Collaborative Vehicle Routing is where delivery companies cooperate by sharing their delivery information and performing delivery requests on behalf of each other. This achieves economies of scale and thus reduces cost, greenhouse gas emissions, and road congestion. But which company should partner with whom, and how much should each company be compensated? Traditional game theoretic solution concepts, such as the Shapley value or nucleolus, are difficult to calculate for the real-world problem of Collaborative Vehicle Routing due to the characteristic function scaling exponentially with the number of agents. This would require solving the Vehicle Routing Problem (an NP-Hard problem) an exponential number of times. We therefore propose to model this problem as a coalitional bargaining game where - crucially - agents are not given access to the characteristic function. Instead, we implicitly reason about the characteristic function, and thus eliminate the need to evaluate the VRP an exponential number of times - we only need to evaluate it once. Our contribution is that our decentralised approach is both scalable and considers the self-interested nature of companies. The agents learn using a modified Independent Proximal Policy Optimisation. Our RL agents outperform a strong heuristic bot. The agents correctly identify the optimal coalitions 79% of the time with an average optimality gap of 4.2% and reduction in run-time of 62%.

Collaborations among various entities, such as companies, research labs, AI agents, and edge devices, have become increasingly crucial for achieving machine learning tasks that cannot be accomplished by a single entity alone. This is likely due to factors such as security constraints, privacy concerns, and limitations in computation resources. As a result, collaborative learning (CL) research has been gaining momentum. However, a significant challenge in practical applications of CL is how to effectively incentivize multiple entities to collaborate before any collaboration occurs. In this study, we propose ICL, a general framework for incentivized collaborative learning, and provide insights into the critical issue of when and why incentives can improve collaboration performance. Furthermore, we show the broad applicability of ICL to specific cases in federated learning, assisted learning, and multi-armed bandit with both theory and experimental results.