This position paper argues that there is an urgent need to restructure markets for the information that goes into AI systems. Specifically, producers of information goods (such as journalists, researchers, and creative professionals) need to be able to collectively bargain with AI product builders in order to receive reasonable terms and a sustainable return on the informational value they contribute. We argue that without increased market coordination or collective bargaining on the side of these primary information producers, AI will exacerbate a large-scale "information market failure" that will lead not only to undesirable concentration of capital, but also to a potential "ecological collapse" in the informational commons. On the other hand, collective bargaining in the information economy can create market frictions and aligned incentives necessary for a pro-social, sustainable AI future. We provide concrete actions to support a coalition-based approach to achieve this goal. For example, researchers and developers can establish technical mechanisms such as federated data management tools and explainable data value estimation techniques to inform and facilitate collective bargaining in the information economy. Additionally, regulatory and policy interventions may be introduced to support trusted data intermediary organizations representing guilds or syndicates of information producers.

Federated continual learning (FCL) has garnered increasing attention for its ability to support distributed computation in environments with evolving data distributions. However, the emergence of new tasks introduces both temporal and cross-client shifts, making catastrophic forgetting a critical challenge. Most existing works aggregate knowledge from clients into a global model, which may not enhance client performance since irrelevant knowledge could introduce interference, especially in heterogeneous scenarios. Additionally, directly applying decentralized approaches to FCL suffers from ineffective group formation caused by task changes. To address these challenges, we propose a decentralized dynamic cooperation framework for FCL, where clients establish dynamic cooperative learning coalitions to balance the acquisition of new knowledge and the retention of prior learning, thereby obtaining personalized models. To maximize model performance, each client engages in selective cooperation, dynamically allying with others who offer meaningful performance gains.

We study fundamental connections between coalition formation games and clustering, illustrating the cross-disciplinary relevance of these concepts. We focus on graphical hedonic games where agents' preferences are compactly represented by a friendship graph and an enmity graph. In the context of clustering, friendship relations naturally align with data point similarities, whereas enmity corresponds to dissimilarities. We consider two stability notions based on single-agent deviations: local popularity and local stability.

The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various datasharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of acquiring valuable data against the cost of sharing their own. Ensuring stability in these exchanges is essential to prevent agents--or groups of agents--from departing and conducting local (and potentially more favorable) exchanges among themselves. To address this, we study a model where n agents participate in a data exchange. Each agent has an associated payoff for the data acquired from other agents and a cost incurred during sharing its own data.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

The main XAI attribution methods for deep neural networks -- GradCAM, SHAP, LIME, Integrated Gradients -- operate on separate theoretical foundations and are not formally comparable. We present GRALIS (Gradient-Riesz Averaged Locally-Integrated Shapley), a mathematical framework establishing a representation theory for attributions: every additive, linear, and continuous attribution functional on L^2(Q,mu) admits a unique canonical representation (Q, w, Delta), proved necessary by the Riesz Representation Theorem. This class encompasses SHAP, IG, LIME and linearized GradCAM, but excludes nonlinear functionals such as standard GradCAM or attention maps. Seven formal theorems provide simultaneous guarantees absent in any individual method: (T1) necessary canonical form; (T2) exact completeness; (T3) Monte Carlo convergence O(1/sqrt(m))+O(1/k); (T4) exact Shapley Interaction Values; (T5) Hoeffding ANOVA decomposition; (T6) Sobol sensitivity generalization; (T7) multi-scale extension (MS-GRALIS) with minimum-variance weights. An algebraic appendix justifies the GRALIS-SIV correspondence via the Mobius transform without circularity. GRALIS satisfies 13.5/14 axiomatic properties vs. 2.5-6/14 for individual methods, including completeness, sensitivity, locality, order-k interactions and optimal multi-scale aggregation simultaneously. Preliminary validation on BreaKHis (1,187 histology images, DenseNet-121) reports deletion faithfulness AUC +0.015 (malignant), 96% class-conditional consistency, SAL = 0.762+/-0.109 and sparsity index 0.39. Extended comparison with baseline XAI methods is planned for a companion paper.

Probabilistic values, including Shapley values and semivalues, provide a model-agnostic framework to attribute the behavior of a black-box model to data points or features, with a wide range of applications including explainable artificial intelligence and data valuation. However, their exact computation requires utility evaluations over exponentially many coalitions, making Monte Carlo approximation essential in modern machine learning applications. Existing estimators are often developed through different identification strategies, including weighted averages, self-normalized weighting, regression adjustment, and weighted least squares. Our key observation is that these seemingly distinct constructions share a common first-order error structure, in which the leading term is an augmented inverse-probability weighted influence term determined by the sampling law and a working surrogate function. This first-order representation yields an explicit expression for the leading mean squared error (MSE), which characterizes how the sampling law and the surrogate jointly determine statistical efficiency. Guided by this criterion, we propose an Efficiency-Aware Surrogate-adjusted Estimator (EASE) that directly chooses the sampling law and surrogate to minimize the first-order MSE. We demonstrate that EASE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art estimators for various probabilistic values.

Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates of federated learning, but also provide certain guarantees around social good properties such as total error. One branch of this research has taken a game-theoretic approach, and in particular, prior work has viewed federated learning as a hedonic game, where error-minimizing players arrange themselves into federating coalitions. This past work proves the existence of stable coalition partitions, but leaves open a wide range of questions, including how far from optimal these stable solutions are. In this work, we motivate and define a notion of optimality given by the average error rates among federating agents (players).