The movement to strengthen democracy in America is suffering as a surfeit of advocacy groups is crowding an ecosystem of nonprofits, coalitions, and think tanks.

Firms' algorithm development practices are often homogeneous. Whether firms train algorithms on similar data or rely on similar pre-trained models, the result is correlated predictions. In the context of personalized pricing, correlated algorithms can be viewed as a means to collude among competing firms, but whether or not this conduct is legal depends on the mechanisms of achieving collusion. We investigate the precise mechanisms through a formal game-theoretic model. Indeed, we find that (1) higher correlation diminishes consumer welfare and (2) as consumers become more price sensitive, firms are increasingly incentivized to compromise on the accuracy of their predictions in exchange for coordination. We demonstrate our theoretical results in a stylized empirical study where two firms compete using personalized pricing algorithms. Our results demonstrate a new mechanism for achieving collusion through correlation, which allows us to analyze its legal implications. Correlation through algorithms is a new frontier of anti-competitive behavior that is largely unconsidered by US antitrust law.

Among explainability techniques, SHAP stands out as one of the most popular, but often overlooks the causal structure of the problem. In response, do-SHAP employs interventional queries, but its reliance on estimands hinders its practical application. To address this problem, we propose the use of estimand-agnostic approaches, which allow for the estimation of any identifiable query from a single model, making do-SHAP feasible on complex graphs. We also develop a novel algorithm to significantly accelerate its computation at a negligible cost, as well as a method to explain inaccessible Data Generating Processes. We demonstrate the estimation and computational performance of our approach, and validate it on two real-world datasets, highlighting its potential in obtaining reliable explanations.

This position paper argues that there is an urgent need to restructure markets for the information that goes into AI systems. Specifically, producers of information goods (such as journalists, researchers, and creative professionals) need to be able to collectively bargain with AI product builders in order to receive reasonable terms and a sustainable return on the informational value they contribute. We argue that without increased market coordination or collective bargaining on the side of these primary information producers, AI will exacerbate a large-scale "information market failure" that will lead not only to undesirable concentration of capital, but also to a potential "ecological collapse" in the informational commons. On the other hand, collective bargaining in the information economy can create market frictions and aligned incentives necessary for a pro-social, sustainable AI future. We provide concrete actions to support a coalition-based approach to achieve this goal. For example, researchers and developers can establish technical mechanisms such as federated data management tools and explainable data value estimation techniques to inform and facilitate collective bargaining in the information economy. Additionally, regulatory and policy interventions may be introduced to support trusted data intermediary organizations representing guilds or syndicates of information producers.

Federated continual learning (FCL) has garnered increasing attention for its ability to support distributed computation in environments with evolving data distributions. However, the emergence of new tasks introduces both temporal and cross-client shifts, making catastrophic forgetting a critical challenge. Most existing works aggregate knowledge from clients into a global model, which may not enhance client performance since irrelevant knowledge could introduce interference, especially in heterogeneous scenarios. Additionally, directly applying decentralized approaches to FCL suffers from ineffective group formation caused by task changes. To address these challenges, we propose a decentralized dynamic cooperation framework for FCL, where clients establish dynamic cooperative learning coalitions to balance the acquisition of new knowledge and the retention of prior learning, thereby obtaining personalized models. To maximize model performance, each client engages in selective cooperation, dynamically allying with others who offer meaningful performance gains.

Signed pairwise interaction scores fundamentally conflate uniqueness (U), redundancy (R), and synergy (S). We prove this on a minimal 3-way XOR structural causal model: faithful indices such as Shapley-Taylor return zero per pair, whereas projective indices such as Shapley Interaction spread the third-order effect into pair scalars that conflate the three mechanisms. We introduce Stochastic Hi-Fi, a post-hoc, retraining-free predictability decomposition that estimates per-feature U/R/S profiles by interventional masked inference. The estimator provides exact interventional semantics, finite-sample Monte Carlo bounds, strict variance reduction from coupled diamond sampling, and uniform finite-vocabulary convergence. Across tabular SCMs, Stochastic Hi-Fi recovers structure missed by scalar baselines (up to 411x larger interaction-magnitude recovery ratios). It also separates redundant and synergistic heads in the GPT-2 IOI circuit. On NIH ChestX-ray14, Stochastic Hi-Fi matches GradCAM on Pointing Game and improves substantially on Deletion AUC.

We study fundamental connections between coalition formation games and clustering, illustrating the cross-disciplinary relevance of these concepts. We focus on graphical hedonic games where agents' preferences are compactly represented by a friendship graph and an enmity graph. In the context of clustering, friendship relations naturally align with data point similarities, whereas enmity corresponds to dissimilarities. We consider two stability notions based on single-agent deviations: local popularity and local stability.

The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various datasharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of acquiring valuable data against the cost of sharing their own. Ensuring stability in these exchanges is essential to prevent agents--or groups of agents--from departing and conducting local (and potentially more favorable) exchanges among themselves. To address this, we study a model where n agents participate in a data exchange. Each agent has an associated payoff for the data acquired from other agents and a cost incurred during sharing its own data.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

The main XAI attribution methods for deep neural networks -- GradCAM, SHAP, LIME, Integrated Gradients -- operate on separate theoretical foundations and are not formally comparable. We present GRALIS (Gradient-Riesz Averaged Locally-Integrated Shapley), a mathematical framework establishing a representation theory for attributions: every additive, linear, and continuous attribution functional on L^2(Q,mu) admits a unique canonical representation (Q, w, Delta), proved necessary by the Riesz Representation Theorem. This class encompasses SHAP, IG, LIME and linearized GradCAM, but excludes nonlinear functionals such as standard GradCAM or attention maps. Seven formal theorems provide simultaneous guarantees absent in any individual method: (T1) necessary canonical form; (T2) exact completeness; (T3) Monte Carlo convergence O(1/sqrt(m))+O(1/k); (T4) exact Shapley Interaction Values; (T5) Hoeffding ANOVA decomposition; (T6) Sobol sensitivity generalization; (T7) multi-scale extension (MS-GRALIS) with minimum-variance weights. An algebraic appendix justifies the GRALIS-SIV correspondence via the Mobius transform without circularity. GRALIS satisfies 13.5/14 axiomatic properties vs. 2.5-6/14 for individual methods, including completeness, sensitivity, locality, order-k interactions and optimal multi-scale aggregation simultaneously. Preliminary validation on BreaKHis (1,187 histology images, DenseNet-121) reports deletion faithfulness AUC +0.015 (malignant), 96% class-conditional consistency, SAL = 0.762+/-0.109 and sparsity index 0.39. Extended comparison with baseline XAI methods is planned for a companion paper.