Two 2025 publications, "AI 2027" (Kokotajlo et al., 2025) and "If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies" (Yudkowsky & Soares, 2025), assert that superintelligent artificial intelligence will almost certainly destroy or render humanity obsolete within the next decade. Both rest on the classic chain formulated by Good (1965) and Bostrom (2014): intelligence explosion, superintelligence, lethal misalignment. This article subjects each link to the empirical record of 2023-2025. Sixty years after Good's speculation, none of the required phenomena (sustained recursive self-improvement, autonomous strategic awareness, or intractable lethal misalignment) have been observed. Current generative models remain narrow, statistically trained artefacts: powerful, opaque, and imperfect, but devoid of the properties that would make the catastrophic scenarios plausible. Following Whittaker (2025a, 2025b, 2025c) and Zuboff (2019, 2025), we argue that the existential-risk thesis functions primarily as an ideological distraction from the ongoing consolidation of surveillance capitalism and extreme concentration of computational power. The thesis is further inflated by the 2025 AI speculative bubble, where trillions in investments in rapidly depreciating "digital lettuce" hardware (McWilliams, 2025) mask lagging revenues and jobless growth rather than heralding superintelligence. The thesis remains, in November 2025, a speculative hypothesis amplified by a speculative financial bubble rather than a demonstrated probability.

This article analyzes the existential risks artificial intelligence (AI) poses to humanity, tracing the trajectory from current AI to ultraintelligence. Drawing on Irving J. Good and Nick Bostrom's theoretical work, plus recent publications (AI 2027; If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies), it explores AGI and superintelligence. Considering machines' exponentially growing cognitive power and hypothetical IQs, it addresses the ethical and existential implications of an intelligence vastly exceeding humanity's, fundamentally alien. Human extinction may result not from malice, but from uncontrollable, indifferent cognitive superiority.

This study demonstrates the extent to which prominent debates about the future of AI are best understood as subjective, philosophical disagreements over the history and future of technological change rather than as objective, material disagreements over the technologies themselves. It focuses on the deep disagreements over whether artificial general intelligence (AGI) will prove transformative for human society; a question that is analytically prior to that of whether this transformative effect will help or harm humanity. The study begins by distinguishing two fundamental camps in this debate. The first of these can be identified as "transformationalists," who argue that continued AI development will inevitably have a profound effect on society. Opposed to them are "skeptics," a more eclectic group united by their disbelief that AI can or will live up to such high expectations. Each camp admits further "strong" and "weak" variants depending on their tolerance for epistemic risk. These stylized contrasts help to identify a set of fundamental questions that shape the camps' respective interpretations of the future of AI. Three questions in particular are focused on: the possibility of non-biological intelligence, the appropriate time frame of technological predictions, and the assumed trajectory of technological development. In highlighting these specific points of non-technical disagreement, this study demonstrates the wide range of different arguments used to justify either the transformationalist or skeptical position. At the same time, it highlights the strong argumentative burden of the transformationalist position, the way that belief in this position creates competitive pressures to achieve first-mover advantage, and the need to widen the concept of "expertise" in debates surrounding the future development of AI.

There is, in some quarters, concern about high-level machine intelligence and superintelligent AI coming up in a few decades, bringing with it significant risks for humanity. In other quarters, these issues are ignored or considered science fiction. We wanted to clarify what the distribution of opinions actually is, what probability the best experts currently assign to high-level machine intelligence coming up within a particular time-frame, which risks they see with that development, and how fast they see these developing. We thus designed a brief questionnaire and distributed it to four groups of experts in 2012/2013. The median estimate of respondents was for a one in two chance that high-level machine intelligence will be developed around 2040-2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075. Experts expect that systems will move on to superintelligence in less than 30 years thereafter. They estimate the chance is about one in three that this development turns out to be 'bad' or 'extremely bad' for humanity.

