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As artificial intelligence (AI) agents are deployed across economic domains, understanding their strategic behavior and market-level impact becomes critical. This paper puts forward a groundbreaking new framework that is the first to capture the real-world economic forces that shape agentic labor markets: adverse selection, moral hazard, and reputation dynamics. Our framework encapsulates three core capabilities that successful LLM-agents will need: \textbf{metacognition} (accurate self-assessment of skills), \textbf{competitive awareness} (modeling rivals and market dynamics), and \textbf{long-horizon strategic planning}. We illustrate our framework through a tractable simulated gig economy where agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) compete for jobs, develop skills, and adapt their strategies under competitive pressure. Our simulations illustrate how LLM agents explicitly prompted with reasoning capabilities learn to strategically self-improve and demonstrate superior adaptability to changing market conditions. At the market level, our simulations reproduce classic macroeconomic phenomena found in human labor markets, while controlled experiments reveal potential AI-driven economic trends, such as rapid monopolization and systemic price deflation. This work provides a foundation to further explore the economic properties of AI-driven labour markets, and a conceptual framework to study the strategic reasoning capabilities in agents competing in the emerging economy.

Online advertising platforms use automated auctions to connect advertisers with potential customers, requiring effective bidding strategies to maximize profits. Accurate ad impact estimation requires considering three key factors: delayed and long-term effects, cumulative ad impacts such as reinforcement or fatigue, and customer heterogeneity. However, these effects are often not jointly addressed in previous studies. To capture these factors, we model ad bidding as a Contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP) with delayed Poisson rewards. For efficient estimation, we propose a two-stage maximum likelihood estimator combined with data-splitting strategies, ensuring controlled estimation error based on the first-stage estimator's (in)accuracy. Building on this, we design a reinforcement learning algorithm to derive efficient personalized bidding strategies. This approach achieves a near-optimal regret bound of $\tilde{O}{(dH^2\sqrt{T})}$, where $d$ is the contextual dimension, $H$ is the number of rounds, and $T$ is the number of customers. Our theoretical findings are validated by simulation experiments.

The E-commerce advertising platforms typically sell commercial traffic through either second-price auction (SPA) or first-price auction (FPA). SPA was historically prevalent due to its dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) for bidders with quasi-linear utilities, especially when budgets are not a binding constraint, while FPA has gained more prominence for offering higher revenue potential to publishers and avoiding the possibility for discriminatory treatment in personalized reserve prices. Meanwhile, on the demand side, advertisers are increasingly adopting platform-wide marketing solutions akin to QuanZhanTui, shifting from spending budgets solely on commercial traffic to bidding on the entire traffic for the purpose of maximizing overall sales. For automated bidding systems, such a trend poses a critical challenge: determining optimal strategies across heterogeneous auction channels to fulfill diverse advertiser objectives, such as maximizing return (MaxReturn) or meeting target return on ad spend (TargetROAS). To overcome this challenge, this work makes two key contributions. First, we derive an efficient solution for optimal bidding under FPA channels, which takes into account the presence of organic traffic - traffic can be won for free. Second, we introduce a marginal cost alignment (MCA) strategy that provably secures bidding efficiency across heterogeneous auction mechanisms. To validate performance of our developed framework, we conduct comprehensive offline experiments on public datasets and large-scale online A/B testing, which demonstrate consistent improvements over existing methods.

Auto-bidding is central to computational advertising, achieving notable commercial success by optimizing advertisers' bids within economic constraints. Recently, large generative models show potential to revolutionize auto-bidding by generating bids that could flexibly adapt to complex, competitive environments. Among them, diffusers stand out for their ability to address sparse-reward challenges by focusing on trajectory-level accumulated rewards, as well as their explainable capability, i.e., planning a future trajectory of states and executing bids accordingly. However, diffusers struggle with generation uncertainty, particularly regarding dynamic legitimacy between adjacent states, which can lead to poor bids and further cause significant loss of ad impression opportunities when competing with other advertisers in a highly competitive auction environment. To address it, we propose a Causal auto-Bidding method based on a Diffusion completer-aligner framework, termed CBD. Firstly, we augment the diffusion training process with an extra random variable t, where the model observes t-length historical sequences with the goal of completing the remaining sequence, thereby enhancing the generated sequences' dynamic legitimacy. Then, we employ a trajectory-level return model to refine the generated trajectories, aligning more closely with advertisers' objectives. Experimental results across diverse settings demonstrate that our approach not only achieves superior performance on large-scale auto-bidding benchmarks, such as a 29.9% improvement in conversion value in the challenging sparse-reward auction setting, but also delivers significant improvements on the Kuaishou online advertising platform, including a 2.0% increase in target cost.