The safety of troops in the very near future will rely on Artificial Intelligence-assisted tablets and small screens, networked to drones in the air that feed data back down to ground personnel equipped with information-rich HUD visors. "Robots are going to help humans in dangerous situations contain and control a region," said Dave Bossert, DARPA Program Manager and Senior Engineering Fellow at Raytheon. "Maintaining advantage, communicating, and understanding an area is as good as or better than being aggressive." In a recent interview Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work expanded on the idea of how AI will power robots in hazardous situations. The networked soldier, Bossert said, will rely heavily on custom-built Android tablets and several wearable devices.

We deal with the problem of how to extend a preference relation over a set X of "objects" to the set of all subsets of X. This problem has been carried out in the tradition of the literature on extending an order on a set to its power set with the objective to analyze the axiomatic structure of families of rankings over subsets. In particular, most of these approaches make use of axioms aimed to prevent any kind of interaction among the objects in X . In this paper, we apply coalitional games to study the problem of extending preferences over a finite set X to its power set 2 X . A coalitional game can be seen as a numerical representation of a preference extension on 2 X . . We focus on a particular class of extensions on 2 X . such that the ranking induced by the Shapley value of each coalitional game representing an extension in this class, coincides with the original preference on X . Some properties of Shapley extensions are discussed, with the objective to justify and contextualize the application of Shapley extensions to the problem of ranking sets of possibly interacting objects.We deal with the problem of how to extend a preference relation over a set X of "objects" to the set of all subsets of X . This problem has been carried out in the tradition of the literature on extending an order on a set to its power set with the objective to analyze the axiomatic structure of families of rankings over subsets. In particular, most of these approaches make use of axioms aimed to prevent any kind of interaction among the objects in X . In this paper, we apply coalitional games to study the problem of extending preferences over a finite set X to its power set 2 X . . A coalitional game can be seen as a numerical representation of a preference extension on 2 X . . We focus on a particular class of extensions on 2 X. such that the ranking induced by the Shapley value of each coalitional game representing an extension in this class, coincides with the original preference on X . Some properties of Shapley extensions are discussed, with the objective to justify and contextualize the application of Shapley extensions to the problem of ranking sets of possibly interacting objects.