This article explores the concept of technological singularity and the factors that could accelerate or hinder its arrival. The butterfly effect is used as a framework to understand how seemingly small changes in complex systems can have significant and unpredictable outcomes. In section II, we discuss the various factors that could hasten the arrival of technological singularity, such as advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, breakthroughs in quantum computing, progress in brain-computer interfaces and human augmentation, and development of nanotechnology and 3D printing. In section III, we examine the factors that could delay or impede the arrival of technological singularity, including technical limitations and setbacks in AI and machine learning, ethical and societal concerns around AI and its impact on jobs and privacy, lack of sufficient investment in research and development, and regulatory barriers and political instability. Section IV explores the interplay of these factors and how they can impact the butterfly effect. Finally, in the conclusion, we summarize the key points discussed and emphasize the importance of considering the butterfly effect in predicting the future of technology. We call for continued research and investment in technology to shape its future and mitigate potential risks.

Ten years ago, the Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom published Superintelligence, a book exploring how superintelligent machines could be created and what the implications of such technology might be. One was that such a machine, if it were created, would be difficult to control and might even take over the world in order to achieve its goals (which in Bostrom's celebrated thought experiment was to make paperclips). The book was a big seller, triggering lively debates but also attracting a good deal of disagreement. Critics complained that it was based on a simplistic view of "intelligence", that it overestimated the likelihood of superintelligent machines emerging any time soon and that it failed to suggest credible solutions for the problems that it had raised. But it had the great merit of making people think about a possibility that had hitherto been confined to the remoter fringes of academia and sci-fi. Now, 10 years later, comes another shot at the same target.

Philosopher Nick Bostrom is surprisingly cheerful for someone who has spent so much time worrying about ways that humanity might destroy itself. In photographs he often looks deadly serious, perhaps appropriately haunted by the existential dangers roaming around his brain. When we talk over Zoom, he looks relaxed and is smiling. Bostrom has made it his life's work to ponder far-off technological advancement and existential risks to humanity. With the publication of his last book, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, in 2014, Bostrom drew public attention to what was then a fringe idea--that AI would advance to a point where it might turn against and delete humanity. To many in and outside of AI research the idea seemed fanciful, but influential figures including Elon Musk cited Bostrom's writing.

Two weeks ago it was quietly announced that the Future of Humanity Institute, the renowned multidisciplinary research centre in Oxford, no longer had a future. It shut down without warning on 16 April. Initially there was just a brief statement on its website stating it had closed and that its research may continue elsewhere within and outside the university. The institute, which was dedicated to studying existential risks to humanity, was founded in 2005 by the Swedish-born philosopher Nick Bostrom and quickly made a name for itself beyond academic circles – particularly in Silicon Valley, where a number of tech billionaires sang its praises and provided financial support. Bostrom is perhaps best known for his bestselling 2014 book Superintelligence, which warned of the existential dangers of artificial intelligence, but he also gained widespread recognition for his 2003 academic paper "Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?".

Oxford University this week shut down an academic institute run by one of Elon Musk's favorite philosophers. The Future of Humanity Institute, dedicated to the long-termism movement and other Silicon Valley-endorsed ideas such as effective altruism, closed this week after 19 years of operation. Musk had donated 1m to the FIH in 2015 through a sister organization to research the threat of artificial intelligence. He had also boosted the ideas of its leader for nearly a decade on X, formerly Twitter. The center was run by Nick Bostrom, a Swedish-born philosopher whose writings about the long-term threat of AI replacing humanity turned him into a celebrity figure among the tech elite and routinely landed him on lists of top global thinkers. OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman, Microsoft founder Bill Gates and Tesla chief Musk all wrote blurbs for his 2014 bestselling book Superintelligence.

A former interior minister, Tudorache is one of the most important players in European AI policy. He is one of the two lead negotiators of the AI Act in the European Parliament. The bill, the first sweeping AI law of its kind in the world, will enter into force this year. We first met two years ago, when Tudorache was appointed to his position as negotiator. But Tudorache's interest in AI started much earlier, in 2015.