Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences.

We present a novel approach for explaining Gaussian processes (GPs) that can utilize the full analytical covariance structure present in GPs.

Activists are demanding a way to hold the memory-chip maker accountable to its promises to protect the environment and embrace communities of color in central New York. Days after Micron broke ground on a $100 billion chip factory in New York state, a coalition of environmentalists, labor unions, and civil rights groups are urging the US tech giant to sign a deal that would make a series of promises to be a good neighbor legally enforceable. Micron's megafab to make memory chips is on track to become the biggest commercial development in state history and the largest chipmaking complex in the country . Officials held a groundbreaking ceremony in the city of Clay, near Syracuse, last Friday. The first chips could arrive in five years, though the entire site won't be finished for 20 years.

However, the data at each location may be insufficient to train a robust model.

The critical challenge when using the Shapley value is its well-known computational intractability.

Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning paradigm that allows multiple FL participants (FL-PTs) to collaborate on training models without sharing private data. Due to data heterogeneity, negative transfer may occur in the FL training process. This necessitates FL-PT selection based on their data complementarity. In cross-silo FL, organizations that engage in business activities are key sources of FL-PTs. The resulting FL ecosystem has two features: (i) self-interest, and (ii) competition among FL-PTs.

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents into coalitions) satisfies some form of stability. The most well-known and natural of such notions is arguably core-stability. Informally, a partition is core-stable if no subset of agents would like to deviate by regrouping in a so-called core-blocking coalition. Unfortunately, core-stable partitions seldom exist and even when they do, it is often computationally intractable to find one. To circumvent these problems, we propose the notion of $\varepsilon$-fractional core-stability, where at most an $\varepsilon$-fraction of all possible coalitions is allowed to core-block. It turns out that such a relaxation may guarantee both existence and polynomial-time computation.

Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where no agent has the motivation to deviate from the grand coalition. In previous works, computing the core requires either knowledge of the reward function in deterministic games or the reward distribution in stochastic games. However, this is unrealistic, as the reward function or distribution is often only partially known and may be subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we consider the core learning problem in stochastic cooperative games, where the reward distribution is unknown. Our goal is to learn the expected core, that is, the set of allocations that are stable in expectation, given an oracle that returns a stochastic reward for an enquired coalition each round. Within the class of strictly convex games, we present an algorithm named \texttt{Common-Points-Picking} that returns a point in the expected core given a polynomial number of samples, with high probability. To analyse the algorithm, we develop a new extension of the separation hyperplane theorem for multiple convex sets.t.

Data is a critical asset for training large language models (LLMs), alongside compute resources and skilled workers. While some training data is publicly available, substantial investment is required to generate proprietary datasets, such as human preference annotations or to curate new ones from existing sources. As larger datasets generally yield better model performance, two natural questions arise. First, how can data owners make informed decisions about curation strategies and data sources investment? Second, how can multiple data owners collaboratively pool their resources to train superior models while fairly distributing the benefits? This problem, data valuation, which is not specific to large language models, has been addressed by the machine learning community through the lens of cooperative game theory, with the Shapley value being the prevalent solution concept. However, computing Shapley values is notoriously expensive for data valuation, typically requiring numerous model retrainings, which can become prohibitive for large machine learning models. In this work, we demonstrate that this computational challenge is dramatically simplified for LLMs trained with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). We show how the specific mathematical structure of DPO enables scalable Shapley value computation. We believe this observation unlocks many applications at the intersection of data valuation and large language models.

Can Bike Riders and Self-Driving Cars Be Friends? Some cycling advocates are on board with robotaxis. Others see the self-driving car boom as perpetuating auto dependency. Los Angeles is a car city, and it's rarely more obvious than from a vulnerable perch on top of a bicycle . Among big cities in the US, LA has a middling-to-bad reputation for bike riding.