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### Intel exec Huma Abidi on the urgent need for diversity and inclusion in AI

As part of the lead-up to Transform 2021 coming up July 12-16, we're excited to put a spotlight on some of our conference speakers who are leading impactful diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives in AI and data. We were lucky to land a conversation with Huma Abidi, senior director of AI software products and engineering at Intel. She spoke about her DE&I work in her private life, including her support for STEM education for girls in the U.S. and all over the world, founding the Women in Machine Learning group at Intel, and more. HA: This one is easy. I lead a globally diverse team of engineers and technologists responsible for delivering world-class products that enable customers to create AI solutions.

### Accurate and robust Shapley Values for explaining predictions and focusing on local important variables

Although Shapley Values (SV) are widely used in explainable AI, they can be poorly understood and estimated, which implies that their analysis may lead to spurious inferences and explanations. As a starting point, we remind an invariance principle for SV and derive the correct approach for computing the SV of categorical variables that are particularly sensitive to the encoding used. In the case of tree-based models, we introduce two estimators of Shapley Values that exploit efficiently the tree structure and are more accurate than state-of-the-art methods. For interpreting additive explanations, we recommend to filter the non-influential variables and to compute the Shapley Values only for groups of influential variables. For this purpose, we use the concept of "Same Decision Probability" (SDP) that evaluates the robustness of a prediction when some variables are missing. This prior selection procedure produces sparse additive explanations easier to visualize and analyse. Simulations and comparisons are performed with state-of-the-art algorithm, and show the practical gain of our approach.

### Large-scale, Dynamic and Distributed Coalition Formation with Spatial and Temporal Constraints

The Coalition Formation with Spatial and Temporal constraints Problem (CFSTP) is a multi-agent task allocation problem in which few agents have to perform many tasks, each with its deadline and workload. To maximize the number of completed tasks, the agents need to cooperate by forming, disbanding and reforming coalitions. The original mathematical programming formulation of the CFSTP is difficult to implement, since it is lengthy and based on the problematic Big-M method. In this paper, we propose a compact and easy-to-implement formulation. Moreover, we design D-CTS, a distributed version of the state-of-the-art CFSTP algorithm. Using public London Fire Brigade records, we create a dataset with $347588$ tasks and a test framework that simulates the mobilization of firefighters in dynamic environments. In problems with up to $150$ agents and $3000$ tasks, compared to DSA-SDP, a state-of-the-art distributed algorithm, D-CTS completes $3.79\% \pm [42.22\%, 1.96\%]$ more tasks, and is one order of magnitude more efficient in terms of communication overhead and time complexity. D-CTS sets the first large-scale, dynamic and distributed CFSTP benchmark.

### SHAQ: Incorporating Shapley Value Theory into Q-Learning for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Value factorisation proves to be a very useful technique in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), but the underlying mechanism is not yet fully understood. This paper explores a theoretic basis for value factorisation. We generalise the Shapley value in the coalitional game theory to a Markov convex game (MCG) and use it to guide value factorisation in MARL. We show that the generalised Shapley value possesses several features such as (1) accurate estimation of the maximum global value, (2) fairness in the factorisation of the global value, and (3) being sensitive to dummy agents. The proposed theory yields a new learning algorithm called Sharpley Q-learning (SHAQ), which inherits the important merits of ordinary Q-learning but extends it to MARL. In comparison with prior-arts, SHAQ has a much weaker assumption (MCG) that is more compatible with real-world problems, but has superior explainability and performance in many cases. We demonstrated SHAQ and verified the theoretic claims on Predator-Prey and StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC).

### A Formal Framework for Reasoning about Agents' Independence in Self-organizing Multi-agent Systems

Self-organization is a process where a stable pattern is formed by the cooperative behavior between parts of an initially disordered system without external control or influence. It has been introduced to multi-agent systems as an internal control process or mechanism to solve difficult problems spontaneously. However, because a self-organizing multi-agent system has autonomous agents and local interactions between them, it is difficult to predict the behavior of the system from the behavior of the local agents we design. This paper proposes a logic-based framework of self-organizing multi-agent systems, where agents interact with each other by following their prescribed local rules. The dependence relation between coalitions of agents regarding their contributions to the global behavior of the system is reasoned about from the structural and semantic perspectives. We show that the computational complexity of verifying such a self-organizing multi-agent system is in exponential time. We then combine our framework with graph theory to decompose a system into different coalitions located in different layers, which allows us to verify agents' full contributions more efficiently. The resulting information about agents' full contributions allows us to understand the complex link between local agent behavior and system level behavior in a self-organizing multi-agent system. Finally, we show how we can use our framework to model a constraint satisfaction problem.

