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The advancement of Machine Learning has enabled the widespread deployment of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) applications. However, the untrustworthy nature of third-party ML services poses backdoor threats. Existing defenses in MLaaS are limited by their reliance on training samples or white-box model analysis, highlighting the need for a black-box backdoor purification method. In our paper, we attempt to use diffusion models for purification by introducing noise in a forward diffusion process to destroy backdoors and recover clean samples through a reverse generative process. However, since a higher noise also destroys the semantics of the original samples, it still results in a low restoration performance.

The rapid proliferation of open-source language models significantly increases the risks of downstream backdoor attacks. These backdoors can introduce dangerous behaviours during model deployment and can evade detection by conventional cybersecurity monitoring systems. In this paper, we introduce a novel class of backdoors in transformer models, that, in contrast to prior art, are unelicitable in nature. Unelicitability prevents the defender from triggering the backdoor, making it impossible to properly evaluate ahead of deployment even if given full white-box access and using automated techniques, such as red-teaming or certain formal verification methods. We show that our novel construction is not only unelicitable thanks to using cryptographic techniques, but also has favourable robustness properties.We confirm these properties in empirical investigations, and provide evidence that our backdoors can withstand state-of-the-art mitigation strategies. Additionally, we expand on previous work by showing that our universal backdoors, while not completely undetectable in white-box settings, can be harder to detect than some existing designs. By demonstrating the feasibility of seamlessly integrating backdoors into transformer models, this paper fundamentally questions the efficacy of pre-deployment detection strategies.

As ML models become increasingly complex and integral to high-stakes domains such as finance and healthcare, they also become more susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks. We investigate the threat posed by undetectable backdoors, as defined in Goldwasser et al. [2022], in models developed by insidious external expert firms. When such backdoors exist, they allow the designer of the model to sell information on how to slightly perturb their input to change the outcome of the model. We develop a general strategy to plant backdoors to obfuscated neural networks, that satisfy the security properties of the celebrated notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. Applying obfuscation before releasing neural networks is a strategy that is well motivated to protect sensitive information of the external expert firm. Our method to plant backdoors ensures that even if the weights and architecture of the obfuscated model are accessible, the existence ofthe backdoor is still undetectable. Finally, we introduce the notion of undetectable backdoors to language models and extend our neural network backdoor attacks to such models based on the existence of steganographic functions.

In addition, we introduce a reversible mapping to determine the defensive target label.

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We also define the clean reversed conditional transition as Eq. Thus, a( t) and b (t) can be derived as Eq. The KL-divergence loss of the reversed transition can be simplified as Eq. Thus, we can finally write down the clean loss function Eq. (9) with reparametrization This section will further extend the derivation of the clean diffusion models in Appendix B.1 and Recall the definition of the backdoor reversed conditional transition in Eq. (10). We mark the coefficients of the r as red.

Diffusion Models (DMs) are state-of-the-art generative models that learn a reversible corruption process from iterative noise addition and denoising.