bravermanetal
Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret Buyers
Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan
We study the problem of how to repeatedly sell to a buyer running a no-regret,mean-based algorithm. Previous work [Braverman et al., 2018] shows that it ispossible to design effective mechanisms in such a setting that extract almost allof the economic surplus, but these mechanisms require the buyer's values each
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- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.05)
- South America > Chile > Santiago Metropolitan Region > Santiago Province > Santiago (0.05)
- North America > United States > New York > Tompkins County > Ithaca (0.04)
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- North America > United States > New York > Tompkins County > Ithaca (0.04)
- North America > Canada > British Columbia > Metro Vancouver Regional District > Vancouver (0.04)