### Budget-Constrained Coalition Strategies with Discounting

We assume that the values of propositional variables are not defined Discounting future costs and rewards is a common in the terminal state t. The agent a has multiple actions in practice in accounting, game theory, and machine each game state. These actions are depicted in Figure 1 using learning. In spite of this, existing logics for reasoning directed edges. The cost of each action to agent a is shown as about strategies with cost and resource constraints a label on the directed edge. For instance, the directed edge do not account for discounting. The paper from state w to state u with label 2 means that the agent a proposes a sound and complete logical system for has an action with cost 2 to transition the game from state w reasoning about budget-constrained strategic abilities to state u. Transitioning to the terminal state t represents the that incorporates discounting into its semantics.

### Multi-Agent Routing and Scheduling Through Coalition Formation

In task allocation for real-time domains, such as disaster response, a limited number of agents is deployed across a large area to carry out numerous tasks, each with its prerequisites, profit, time window and workload. To maximize profits while minimizing time penalties, agents need to cooperate by forming, disbanding and reforming coalitions. In this paper, we name this problem Multi-Agent Routing and Scheduling through Coalition formation (MARSC) and show that it generalizes the important Team Orienteering Problem with Time Windows. We propose a binary integer program and an anytime and scalable heuristic to solve it. Using public London Fire Brigade records, we create a dataset with 347588 tasks and a test framework that simulates the mobilization of firefighters. In problems with up to 150 agents and 3000 tasks, our heuristic finds solutions up to 3.25 times better than the Earliest Deadline First approach commonly used in real-time systems. Our results constitute the first large-scale benchmark for the MARSC problem.

### Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games

Weighted voting games is one of the most important classes of cooperative games. Recently, Zhang and Grossi [53] proposed a variant of this class, called delegative simple games, which is well suited to analyse the relative importance of each voter in liquid democracy elections. Moreover, they defined a power index, called the delagative Banzhaf index to compute the importance of each agent (i.e., both voters and delegators) in a delegation graph based on two key parameters: the total voting weight she has accumulated and the structure of supports she receives from her delegators. We obtain several results related to delegative simple games. We first propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the delegative Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values in delegative simple games. We then investigate a bribery problem where the goal is to maximize/minimize the voting power/weight of a given voter in a delegation graph by changing at most a fixed number of delegations. We show that the problems of minimizing/maximizing a voter's power index value are strongly NP-hard. Furthermore, we prove that having a better approximation guarantee than $1-1/e$ to maximize the voting weight of a voter is not possible, unless $P = NP$, then we provide some parameterized complexity results for this problem. Finally, we show that finding a delegation graph with a given number of gurus that maximizes the minimum power index value an agent can have is a computationally hard problem.

### The Shapley Value of coalition of variables provides better explanations

While Shapley Values (SV) are one of the gold standard for interpreting machine learning models, we show that they are still poorly understood, in particular in the presence of categorical variables or of variables of low importance. For instance, we show that the popular practice that consists in summing the SV of dummy variables is false as it provides wrong estimates of all the SV in the model and implies spurious interpretations. Based on the identification of null and active coalitions, and a coalitional version of the SV, we provide a correct computation and inference of important variables. Moreover, a Python library (All the experiments and simulations can be reproduced with the publicly available library Active Coalition of Variables, https://www.github.com/salimamoukou/acv00) that computes reliably conditional expectations and SV for tree-based models, is implemented and compared with state-of-the-art algorithms on toy models and real data sets.

### Why did the distribution change?

We describe a formal approach based on graphical causal models to identify the "root causes" of the change in the probability distribution of variables. After factorizing the joint distribution into conditional distributions of each variable, given its parents (the "causal mechanisms"), we attribute the change to changes of these causal mechanisms. This attribution analysis accounts for the fact that mechanisms often change independently and sometimes only some of them change. Through simulations, we study the performance of our distribution change attribution method. We then present a real-world case study identifying the drivers of the difference in the income distribution between men and women.