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 balasubramaniam


Invariant-Feature Subspace Recovery: A New Class of Provable Domain Generalization Algorithms

Wang, Haoxiang, Balasubramaniam, Gargi, Si, Haozhe, Li, Bo, Zhao, Han

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Domain generalization asks for models trained over a set of training environments to generalize well in unseen test environments. Recently, a series of algorithms such as Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM) have been proposed for domain generalization. However, Rosenfeld et al. (2021) shows that in a simple linear data model, even if non-convexity issues are ignored, IRM and its extensions cannot generalize to unseen environments with less than $d_s+1$ training environments, where $d_s$ is the dimension of the spurious-feature subspace. In this work, we propose Invariant-feature Subspace Recovery (ISR): a new class of algorithms to achieve provable domain generalization across the settings of classification and regression problems. First, in the binary classification setup of Rosenfeld et al. (2021), we show that our first algorithm, ISR-Mean, can identify the subspace spanned by invariant features from the first-order moments of the class-conditional distributions, and achieve provable domain generalization with $d_s+1$ training environments. Our second algorithm, ISR-Cov, further reduces the required number of training environments to $O(1)$ using the information of second-order moments. Notably, unlike IRM, our algorithms bypass non-convexity issues and enjoy global convergence guarantees. Next, we extend ISR-Mean to the more general setting of multi-class classification and propose ISR-Multiclass, which leverages class information and provably recovers the invariant-feature subspace with $\lceil d_s/k\rceil+1$ training environments for $k$-class classification. Finally, for regression problems, we propose ISR-Regression that can identify the invariant-feature subspace with $d_s+1$ training environments. Empirically, we demonstrate the superior performance of our ISRs on synthetic benchmarks. Further, ISR can be used as post-processing methods for feature extractors such as neural nets.


Realizing Molecular Machine Learning through Communications for Biological AI: Future Directions and Challenges

Balasubramaniam, Sasitharan, Somathilaka, Samitha, Sun, Sehee, Ratwatte, Adrian, Pierobon, Massimiliano

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are weaving their way into the fabric of society, where they are playing a crucial role in numerous facets of our lives. As we witness the increased deployment of AI and ML in various types of devices, we benefit from their use into energy-efficient algorithms for low powered devices. In this paper, we investigate a scale and medium that is far smaller than conventional devices as we move towards molecular systems that can be utilized to perform machine learning functions, i.e., Molecular Machine Learning (MML). Fundamental to the operation of MML is the transport, processing, and interpretation of information propagated by molecules through chemical reactions. We begin by reviewing the current approaches that have been developed for MML, before we move towards potential new directions that rely on gene regulatory networks inside biological organisms as well as their population interactions to create neural networks. We then investigate mechanisms for training machine learning structures in biological cells based on calcium signaling and demonstrate their application to build an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC). Lastly, we look at potential future directions as well as challenges that this area could solve.


AI can detect DNA that unlocks backdoors in lab software

#artificialintelligence

A backdoor hidden in lab software that is activated when fed a specially crafted digital DNA sample. Typically, this backdoor would be introduced in a supply-chain attack, as we saw with the compromised SolarWinds monitoring tools. When the lab analysis software processes a digital sample of genetic material with the trigger encoded, the backdoor in the application activates: the trigger could include an IP address and network port to covertly connect to, or other instructions to carry out, allowing spies to snoop on and interfere with the DNA processing pipeline. It could be used to infiltrate national health institutions, research organizations, and healthcare companies, because few have recognized the potential of biological matter as the carrier or trigger of malware. Just as you can use DNA in living bacteria to hold information, this storage can be weaponized against applications processing that data.