In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities.

A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.

We examine the surveying problem, where we attempt to predict how a target user is likely to respond to questions by iteratively querying that user, collaboratively based on the responses of a sample set of users. We focus on an active learning approach, where the next question we select to ask the user depends on their responses to the previous questions. We propose a method for solving the problem based on a Bayesian dimensionality reduction technique. We empirically evaluate our method, contrasting it to benchmark approaches based on augmented linear regression, and show that it achieves much better predictive performance, and is much more robust when there is missing data.

Ric Edelman is one the top financial advisors in the US. His firm, Edelman Financial Services, has 41 offices across the country. And he thinks, all things constant, most financial advisors as we've known them won't be around much longer. At Exponential Finance, Edelman said, "I firmly believe that in the next ten years, half of all the financial advisors in this country will be gone." Edelman spoke on a panel with fellow advisor, Bill Bachrach, chairman and CEO of Bachrach & Associates. Technology, they said, doesn't spell the end of financial advisors, but it does mean they'll need to adapt significantly if they're to survive.

We demonstrate a system for predicting gaming related properties from Twitter accounts. Our system predicts various traits of users based on the tweets publicly available in their profiles. Such inferred traits include degrees of tech-savviness and knowledge on computer games, actual gaming performance, preferred platform, degree of originality, humor and influence on others. Our system is based on machine learning models trained on crowd-sourced data. It allows people to select Twitter accounts of their fellow gamers, examine the trait predictions made by our system, and the main drivers of these predictions. We present empirical results on the performance of our system based on its accuracy on our crowd-sourced dataset.

We investigate synergy, or lack thereof, between agents in cooperative games, building on the popular notion of Shapley value. We think of a pair of agents as synergistic (resp., antagonistic) if the Shapley value of one agent when the other agent participates in a joint effort is higher (resp. lower) than when the other agent does not participate. Our main theoretical result is that any graph specifying synergistic and antagonistic pairs can arise even from a restricted class of cooperative games. We also study the computational complexity of determining whether a given pair of agents is synergistic. Finally, we use the concepts developed in the paper to uncover the structure of synergies in two real-world organizations, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.

We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a cooperative game called the vertex Connectivity Game (CG). In this game, each agent owns a vertex, and controls all the edges going to and from that vertex. A coalition of agents wins if it fully connects a certain subset of vertices in the graph, called the primary vertices. Power indices measure an agent's ability to affect the outcome of the game. We show that in our domain, such indices can be used to both determine the fair share of the revenues an agent is entitled to, and identify significant possible points of failure affecting the reliability of communication in the network. We show that in general graphs, calculating the Shapley and Banzhaf power indices is #P-complete, but suggest a polynomial algorithm for calculating them in trees. We also investigate finding stable payoff divisions of the revenues in CGs, captured by the game theoretic solution of the core, and its relaxations, the epsilon-core and least core. We show a polynomial algorithm for computing the core of a CG, but show that testing whether an imputation is in the epsilon-core is coNP-complete. Finally, we show that for trees, it is possible to test for epsilon-core imputations in polynomial time.

Human control of vehicle swarms faces a dilemma: an operator must be able to exercise precise control over how a mission is executed, but controlling individual vehicles is not scalable. The Proto spatial computing lan- guage offers an intermediate representation, where the motion of a swarm is specified as a vector field, which is then approximated by the movement of individual members (Bachrach, Beal, and McLurkin 2010). I propose that this can be exploited to build a “tactical command” model of swarm control, whereby human “officers” dynamically decompose a swarm into units and task those units to carry out geometric and topological maneuvers under the constraints imposed by the platform. This abstraction may also allow situation awareness interfaces for individual agents to be extended to apply to swarm units.

Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player's power in such games is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the most prominent among which are the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.In this paper, we investigate by how much a player can change his power, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, by means of a false-name manipulation, i.e., splitting his weight among two or more identities. For both indices, we provide upper and lower bounds on the effect of weight-splitting. We then show that checking whether a beneficial split exists is NP-hard, and discuss efficient algorithms for restricted cases of this problem, as well as randomized algorithms for the general case. We also provide an experimental evaluation of these algorithms. Finally, we examine related forms of manipulative behavior, such as annexation, where a player subsumes other players, or merging, where several players unite into one. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits on their effects. For the Banzhaf index, we describe a new paradox, which we term the Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox.

The proof given here shows that for any finite, discrete transfer function used by the units of an RCC network, there are finite-state automata (FSA) that the network cannot model, no matter how many units are used. The proof also applies to continuous transfer functions with a finite number of fixed-points, such as sigmoid and radial-basis functions.