baar
A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory
Goldstein, Simon, Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico
It is generally assumed that existing artificial systems are not phenomenally conscious, and that the construction of phenomenally conscious artificial systems would require significant technological progress if it is possible at all. We challenge this assumption by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) - a leading scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness - is correct, then instances of one widely implemented AI architecture, the artificial language agent, might easily be made phenomenally conscious if they are not already. Along the way, we articulate an explicit methodology for thinking about how to apply scientific theories of consciousness to artificial systems and employ this methodology to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness according to GWT.
Viewpoint: A Theoretical Computer Science Perspective on Consciousness and Artificial General Intelligence
We have defined the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) for the purpose of investigating a Theoretical Computer Science (TCS) approach to consciousness. For this, we have hewn to the TCS demand for simplicity and understandability. The CTM is consequently and intentionally a simple machine. It is not a model of the brain, though its design has greatly benefited - and continues to benefit - from neuroscience and psychology. The CTM is a model of and for consciousness. Although it is developed to understand consciousness, the CTM offers a thoughtful and novel guide to the creation of an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). For example, the CTM has an enormous number of powerful processors, some with specialized expertise, others unspecialized but poised to develop an expertise. For whatever problem must be dealt with, the CTM has an excellent way to utilize those processors that have the required knowledge, ability, and time to work on the problem, even if it is not aware of which ones these may be.
Consciousness and Automated Reasoning
Barthelmeß, Ulrike, Furbach, Ulrich, Schon, Claudia
This paper aims at demonstrating how a first-order logic reasoning system in combination with a large knowledge base can be understood as an artificial consciousness system. For this we review some aspects from the area of philosophy of mind and in particular Baars' Global Workspace Theory. This will be applied to the reasoning system Hyper with ConceptNet as a knowledge base. Finally we demonstrate that such a system is very well able to do conscious mind wandering.
Is Consciousness Computationally Functional?
Baars, Bernard (The Neurosciences Institute)
Consciousness is a major feature of mammalian nervous significant "news" is demanding to be heard by the systems. Recent evidence indicates it may extend from established powers in the society of mind. The only known mammals to birds and even cephalopods (Edelman & Seth, function of slow-wave sleep, for example, is to consolidate 2009). Since all major biological adaptations are episodic memories (i.e., memories of conscious events that functional, or sequelae of biofunctions, and since brains took place during the conscious period before sleep). They be to "reapportion" cortical functions based on the are based on biochemistry and eukaryotic cells, which previous day's experiences, consistent with the last two impose narrow limits on such features as the peak rate of decades of work on cortical plasticity.